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Preface 
 
At the onset of the 21st century, we are searching for reliable and sustainable energy 
sources that have a potential to support growing economies developing at accelerated 
growth rates, technology advances improving quality of life and becoming available to 
larger and larger populations. We have to make sure that this continuous quest for 
prosperity does not backfire via catastrophic irreversible climate changes, and 
depleted or limited resources that may challenge very existence of future generations. 
We are at the point in our history when we have to make sure that our growth is 
sustainable. New energy sources and systems must be inherently safe and 
environmentally benign. 
The quest for robust sustainable energy supplies meeting the above constraints leads 
us to the nuclear power technology. Today’s nuclear reactors are safe and highly 
efficient energy systems that offer electricity and a multitude of co-generation energy 
products ranging from potable water to heat for industrial applications. Although it is 
not inherently sustainable as solar power, nuclear technology is sustainable by design. 
Advanced nuclear energy systems are capable to breed new fuel, take care of nuclear 
waste and operate in an inherently safe way with minimized environmental effects. 
Catastrophic earthquake and tsunami events in Japan resulted in the nuclear accident 
that forced us to rethink our approach to nuclear safety, requirements and facilitated 
growing interests in designs, which can withstand natural disasters and avoid 
catastrophic consequences. 
This book is one in a series of books on nuclear power published by InTech. It consists 
of ten chapters on system simulations and operational aspects: 
• Simulation and Simulators used for Nuclear Power Generation, 
• Safety Studies and General Simulations of Research Reactors Using Nuclear 
Codes, 
• Development of an Appendix K Version of RELAP5-3D and Associated 
Deterministic-Realistic Hybrid Methodology for LOCA Licensing Analysis, 
• Analysis of Error Rropagation Between Software Processes, 
• Thermal-hydraulic Analysis in Support of Plant Operation, 
• A Literature Survey of Neutronic and Thermal-Hydraulics Codes for 
Investigating Reactor Core Parameters; Artificial Neural Networks as the VVER-
1000 Core Predictor, 
X      Preface 
 
• Recent Trends in Mathematical Modeling & Simulation of Fission Product 
Transport from Fuel to Primary Coolant of PWRs, 
• Thermal-hydraulic Simulations of Supercritical-water-cooled Reactors, 
• Non-linear Design Evaluation of Class 1-3 Nuclear Power Piping, 
• The Method of Text-mining Approach Towards Risk Communication in 
Environmental Science. 
 
Our book does not aim at a complete coverage or a broad range. Instead, the included 
chapters shine light at existing challenges, solutions and approaches. Authors hope to 
share ideas and findings so that new ideas and directions can potentially be developed 
focusing on operational characteristics of nuclear power plants. The consistent thread 
throughout all chapters is the “system-thinking” approach synthesizing provided 
information and ideas. 
The book targets everyone with interests in system simulations and nuclear power 
operational aspects as its potential readership groups - students, researchers and 
practitioners. The idea is to facilitate intellectual cross-fertilization between field 
experts and non-field experts taking advantage of methods and tools developed by 
both groups. The book will hopefully inspire future research and development efforts, 
innovation by stimulating ideas.  
We hope our readers will enjoy the book and will find it both interesting and useful. 
 
Pavel V. Tsvetkov 
Department of Nuclear Engineering 
Texas A&M University 
United States of America 
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Simulation and Simulators for  
Nuclear Power Generation 
Janos Sebestyen Janosy 
MTA KFKI Atomic Energy Research Institute 
Hungary 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter deals with simulation, a very powerful tool in designing, constructing and 
operating nuclear power generating facilities. There are very different types of power plants, 
and the examples mentioned in this chapter originate from experience with water cooled 
and water moderated thermal reactors, based on fission of uranium-235. Nevertheless, the 
methodological achievements in simulation mentioned below can definitely be used not 
only for this particular type of nuclear power generating reactor. 
Simulation means: investigation of processes in the time domain. We can calculate the 
characteristics and properties of different systems, e.g. we can design a bridge over a river, 
but if we calculate how it would respond to a thunderstorm with high winds, its movement 
can or can not evolve after a certain time into destructive oscillation – this type of 
calculations are called simulation. 
For simple systems we probably can reach an analytical solution to show that a given 
system is damped enough to stay stable without oscillation even in very different 
circumstances. Simulation steps in when the systems are too sophisticated to reach any 
analytical solution. Unfortunately, if we want to reach correct and accurate results we 
usually end up with very sophisticated and non-linear system description. This unavoidable 
leads us to simulation. 
According to some authors, probably the last engineering achievement made completely 
without simulation was the Empire State Building. The Boeing 777 was mentioned as the 
first construction the design of which was completely unthinkable without simulation. 
(Janosy, 2003) 
We need simulation if: 
• The processes are too sophisticated and they have too many physical states just to think 
about everything 
• It is too expensive and/or dangerous to build a prototype just for testing – or even if we 
have a prototype, we are very limited in testing and checking it under very different 
circumstances due to the costs and unavoidable dangers 
• We want to check properties and compare different solutions under extreme conditions. 
All these conditions are present in designing, constructing or operating a nuclear power 
generating system (Janosy, 2007 November). 
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The process of simulation can be accomplished with or without human interaction. Earlier 
the common way of doing it was to write a simulation program, to prepare input data sets, 
run the program on a powerful computer system and wait for the results. Most of the 
analyses of accident scenarios are being done this way even nowadays. 
We already know for long time that we can save significant time and effort if we can 
participate in the process of simulation. We should watch the results from the very beginning, 
and we should have means to interact with the process, to change inputs and influence this 
way the sequence of the events. If our computer is capable to do that, then we have a simulator. 
2. Modeling and simulation 
It is easy to understand that no simulation can be done without prior modeling. Modeling 
nowadays means exceptionally mathematical modeling. We have to study the processes in 
question, and try to find the proper formalism to describe them correctly with mathematical 
expressions and tools. 
Even nowadays, in the era of cheap and abundant computational power it is essential to 
differentiate between dominant and unimportant processes. Even if we can afford extremely 
fast computers, not eliminating the unimportant processes and modeling everything we can 
think of, leads to enormous problems during verification and validation of our models. 
2.1 Types of mathematical models 
Continuous processes can be described by set of differential equations. If only the time 
dependence is important, we construct a set of ODEs (Ordinary Differential Equations), 
where all derivatives are taken only by time. Sometimes these models are called as 'point 
models' because they have no space dependence; they depend only upon the time. If all the 
derivatives can be described by separate functions, we get the following (rather simple) 
form: 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
( , ,... , , ,... , ); 1,...
( , ,... , , ,... , ); 1,...
i
i n k
j j n k
dy f y y y p p p t i n
dt
z g y y y p p p t j l
= =
= =
 
where y: the state variables; p: the input; z: the output variables 
Sometimes these functions f and g cannot be separated so nicely and easily, sometimes we 
have to iterate, etc. Nevertheless, practically all numerical solution methods need to get the 
values of all derivatives explicitly.  
If we have to take into account the space dependence as well, we get a set of PDEs, (Partial 
Differential Equations). Presuming again that we can define separate functions for each 
derivative, we get: 
, 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
( , ,... , , ,... , , ,... , ); 1,... , 1,...
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where y: the state variables; p: the input; z: the output variables; x: the space coordinates. 
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2.2 Discretisation in time and space 
If we want to solve our equations numerically, we have to discretise them by time and 
space. Discretisation in time means that instead of the continuous solution for each state 
variable and each output we get time series, e.g. discrete values valid only at given time 
instances. The time difference between two consecutive time values is called as 'time step of 
integration'. Instead of time derivative the differences of the consecutive values of the state 
variables are used, divided by the time step. 
The same is true for space discretisation, frequently called as nodalisation. Instead of 
continuous functions we get discrete time series of state variables for each node, having 
finite volume and finite distance between them. (The same way, instead of the space 
derivatives this finite distance is used in the equations to divide the difference of the state 
variables in two neighboring nodes.)  
The stability and accuracy of the numerical solution highly depends upon the time step of 
the integration and of the space distance of the nodalisation. It is quite obvious that the 
smaller is the time step, the smaller are the nodalisation distances and the sizes of the nodes, 
the better is the stability and accuracy of the solution. On the other hand, making the time 
step and the nodalisation grid smaller increases the number of the state variables and the 
necessary computer power. 
Sometimes physical processes happening at the same time and space are divided and solved 
separately. Usually the neutron-physical processes of heat generation and thermo-hydraulic 
processes of the heat removal are solved by two separate programs. The first calculates the 
heat to be removed from the core of the reactor, the second the temperatures of coolant and 
fuel as result of the cooling process. The time step of the data exchange between these two 
simulation programs should be small enough not to generate remarkable errors as a 
consequence of this separation. 
There are advanced mathematical methods to solve a system of differential equations. 
Remarkable computer resources can be spared using so called multistep methods, that means 
the next value of a variable is calculated not only using the previous one, but a sequence of 
previous values. Unfortunately these multistep methods cannot be used if discrete events 
happen between two acts of solution (e.g. rod drop or valve closure). These events are 
causing discontinuities in the high-order derivatives, which are usually not allowed if using 
multistep methods. 
Logical functions and event sequences usually are not simulated by differential equations, 
but by separate programs dedicated to this purpose. Protections, interlocks and other 
similar functions of the process instrumentation are modeled this way. 
2.3 Model verification and validation 
After the modeling has been finished and before any simulation is started, we have to verify 
and validate our simulation system. 
In our case verification means, that our model and the numerical solution system is working 
according our intentions. The model equations are correct and free from programming 
errors, and the same is true for the numerical solving programs. The solution is stable and 
accurate. 
This can be verified using so called benchmark tests. These are well-known experimental 
results, measured on different experimental facilities. They are usually much smaller than a 
nuclear power generating unit, but specially tailored to demonstrate sophisticated physical 
phenomena which are not allowed to test on a real plant - e.g. pipe break causing the 
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coolant to flow out. Usually we have a two-phase outflow (steam and water) coming with 
the speed of the sound. 
Sometimes it is not necessary to develop sophisticated model programs with elaborated 
numerical solving schemas. For example, to simulate thermo-hydraulic processes inside the 
primary circuit of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) we can use the RELAP program 
(developed in the USA), the ATHLET code (developed in Germany) or the CATHARE code 
(developed in France). Several millions of dollars and hundreds of man-years have been 
spent to develop and validate them, against great many experiments. 
Even using well-validated and certified codes we cannot omit the validation process. During 
validation we have to show that the input data made for these codes correctly describes the 
nuclear power generating unit in question. The nodalisation corresponds to the actual 
geometry of our plant and it is prepared according to the rules prescribed in the user 
manual to the given code. All masses, heat exchange surfaces, heat capacities, heat 
conductance etc. are calculated for each node correctly. Some simple transients which 
happens sometimes on the plant and are not regarded as accident (e.g. pump trips, turbine 
trips, network frequency control acts etc., usually called as AOO - anticipated operational 
occurrences) are calculated with the code and compared with the measurements in order to 
show, that the current and parameterized for the given plant model is valid. 
3. Classification of simulators 
The simulation of the desired process can go faster or slower than the real time, even both 
can happen during one act of simulation. The beginning of an accident or even a transient 
may require more computational power than the (asymptotic) end of it. If we do not care the 
relation between the simulated time and the real time too much, then we have an engineering 
simulator. The only thing what differs it from an off-line simulation program is the 
interactivity provided by the man-machine interface to the simulation code. 
Sometimes it may happen that we want to test a ready-made controller hardware before putting 
it into operation on the real plant, or we want to teach people how different scenarios 
should be handled in the control room. In this case we should have a simulator which always 
runs in real time. (Controllers or people cannot tolerate a simulator running faster or slower 
than the real process.) This way we get a development simulator or training simulator. 
The best way to teach people is to have a replica control room for interaction, and therefore a 
replica simulator. Only these simulators can provide the so called “hand-on” training, 
showing an environment very similar to that on the real nuclear power plant. Moreover, if 
the operations are not limited only to some panels in this control room but all switches, 
meters and annunciators of the real control room are handed correctly by the simulator, 
then we have the king of all simulators – the full-scope replica training simulator. 
The simulation time step of the modern training simulators is around 0.1...0.2 seconds. For 
the processes shown in the control room practically we do not need smaller ones. Of course, 
there are some processes faster than that but usually they cannot be presented to the 
operators in the real control room, either. Several decades ago because of the slower 
computers the time step was chosen around 1 second, and this was not too bad, either.  
However, the man-machine interface between the simulator and the operator is a different 
question. If an analogue meter moves only once per second it is very unrealistic and 
disturbing for the operator. The same is true for the actuator. Pushbuttons sensed only once 
per second are not very realistic but control actions performed in the control room are even 
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worse. It is impossible to set a valve or control rod to an exact position if the time resolution 
of these inputs is only one second or even 0.2 second. It can happen that the new valve 
position is calculated only once per second but the time of action (how long a pushbutton 
has been pushed) must be measured and presented to the model programs with much 
greater accuracy. 
Therefore the scanning frequency of the control room must be not slower than once per 
50 msec or once per 100 msec. Analogue values shown on the meters should be interpolated 
with this frequency and each operation in the control room - pushing or releasing switches, 
etc. - should be accomplished with a time stamp of this resolution. 
3.1 The absolute necessity of the training simulators 
It is quite understandable, that we need simulator training if the device to be learned  
• is very expensive to build and operate 
• can lead to dangerous and even lethal consequences if operated erroneously.  
Everybody understands easily that e.g. jet pilots should be trained on simulators. In case of 
nuclear power we have two more reasons to do so: 
• Jet pilots are taking off and landing daily. Probably they can maintain their knowledge 
having this kind of practice. On the other hand, nuclear power plants are started and 
shut down for re-fueling normally once per year. During the whole year practically they 
are operating on the maximal possible power. The knowledge and the preparedness of 
the operators to deal with any situation may be kept on necessary level only with 
regular simulator training. 
• Since the Chernobyl accident emerged from a not-properly-designed-and-executed 
experiment, it is practically impossible to get authorization to make experiments on an 
existing nuclear power plant. New ideas, new control and protection systems, new 
types of technological units are required to be tested thoroughly on development 
simulators. If they have man-machine interface consequences, then the required 
simulators should be replica – even better: full-scope replica simulators. 
These considerations increase significantly the importance of simulators in the nuclear 
power generating industries. 
3.2 Simulation in design and authorization 
Nowadays it is more difficult to get the approval of the authorities for constructing a new 
nuclear power plant than to accomplish the construction itself. The design and the 
authorization are “handshaking” processes with many stages. Not going into detail, during 
these processes the so called Safety Report has to be worked out, too. Part of this report deals 
with different possible scenarios. Some definitions of basic importance: 
The design basis accident is defined as follows: 
A postulated accident that a nuclear facility must be designed and built to withstand 
without loss to the systems, structures, and components necessary to ensure public health 
and safety. 
The beyond design basis accident is defined as follows: 
This term is used as a technical way to discuss accident sequences that are possible but were 
not fully considered in the design process because they were judged to be too unlikely. (In 
that sense, they are considered beyond the scope of design basis accident that a nuclear 
facility must be designed and built to withstand.) As the regulatory process strives to be as 
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thorough as possible, "beyond design-basis" accident sequences are analyzed to fully 
understand the capability of a design. 
Naturally, all these accidents, transients and scenarios are evaluated and studied by means 
of simulation programs. These programs are being developed by few nations only (USA, 
Russia, Germany, and France) because the development and the verification is a rather 
expensive and lengthy process: not every country can afford it and on the other hand, it is 
not necessary to do so, too. These programs are usually developed for a given reactor type 
and can be used for a certain family of nuclear power plants. Usually there are no 
restrictions in participating in the development and in the usage of these simulation 
programs. It is done on the basis of bilateral agreements. 
Practically there are three phases of the usage of these programs: 
• Development of the simulation package itself, verification and validation using different 
benchmark test results 
• Model construction for the simulation package, using design data of the nuclear power 
plant in question; verification and validation of the constructed models using data 
available from similar nuclear power plants 
• Generating different accident and transient scenarios for the safety report using the “worst 
case” philosophy in handling of the uncertainties. 
4. Simulators for training and development 
It is common for these simulators that - dealing with people and real equipment under test  
- they should be running in real time. 
4.1 Model programs and data storage requirements 
First it has to be defined, what are the basic requirements to the model programs and the 
data storage facilities of the training simulator. 
The simulator programs are started together with the whole training simulator. During the 
initialization phase it is allowed to set up different data tables etc., even reading files. After 
initialization the programs of the mathematical models are waiting for the command of the 
main control program of the simulator, the real-time executive.  
All state variables defining the current state of the model - and therefore the state of the 
simulated power plant - should be located in the real-time data base (see Fig. 1). This 'data 
base' is usually just a manageable piece of a shared memory. The exact (binary) copy of this 
piece of memory can be used as a fully defined snapshot of the state. 
After getting the proper command from the real-time executable the model programs 
advance one time step and based on the previous state (the results of the previous step) they 
calculate the state of the plant in the next step. Meanwhile, the actions of the operators in the 
Control room are scanned by the man-machine interface (MMI programs) asynchronously 
with a much shorter time step. The actions are stored in the I/O data base and are used by 
the model programs. 
If the time step is short enough (e.g. 0.2 sec or less) then the model programs can use only 
one copy of the state variables. Before the actual step it contains data belonging to the last 
step. During the execution of the model programs the state variables are calculated for the 
next step one by one, and after the execution they all belong to the next step. Frankly 
speaking, it is not exactly correct that some model programs should use data form the 
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previous and the next step simultaneously, but if the time step is small enough - and it is - 
then this fact cannot cause big errors. 
 
State variables:
results of the
previous step
State variables:
describing the
actual state
Binary copy
to hard disk:
snapshot
Programs of
mathematical
models
I/O Data
base
MM Interface
programs e.g.
Control Room
interface
MMI
devices
(meters,
actuators)
Simulator programs
The Real-Time Data base
 
Fig. 1. Simulator programs and data storage 
 
Control Room Interface
Operators
Archive
FREEZE
REPLAYRUN
Plots ,
Logs
Load Initial 
Conditions , 
Backtracks
Snapshots
Log of 
Actions
EXIT
 
Fig. 2. States of the training simulator 
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If we decide to use this approach - having only one copy of state variables in the memory; it 
is quite common in simulators - then we have to consider not to allow access to these state 
variables until the actual act of integration is not finished. Accessing the state variables any 
time means that other programs may fetch values not belonging to the same time instance. 
For analogue values it is not a big problem, but solving logical circuitry it can lead to 
confusion and incorrectness. 
The different states of the simulator are presented on Fig. 2. Black arrows are state 
transitions, white arrows symbolize data flow. 
After starting up the simulator and all related programs (from the EXIT state) we reach the 
FREEZE state. All programs are able to run, but practically neither of them is actually 
running. 
During the FREEZE state we are able to initialize the simulator, either loading in a saved 
Initial Condition, or a previously saved snapshot (loading it is often called backtracking).  
Adjusting switches in the Control room to the actual loaded state may become necessary; it 
is done using the Control room set-up report made by the CR I/O system. 
From the FREEZE state we can move to the RUN state. 
The model programs calculate cyclically the actual state every time step and all the analogue 
meters and annunciators of the Control room are driven accordingly. All the operations of 
the staff are scanned in and stored in the Log of actions, and are added to the Archive, 
together with the history of the most important parameters - there are several hundreds of 
them. After the simulation session is finished, different logs and plots can be generated for 
evaluation of the trainees. 
During the simulation snapshots are taken regularly, or at any instant if the Instructor of the 
actual simulation session commands to do so. Any time the instructor can stop the 
simulation and return to the FREEZE state. During FREEZE state the parameters are 
displayed in the Control room, and the situation can be analyzed. No operations can be 
performed, though. 
From the FREEZE state we can re-play how the operations happened earlier in the control 
room. Backtracking using a snapshot, made earlier, we can enter the REPLAY state. During 
the REPLAY state all the simulation is performed and the control room is driven as during 
the RUN state, with the exception that no actions are accepted from the operators.  
All operations are taken from the Log of actions, with their time stamps together, therefore 
the trainees are able to follow what and how it happened earlier in the Control room. 
Any time the REPLAY can be stopped, the state turns to the FREEZE state, and real 
operations can commence entering the RUN state again. This is a very useful ability for the 
Instructor, to go back in time, to show when and how a mistake was done, what are the 
consequences and how it should be continued in a correct way. 
4.2 Architecture of the simulators 
Practically the full-scope replica simulator consists of the following parts: 
• Computer system of the simulator. It incorporates the model programs, the simulation 
control programs, the loggers, plotters, the archive etc. necessary to conduct a 
simulation session. 
• Control room and interface devices - a replica of the real control room equipped with all 
meters, switches, pushbuttons, screens, memo-schema etc. and the hardware/software 
devices (the MMI, the man-machine interface) enabling the computer system of the 
simulator to handle them quickly and correctly. 
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• Instrumentation and control devices taken from the real power plant. It is very 
advantageous if we can take over the plant computer system, the core surveillance 
system and other systems directly from the plant.  
• The Instructor's system, the basic tool of the Instructors to control the simulation 
session. The Instructor's system is usually hidden from the trainees, but sometimes, 
when the Instructor is present in the Control room, he/she can use a remote control 
unit to activate different pre-programmed events. 
It is obvious that it is much better to use the real plant computer, the real core surveillance 
system instead of simulating them. The operators feel the real controls; the real functions of 
these units can be studied. The problem lies in the simulator functions to which these real 
instruments are poorly suited. No real plant computer etc. is prepared to the stopped and 
standing time, or even worse: to the backtracking, going back in time. It is difficult to 
accommodate the real equipment to the new initial condition loaded into the simulator (e.g. 
nominal state immediately after the cold shutdown state). It is obvious that all functions 
somehow connected to the time (logging, making archives, and plotting) should be 
excluded if possible. If they cannot be excluded: we have to refuse to integrate the real units, 
we have to model their functions. 
That is the main reason that all time-related functions are incorporated to the Instructor's 
system: logging, plotting, making archives etc. etc. On the other hand, all simulator-specific 
functions are evaluated in the simulator.  
 
 
Fig. 3. The replica control room of the Paks NPPs training simulator 
The most important function is the pre-programming of the malfunctions. All valves can 
leak, all pipes can break, all pumps can be tripped, and there are very many equipment-
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specific malfunctions. They can be activated promptly, or at a given time instance, and/or 
when a logical function becomes 'true' (e.g. IF the temperature is higher than ... AND the 
flow is less than ... etc.) 
 
 
Fig. 4. The instructor's workstation of the Paks NPPs training simulator 
4.3 Protection system refurbishment using simulator 
The existing nuclear power plants were licensed earlier usually for 30 years; most of these 
licenses expire in the next decade. Nowadays it is a common practice to prolong the 
operation of the NPPs up to 50-60 years. 
After the Chernobyl accident in 1986 requirements to the safety of nuclear power generation 
units has been changed dramatically. As a result, many enhancements have been introduced 
not only to the Instrumentation & Control (I&C) and Protections circuitry but to the 
technological systems as well. Practically all these changes have been introduced on the 
simulators first, in order to show the results of the forthcoming changes. 
Even without that the “moral” and practical lifetime of the I&C systems is much less than 
50-60 years, let say only 8-10 years. If they contain computers (and nowadays they do) this 
becomes even shorter, about 5-7 years. The “aging” IT systems cannot be kept running for a 
longer time. Spare parts and even software drivers become obsolete. 
Replacing protection and control systems is relatively easy if the functionality remains the 
same. Fig. 5. shows how it can be done. 
First, while the old system is still in charge, the new system is placed parallel to it. Both 
controllers (or others, as protections, interlocks) get the same inputs. The new controller 
should be tuned until the response becomes the same in rather different situations, too. Then 
the old controller can be replaced. This method cannot be used when it is dangerous or just 
it is not allowed to test the equipment in extreme conditions. It is a rather new practice to 
use simulators for I&C or other system’s refurbishments (Janosy, 2007 March). First the 
simulators are used during the design of the new systems (Janosy, 2008). Integrating 
software models of the newly designed models into the simulator in an interchangeable way 
the proposed functionalities can be tested in normal, accidental and even extreme 
circumstances (software-in-the-loop tests). After approval of the demonstrated functions 
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Fig. 5. Old and new controllers tested in parallel 
and performance, the manufacturing of the new hardware can be authorized. The new 
hardware should be attached to the simulator, too, and the functionalities and the 
performance can be compared with its already existing software model (hardware-in-the-
loop tests).  
As it was mentioned before, it is not very easy to integrate real I&C hardware to the 
simulator because of the special simulator functions of FREEZE, BACKTRACK, REPLAY. 
This procedure had to be organized as it can be seen on Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Instrumentation and control system (I&C) is tested on the training simulator 
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The black color indicates the original functions of the simulator. The technological models 
advance in time using their state variables. The value of the measurements are calculated 
and the old I&C models calculate the control parameters (e.g. control valve and rod 
positions) governing the technological models. The development of the new system is made 
in four consecutive steps. 
1. The new controllers' mathematical models are constructed and their simulation models 
are placed parallel with the old one (blue boxes). On the basis of the same 
measurements the new model calculates the control parameters. In this phase the 
(software) switch is placed to the (Guided) position, that means that the control actions 
of the new controller are only logged, the old controller model is in charge. 
2. If everything looks perfect, the switch is thrown into (Full) position, and the 'software in 
the loop' mode is achieved. 
3. After thorough testing the new controller is manufactured and using some temporary 
I/O hardware interface (red boxes) it is connected to the simulator. (Spare parts of the 
Control room I/O can be used). The new hardware is driven by the measurements, too, 
but the new software governs the simulator - (SW) and (Full) position of the switches. 
4. If according to the logged response of the hardware is OK, the upper switch can be 
thrown to (HW) position. This is the 'hardware in the loop' mode of operation. 
Thanks to the simulator, the new I&C equipment can be tested under extreme conditions, 
too, without the slightest economic and environmental risks. 
Practically everything can be tested before the plant stops. During the refueling - which 
usually takes more than 20 but less than 30 days - the new equipment can be integrated to 
the real unit and in the same time the idling operators can study the behavior of the new 
I&C on the simulator in 'software in the loop' mode. 
5. Nodalisation problems of the reactor models 
The most important and difficult part of the simulation programs and the simulators is the 
reactor model. Fuel elements, integrated into fuel assemblies produce heat in the nuclear 
reactors in rather difficult, harsh conditions. The pressure and temperature is high - up to 
160 bar and 320°C - and the power density in some reactors reaches 90 kW/liter and above. 
They are made from expensive metals using expensive technologies. They should not leak - 
the cladding represents the first barrier between the radio-active materials and the 
environment (usually there are at least three barriers). If there is a remarkable leak, the 
reactor should be stopped and the leaking fuel assembly replaced - a procedure causing 
significant economic loss. 
Nevertheless, some fuel assemblies are well made and they practically never leak. During 
the 20-year-history of the four-unit Paks NPP there was detectable leak only once or twice. 
The fuel elements originally spent three years in the core, nowadays they stay for four years 
- with slightly higher uranium content, of course. If they should stay for five years, the 
increasing of the enrichment is not enough - the control system of the reactor is not designed 
to cover the excessive reactivity of the core, produced by the higher enrichment of the fresh 
fuel. 
The solution is the Gadolinium (Gd) which is a burnable neutron poison. In the first year - 
or so - it helps to cover the excessive reactivity by absorption of neutrons, then it burns out 
and do not causes any problem in the upcoming years. Now we replace at the Paks NPP 
every year 1/4th of the fuel elements with fresh ones. If we start to replace them with the 
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new types, supposed to stay for five years, it means that we are going to use mixed cores at 
least for four years. These cores need special treatment and the operators should be trained 
to it. The core surveillance system must be fitted to these mixed cores, too. To train the 
operators to their more sophisticated duties we had to replace the reactor model and the 
model of the primary circuit with more elaborated 3D spatial models. 
We have 349 fuel assemblies in the core; each of them can be of different age and different 
composition. The core configuration is carefully optimized each year to ensure that the 
power distribution and burn-out corresponds to the maximal safety and to the best fuel 
economy. Careful design of the reactor loads results in negative temperature and volumetric 
coefficients that means that the reactor is capable to self-regulate its power - because making 
the coolant hotter and thinner means worse neutron balance and therefore it decreases 
nuclear power. 
These effects make the neutron kinetic model of the reactor and the thermo-hydraulic model 
of the primary cooling circuit tightly coupled; therefore they mathematical models must be 
solved simultaneously. Describing very different physical phenomena we get very different 
equations - that leads to severe problems of the simultaneous numerical solution. (Hazi, 
Kereszturi et al., 2002) 
The crucial point is: how to nodalise the nuclear reactor and the primary circuit in order to 
achieve high fidelity of simulation with reasonable computer loads - in other words 
achieving accurate simulation and still remaining in real-time. It looks easy to divide the 
equipment to very small parts, and solve the problem using them as coupled nodes. 
Decreasing the size of the individual nodes not only increases their number according to the 
third power, but in the same time it significantly decreases the necessary time step of the 
numerical integration. 
5.1 Nodalisation problems: Neutronics 
As it is shown on Fig. 7, we have in the core 349 hexagonal fuel assemblies (the numbers 
outside the core refer to the six cooling loops). The 37 numbered fuel assemblies are used to 
control the chain reaction. They are twice as long as a normal fuel assembly. The upper part 
is made from special steel designed do absorb the proper amount of neutrons in order to be 
able to control the chain reaction. The lower part is a usual fuel assembly containing usual 
amount of fuel. Pulling out this control assembly means that the lower part enters the core, 
lowering it causes this part to leave and to be replaced by the neutron absorber assembly. 
The 37 control assemblies are organized into 6 groups, containing 6 assemblies except the 
6th one, which contains 7 (this 7th is the central one). The first five groups with 30 
assemblies are used as the "safety rods", fully pulled out during normal operation and fully 
lowered during reactor shut-down. The 6th group is normally used as "control rods", during 
normal operation they are always in different intermediate positions according to the 
prescribed power of the reactor. In some very rare situations the 5th group is helping to the 
6th one, sometimes staying in intermediate position, too. 
That evidently means that the first four groups do not influence the spatial distribution of 
the neutrons, their absorbents are pulled out and their fuel assemblies are inserted. 
Lowering them the reactor is shut down and the spatial distribution is not interesting any 
more. In the same time, the last two groups - the 5th and the 6th - can seriously influence the 
3D distribution of the neutrons, being in different intermediate positions according to the 
different operating conditions of the reactor and the primary circuit. 
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The nodalisation of the core from the neutron kinetics point of view does not leave us too 
much freedom: each "neighbor" to each assembly can be of different "age" in the reactor 
(zero to four, later zero to five years), with or without Gadolinium content accordingly. 
Different "age" means different burn up, thus different stage of enrichment and different 
isotope content. That means that in horizontal plane each assembly should be a separate node. 
As to the vertical nodalisation, we must have not less than 8 or 10 planes to get enough 
resolution (8 to 10 points) to describe the axial neutron (and heat) distribution. We have 
chosen 10 planes vertically - that means, we have finally 349 x 10 nodes for the KIKO3D 
model (Kereszturi et al., 2003). 
Real-time spatial (3D) simulation of 3490 nodes in several groups of neutrons according to 
their actual energy requires huge computer power. The only way to do it using several 
processors; it means to separate the time and space problem. The result can be written as a 
product of two functions: the amplitude function of time and the distribution function of 
space. Solving the equations in different processors means that these programs have access 
to the data of the other only after finishing the actual time step, and this means that delays 
are introduced. 
 
 
Fig. 7. The map of the core with the 349 fuel assemblies, including the 37 control ones 
5.2 Nodalisation problems: Thermo-hydraulics 
Thermo-hydraulic nodes should be much larger in space than the neutron-kinetic nodes. It 
is connected with the 0.2 sec. time step of the full scope replica simulator of the power plant. 
If we want to avoid large number of iterations, the amount of the steam/water 
leaving/entering the node each time step must be probably less than the full amount of the 
steam/water inside the node. It means that if we multiply the maximal feasible volumetric 
flow-rates with the 0.2 sec. integration time step, we get the minimal volumes for the nodes 
in question.  
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Fig. 7. shows the thermo-hydraulic nodalisation of the reactor as well. According to the 
reasons explained above, we have much less thermo-hydraulic nodes radially in the core, 
and the number of the axial layers is only half that of the number of neutronic nodes: we are 
limited here to only five layers. The reactor core is divided radially to only six outer, six 
inner and one central node: altogether 13 nodes. 
Each of the outer six nodes marked with different colors consists of 40 fuel assemblies. The 
inner six nodes - all are marked as green - contain 16 fuel assemblies each but one of them 
belongs to the 5th control rod group, one of the to the 6th control rod group. The 13th, the 
innermost small node contains 13 fuel assemblies, one of them - the central - contains the 7th 
rod of the 6th group. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Debugging tool for the core nodalisation and for the six cooling loops 
 
Nuclear Power - System Simulations and Operation 
 
16 
This kind of thermo-hydraulic nodalisation provides the following benefits: 
• During operation on power, only control rods of the 5th and 6th control rod group may 
have intermediate positions, influencing the spatial distribution of the neutrons. The 
inner 6 nodes and the central node are responsible for the calculation of these effects. 
• One or more cooling loops may fail, usually because of the tripped main circulating 
pumps (MCPs). The six outer large nodes can respond spatially to these effects. 
The thermo-hydraulic model has to deal not only with the reactor vessel but the six cooling 
loops of the primary circuit. 
The original instrumentation of the nuclear power plant can not show the power, the 
pressure, the temperature and the steam content of the water in each simulation node of our 
simulator. It is not necessary to measure these parameters in such detail for the operation of 
the plant. It means that the full-scope replica simulator has no tools to follow the actual 
values in these nodes. For development and debugging we had to develop special 
debugging tools (programs) to display these data on different windows on the screen in 
order to follow the performance of our model programs closely (see Fig. 8). 
Thanks to the nodalisation scheme described above, different spatial effects in the core can 
be studied. As an example, the "rod drop" malfunction is presented. 
If a control rod erroneously drops into the core, the negative reactivity caused by it can be 
compensated by the power controller, pulling all the other rods a little out from the core. 
However, the power locally will be less around the fallen neutron absorber. 
All well-designed reactors are self-regulating, that means overheating causes negative 
reactivity thus decreases the heat power, and overcooling does the opposite - it leads to 
positive reactivity and the power increases a little. This effect compensates the locally 
introduced (by the fallen rod) negative reactivity, and that's why the distortion of the power 
field - and the resulting temperature field - is not so strong than it could have been expected, 
not taking into account the temperature effects and the resulting self-regulating features. 
However, the resulting asymmetry of the temperature field is remarkable, as it can be seen 
on Fig. 9. 
5.3 Reactor thermo-hydraulics 
Normally the primary circuit of a pressurized water reactor is filled up with water and there 
is no boiling. Nevertheless, we have the pressurizer with the steam cushion, the secondary 
parts of the steam generators with boiling, the steam headers, therefore we have to construct 
a two-phase-flow (steam, water) model anyway. 
Moreover, in case of LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident) if the water flows out through the 
break of some pipelines, the emergency core cooling circuits step in, pump water into the 
primary circuit and the reactor vessel in order to keep the core covered with water and 
cooled. Air and other non-condensable gases may enter the primary circuit. During the 
startup of the plant the initial pressure is reached by nitrogen cushion in the pressurizer. 
Because these states the simulation model should handle not only water and steam, but non-
condensable gases (third component.) 
The best tool to simulate these states is the so called "6 equation" model - energy, mass and 
momentum balance equations for steam and water separately, but with enabled state 
changes (boiling, condensation). (The non-condensable gases usually are added to the steam 
phase but state changes are disabled for them).  
Solving 6-equation models in real time is an exceptionally demanding task, requiring very 
powerful computers. Things are getting much simpler using 5 equation models (common 
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Fig. 9. Picture of the in-core surveillance system VERONA - driven by "rod drop" state data 
from the simulator 
equation for the momentum of steam and water) but in this case the water and steam 
velocity should be the same - these models are accurate only in case of low steam content 
(emulsion flow). Higher steam content or stagnant flow causes phase separation and different 
speeds. The commonly used solution is the so called "5½-equation" model - one momentum 
equation but so called "drift flux model" which allows different speeds for water and steam 
but handles them with algebraic approximations. The RETINA code (Reactor Thermo-
Hydraulics Interactive) can solve both the 6 and the 5½ equation systems (Hazi et al, 2001) 
The most demanding task during the tuning and V&V of the simulator is to tailor these 
drift-flux correlations to behave correctly in very different circumstances - stagnant, layered 
coolant in the pressurizer vessel, isolated loop, etc 
We have very different situations - normal operating and transients, stopping, cooling 
down, heating up, reaching criticality of the reactor, loading up, and separating loops with 
main gate valves (a rare feature possible only for Soviet/Russian reactors). There real art 
during the V&V of the models lies in handling and tuning of the drift flux correlations 
(nodes above each other, separating, nodes horizontally following each others, pipes and 
stagnant coolants in vessels, etc.) 
As non-condensable gases are carried with steam, boron acid solvent (used to absorb 
neutrons) and radio-nuclides carried with water (in case of leakage) are simulated, too, but 
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this task is much simpler than the correct simulation of the two-phase-flow. (However, 
"aging", decaying radio-nuclides continuously are changing the concentration of different 
isotopes and this has to be taken into account, too.) 
The simulation of the normal operating modes of the power plant are the less demanding 
for the stability of the numerical integration of the models, and in the same time we have 
ample data and recordings to fit the parameters of our models. On the other hand, the 
training of the operators to anticipated (but rarely happening) transients and accidents is the 
most important and valuable, but these are difficult physical states with no data (so far, so 
good) to verify and validate the simulation. 
The scope of simulation - by definition of the full-scope, replica simulators - covers anything 
that can happen to the filled-up primary circuit with the closed reactor vessel. (Up to now 
we do not simulate open reactor vessel with interrupted circulation, as it is usual during the 
refueling outage.) 
Covering only the events happening to the hermetically closed primary circuit (with pipe 
breaks and loss of coolant accident of course) that means: 
• normal operation with normal transients (load changes, frequency regulation) 
• bringing to power (heating up, reaching criticality with the reactor, producing steam, 
speeding and heating up the turbines, reaching the nominal power 
• stopping the reactor, cooling down, changing to natural circulation without the pumps, 
etc. 
• malfunctions of any kind, pump trips, valve jams, valve leaks, short circuits, failures of 
electrical supplies, island mode of operation (separation from the electrical grid) 
• accidents up to the design basis accident, which means a large-break LOCA - breaking 
of the pipe of the pipeline of the main cooling loop. 
According to the integration of the models described above, all these transients can be 
studied in "4D" in the reactor - that means in time and space, too. 
6. Conclusions 
Simulation is not a profession: it is a way of life - I was told on my first international conference I 
participated - 'Simulation 1977' in Montreaux, Swiss. I can add to that after 34 years: it is a 
way of thinking, too. The first Reference shows the first book I had to study after I started 
with simulation in 1970 (Ralston, 1965). 
My greatest mentor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Richard Zobel retired, and went out to his garden with 
a pint of beer. The next day he started to model and simulate the sounds produced by the 
small plashing waterfall in the corner of his garden, with great success, resulting in excellent 
papers. After being invited later as Assoc. Professor in the Prince of Songkla University, Hat 
Yai and Phuket Campuses, Thailand, where he survived the big tsunami in the Indian 
Ocean on 2004, he became one of the leading experts in tsunami simulation. Dr. Zobel is 
going definitely to model and simulate things up to the last minute of his life. 
At the beginning the simulation was very different from the simulation we are making 
today. We had no powerful digital computers available that time or they were used for 
different purposes secretly - ordinary scientists had no access to them. We used sometimes 
analogue computers with integrators made from operational amplifiers. Sometimes they 
were not electrical, but pneumatic 'operational amplifiers'. Modeling meant not always 
mathematical modeling - we had to use e.g. electrical analogy, representing long pipelines 
by inductance, vessels and tanks by electrical capacity; pressure meant voltage and flow was 
represented by electrical current. 
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Numerical analysis was very different when the maximal calculating capacity was 
represented by desktop calculators, first mechanical and after a while electrical. Methods of 
Runge-Kutta, Fowler-Warten, Hindmarsch-Gear were studied and used widely, together 
with the flourishing predictor-corrector multistep methods. Everybody had his/her favorite 
numerical integrating algorithm and praised it to the others. 
Nevertheless, even that time and ever since simulation is a great way of learning: Observing a 
natural phenomenon we gain an imagination how it works and try to build a model 
selecting the most dominant processes of it. Using powerful computers in a proper way we 
can learn whether our imagination was good or wrong, or just not enough: something is still 
missing. Finally, if the results of simulation are really very close, very similar to the real 
behavior of the studied phenomenon, we get the unforgettable feeling: we are able to 
understand and describe what Mother Nature had been doing and how! 
Back to the nuclear industry, it is obvious that power generating nuclear power plants 
cannot be used as test facilities to check out different new ideas. (Some people do not like 
even the doctors "practicing" - they should not practice, they should already know what they 
are doing before treating a patient.) As matter of fact, simulation is taking all over - working 
on models is much safer and much cheaper than doing anything else. 
The practice of modeling nuclear power plants show that the up-to-date and state-of-art 
modeling techniques are fully adequate to support all tasks of design, licensing, 
construction and operation of nuclear power generating plants or other nuclear facilities. 
Even the cause and the circumstances of different accidents can be determined the best and 
easiest way by simulation studies. 
Simulation is widely used by students of the universities, by design institutes and 
companies, by the authorities, by research institutes, during the construction and start-up of 
new nuclear power plants, designing re-fueling, and keeping up the knowledge of 
experienced operators and for teaching the new ones. Normally, new plants already have 
the simulator before the real construction is going to be started. (They should be always 
slightly modified and adjusted to the local circumstances, anyhow. There are no units being 
exactly identical to each other.) 
We are operating and continuously developing the Paks NPP's full-scope replica simulator 
already 23 years. We have been able to replace the Reactor Protection System, to develop 
different enhancements to the technology of the NPP and study spatial behavior of very 
different mixed cores using this simulator successfully. Originally the simulator was called 
as the '5th unit', because all changes of the four energy generating units had to be performed 
later to the model system of the simulator, too. Now the simulator became the '1st unit', 
because any enhancement, development or change has to be demonstrated on the simulator 
first before getting the approval to do so on the real units, too. 
The simulator is busy working in two shifts to teach and keep up the knowledge of the 
operating personnel of the NPP. It is very difficult to obtain simulator time for other 
purposes. The most expensive part of the training simulator is the Control room and the 
corresponding real-time I/O interface to it. Replacing the Control room with a couple of 
high resolution touch-screens we will be able to reproduce it in several copies, that way to 
make it affordable for different studies and planned refurbishments, and for teaching 
students and non-operative personnel, too. Having multiple copies definitely increases the 
quality of service and support to the operation of our nuclear power plant, producing close 
to 40% of electricity of our country. 
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1. Introduction 
Interest in safety issues of nuclear research reactors is nowadays increasing due their 
enlarged commercial exploitation commonly directed at neutrons generation for several 
types of scientific and social purposes. Power generation is not the main activity of a nuclear 
research reactor reaching maximum power operation of about 100 MW. In spite of this, 
specific features are necessary to ensure safe utilization of such installations. Therefore, 
several codes have been used focusing special attention for research reactors safety analysis 
and valuation of specific perturbation plant processes. A combination of codes for thermal 
hydraulic analysis, for assessment of probabilistic risk, fuel investigation and reactor physics 
studies are fundamental tools for an appropriate reactor behaviour definition.   
It is appropriate to use internationally recognized, accepted and validated best estimate 
codes. The continuous development and validation of the nuclear codes ensures the 
improvement of best estimate methods. Typically, thermal hydraulic system codes may 
need the most effort in terms of developing input models for system analyses in research 
reactors. The fuel codes can be used for analysis of design basis accident conditions and may 
be used to provide initial conditions for the system thermal hydraulic codes. Neutron kinetic 
codes can be coupled to thermal hydraulic system codes to provide a more realistic 
simulation of transients where there is a large reactivity variation. Reactor physics codes are 
typically used to support the performance of the core as well as to provide results used in 
the system thermal hydraulic codes for accident analysis. Containment codes may be 
necessary to estimate parameters as the time of failure of the containment, confinement or 
reactor building. 
In this Chapter, the state-of-the-art related to nuclear codes applied to research reactors are 
being presented. Results of simulations performed with two specific codes, the thermal 
hydraulic RELAP5 code and the General Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport code (MCNP), 
for the TRIGA IPR-R1 research reactor in Brazil are also presented.  
 
Nuclear Power - System Simulations and Operation 
 
22 
2. Nuclear research reactors in operation 
The main activity of the nuclear research reactors is not connected to power generation. 
However, they are widely used to several activities as to non-destructive materials testing, 
radioisotopes production, nuclear medicine, research, and many others fields. 
The Research Reactor Database (RRDB) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
contains administrative, technical and utilization information on over 670 research reactors 
including critical and sub-critical assemblies in 69 countries and the European Union. 
Second the RRDB data, nowadays there are 239 research reactors in operation around the 
world (see Table 1). Approximately, half of this total is now over 40 years old being 
necessary to address deficiencies and new requirements that evolve over time. In this way, 
reactor organizations undertake an array of work activities to either re-establish performance 
that has degraded over time, maintain performance in the face of changing conditions or 
adapt to new customer or regulatory demands (IAEA, 2009). 
 
Status Developed Countries Developing Countries 
Cancelled 1 4 
Operational 148 91 
Shut down 183 21 
Decommissioned 194 16 
Temporary shutdown 8 5 
Planned 1 1 
Under construction 2 1 
Unverified information 0 1 
Total 537 140 
From IAEA (2011) http://nucleus.iaea.org/RRDB 
Table 1. Research reactors in the world 
The operating mode as well as the design of research reactors can vary largely differently 
from the power reactors. The most common design of research reactors is the pool type, 
where the core is a cluster of fuel elements sitting in a large pool of water. The water in the 
pool has function of cooling, as well as moderation, neutron reflector and it is able to assure 
an adequate radioactive shielding. The reactor cooling occurs predominantly by natural 
convection, with the circulation forces governed by the water density differences. The heat 
generated from the nuclear fissions can be also removed pumping the pool water through a 
heat exchanger characterizing a forced cooling. 
Some examples of different types of research reactors are listed in Table 2. The TRIGA 
reactor is the most common design having about 60-100 cylindrical fuel elements with metal 
cladding enclosing a mixture of uranium fuel and zirconium hydride. The main 
characteristic of this type of fuel is the prompt negative temperature coefficient that 
provides safety and automatically limiting the power when excess of reactivity is suddenly 
inserted. Fig. 1 shows a photography of an upper view of the research reactor type open-
pool IPR-R1 TRIGA. IPR-R1 is installed at Nuclear Energy Development Centre (CDTN) of 
Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. It works at 100 
kW but will be briefly licensed to operate at 250 kW. It presents low power, low pressure, 
for application in research, training and radioisotopes production. The reactor is housed in a 
6.625 meters deep pool with 1.92 meters of internal diameter and filled with light water.    
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Other research reactor designs are moderated using heavy water or graphite. The fast 
reactors are in a small number; they require no moderator and can use a mixture of uranium 
and plutonium as fuel. Homogenous type reactors have a core comprising a solution of 
uranium salts as a liquid, contained in a tank about 300 mm diameter. This type was 
popular in the past due to its simple design; however only a small number is nowadays in 
operation. High temperature research reactors, as that developed in Japan (the HTTR – High 
Temperature Test Reactor), have mainly the aim of to investigate the TRISO fuel designed 
for the Generation IV power reactors, as the HTGRs - High Temperature Gas Reactors - 
Verfondern et al., 2007). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Core upper view and pool of the IPR-R1 TRIGA 
Graphite or beryllium is commonly used as the reflector in research reactors, although other 
materials may also be used. The fuel of research reactors can be of type HEU (highly 
enriched uranium) or LEU (low enriched uranium). However, because of the programmes 
of nuclear non-proliferation, there is a tendency of the countries to convert core reactor HEU 
to LEU.  
The fuel assemblies of research reactors are typically made in plates or cylinders, as 
presented in the examples of Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively. Figure 2 illustrates the 
MTR (material testing reactor) fuel assembly used in the IEA-R1. A typical IEA-R1 fuel 
element has 18 plane parallel fuel plates, mounted mechanically between two lateral 
aluminium holders with grooves, and its overall dimensions are (7.6 X 8.0) cm and 88.0 cm 
high. Each fuel plate consists of an aluminium cladding and a meat where the nuclear fuel is 
located (Terremoto et al., 2000).  
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Figure 3 presents the design of two types of cylindrical fuel elements used in the research 
reactor IPR-R1. This fuel contains high concentrations of hydrogen using a metal alloy of 
uranium and zirconium and its main characteristic is the prompt negative temperature 
coefficient. 
 
Type Name Country Power (kW) Criticality 
Thermal Flux
(n/cm²s) 
Fuel and 
Enrichment 
TRIGA IPR-R1 Brazil 100 1960 4.3 x 1012 U-Zr-H 20% 
Pool IEA-R1 Brazil 5000 1957 4.6 x 1013 
U3O8-Al and 
U3Si2-Al 
20% 
Pool MTR MNR Canada 5000 1959 1.0 x 1014 U3Si2-Al 19.75% 
Fast Source TAPIRO Italy 5 1971 (Fast Flux) 4.0 x 1012 
U-Mo alloy 
93.5% 
High Tem-
perature Gas HTTR Japan 30000 1998 7.5 x 10
13 UO2 6% 
Argonaut UFTR USA 100 1959 2.0 x 1012 U3Si2-Al 19.75% 
Heavy Water NBSR USA 20000 1967 4.0 x 1014 U3O8-Al 93% 
From IAEA (2011) http://nucleus.iaea.org/RRDB 
Table 2. Examples of nuclear research reactors 
 
 
Fig. 2. Cross-sectional diagram of a standard MTR fuel element irradiated in the IEA-R1 
research reactor, showing in detail the structure of two successive fuel plates (measure in 
cm). Adapted from (Terremoto et al., 2000) 
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Fig. 3. IPR-R1 TRIGA – design of two types of cylindrical fuel elements (measure in mm) 
3. Application of nuclear codes in research reactor analysis 
In general, the codes used for research reactors analysis are also used in the nuclear power 
plant (NPP) having both the same basis of development and utilization. The differences on 
validation and application for each case appear due the complexity of the different classes of 
reactors. Particularly, the codes available internationally for safety analysis of research 
reactors can be classified in different issues according with their application including 
reactor physics, fuel behaviour, thermal hydraulic processing, computational fluid 
dynamics (CFD) and structural analysis (IAEA, 2008). Each of these topics are being 
explained with some more details and exemplified next.  
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3.1 Neutron kinetic modeling  
Reactor physics codes are capable to model the 2D or 3D core neutron kinetics  for analysing 
local or asymmetrical effects in the reactor core that is possible to occur as in steady state as 
in transient operation. Examples of reactor physics codes are WIMS-D, DYN3D, CITATION, 
PARET and NESTLE. WIMS-D, a deterministic code system for reactor lattice calculation, 
can be used to calculate group constants dividing the core into several identical unit cells. 
The calculated cross-sections can then be used as input to another type of code as, for 
example, the code CITATION for global core calculations (Khana et al., 2000; Dalle et al., 
2002). 
The computer code DYN3D was developed for safety analyses of nuclear reactors after 
reactivity perturbations of the system, but it can be used also for fuel management 
calculations.  
PARET code has been used extensively for research reactor analysis which iteratively solves 
for the neutronic-hydrodynamic-heat transfer aspect of the reactor under steady state and 
transient behaviour. It can be used to investigate core reactivity insertions being a coupled 
kinetics and thermal hydraulics code for predicting the course of non-destructive transients 
in research reactors (Woodruff et al., 1996; Housiadas, 2002; Velit and Primm, 2008). 
Other example is the NESTLE code that solves the two or four group neutron diffusion 
equations in either Cartesian or hexagonal geometry using the Nodal Expansion Method 
(NEM) and the non-linear iteration technique. NESTLE was embedded in the thermal 
hydraulic code RELAP5 obtaining the multi-dimensional neutron kinetics model RELAP5-
3D. Steady-state eigenvalue and time dependent neutron flux problems can be solved by the 
NESTLE code as implemented in RELAP5-3D. In spite of RELAP5-3D to be developed for 
power reactors applications, it has been successfully used for research reactors analyses 
(Costa et al., 2011; Marcum et al., 2010). 
Therefore, as can be verified from some before examples, generally two or more codes are 
used directly or indirectly connected for a more detailed and realistic simulation exploring 
the main capability of each one. 
Calculations using discrete ordinate diffusion and transport theory have been used 
extensively for reactor simulation purposes. However, the Monte Carlo technique offers 
significant advantages, since the complex geometrical configuration of the reactor core can 
be modelled in detail. Therefore, the Monte Carlo code (MCNP) has been applied to 
research reactor simulations mainly for neutron flux calculations (Fernandes et al., 2010; 
Shoushtari et al., 2009; Stamatelatos et al., 2007; Huda, 2006). A more detailed example of the 
MCNP code application to simulations of neutron flux value on the irradiation channels of 
the  IPR-R1 TRIGA research reactor, adapted from (Guerra et al., 2011), has been presented 
in the Annex A.    
3.2 Fuel analysis 
Researchers in several countries have worked with the aiming to develop codes that predict 
the behaviour of a fuel assembly during extreme transients as, for example, a LOCA (loss of 
coolant accident). Such codes attempt to predict the deformation of a fuel rod, the 
termination of deformation by rupture, the temperature reached by the cladding, oxidation 
of cladding, and in some codes, the interaction between neighbouring rods. Codes which 
calculate fuel rod behaviour in whole assemblies including rod-to-rod interactions are 
relatively rare. One example of such code is the Japanese FRETA-B specialised in two-
dimensional analysis in the transverse direction (NEA, 2009). DRACCAR is other example 
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of fuel code that is currently under development at IRSN (Institute for Radiological 
Protection and Nuclear Safety) with the purpose of to simulate the thermal mechanical 
behaviour of a rod bundle under LOCA with a 3D multi-rod description (Papin et al., 2006). 
3.3 Thermal hydraulic modeling 
Thermal hydraulic system codes are applicable to a wide variety of reactor designs and 
conditions. Such system codes allow simulating the complete primary and secondary 
circuits and the interactions between them. Examples of system thermal hydraulic codes are 
RELAP5, TRAC, CATHARE, ATHELET, DINAMIKA and CATHENA. They are generally 
classified as best estimate codes. The term “best estimate code” means that the code is free of 
deliberate pessimism and contains sufficiently detailed models to describe the relevant 
processes of the transients that the code is designed to model (IAEA, 2008). 
Models for two fluid, non-equilibrium hydrodynamics, point and multidimensional reactor 
kinetics, control systems, and special system components make these thermal hydraulic 
codes very attractive. However, the use of these codes for research reactors must be careful 
in order to ensure that the models included in such codes are valid for the operating regimes 
of the research reactors. The validity of the models and correlations should be verified. 
As an example, the ATHLET thermal hydraulic code developed at the GRS, Society for Plant 
and Reactor Safety, was planed to analyse leaks and transients for power reactors. However, 
to extend the applicability of the code to the safety analysis of research reactors, a model 
was implemented permitting a description of the thermal-dynamic non-equilibrium effects 
in the subcooled boiling regime (Hainoun et al., 1996). 
In the same way, the RELAP5 code has been modified to better simulate the research 
reactors operation conditions (low pressure, low mass flow rate, low power). For example, a 
subcooled boiling model of upward vertical flow consistent with phenomenological 
observations of the subcooled flow boiling mechanisms was proposed to extend the range of 
applicability of the RELAP5 code to low pressures (Končar and Mavko, 2003). Therefore, 
recent works as, for example (Antariksawan et al., 2005; Khedr et al., 2005; Marcum et al., 
2010; Reis et al., 2010), have been performed to investigate the applicability of the RELAP5 
code to research reactors operating conditions (TRIGA 2000, MTR, Oregon State TRIGA, 
IPR-R1 TRIGA), respectively. Application of a model for the IPR-R1 TRIGA using the 
RELAP5 code is detailed in the Annex B.   
The user of a thermal hydraulic system code has a very large number of available basic 
elements (single volumes, pipes, branches, junctions, heat structures, pumps, etc) to develop 
a detailed reactor nodalization. The model can reproduce a specific part or the whole system 
to be simulated. However as there is not a fixed rule to perform the nodalization, a large 
responsibility is passed to the user of the code in order to develop an adequate model 
scheme which makes best use of the various modules and the prediction capabilities of the 
specific code (Petruzzi and D’Auria, 2008; D’Auria and Galassi, 1998). 
Subchannel codes are used to analyse specific processes within the core of the reactor, such 
as localized flow and heat transfer variables in representative fuel assemblies. Examples are 
PARET and COBRA codes. 
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) is increasingly being used in the nuclear community 
to model safety relevant phenomena occurring in the reactor coolant system and for the 
analysis of localized phenomena such as the flow pattern in complex geometries. However, 
CFD is a relatively recent development and their qualification status for application in 
transient flow analysis for research reactor licensing should be verified.  
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3.4 Structural codes 
Structural analysis codes are used to describe the behaviour of mechanical components such 
as core support and pool structures, in the case of a pool type reactor, under various accident 
conditions. These codes are commercially available and have generally been developed for 
non-nuclear applications. They utilize boundary conditions supplied, for example, by 
thermal hydraulic codes. Examples of structural analysis codes are NASTRAN and ANSYS.  
NASTRAN, the NASA Structural Analysis System, is a powerful general purpose finite 
element analysis program and it is a standard in the structural analysis field, providing the 
engineer with a wide range of modelling and analysis capabilities. The computational 
programme ANSYS is a multipurpose finite element code that can perform a variety of 
calculations, including stress analysis, temperature distributions, and thermal expansions in 
solid materials. 
4. Verification and validation of codes 
The applicability of a code to reactor safety analysis, mainly for licensing, is directly related 
with its qualification which must be rigorously documented.  It is not possible to provide a 
detailed list of the key phenomena and code features necessary for each type of code. 
However, the IAEA proposes basically three criteria to verify the adequacy of the codes for 
treating important phenomena (IAEA, 2008): 
a. The use of internationally recognized and accepted codes provides some assurance that 
the codes are adequate for their intended application. 
b. Individual codes need to be evaluated on a systematic basis, comparing the intended 
application of the code with the actual conditions for which the code is applied. 
c. Lists of important phenomena expected during the transients that constitute the target 
of the investigation must be established. In many cases, documentation is available on 
an individual code basis that describes the relative importance of the different 
phenomena.  
Code verification is defined as the review of the source coding against its description in the 
documentation. The line by line verification of large codes is a time consuming and 
expensive process. Therefore, this process is limited to only some codes. However, many 
industry sponsored codes have been subjected to stringent verification procedures as a 
consequence of the regulatory licensing process (IAEA, 2008).  
Extensive code validation requires efforts at the international level, involving validation 
projects, usually managed by the code developers and carried out, under cooperation and 
exchange agreements, by user groups worldwide with access to experimental facilities 
designed to provide data on behaviour and phenomena of importance. Several international 
standard problems provide comparison between codes. 
The validation of a code modelling for determined system implicates that the model 
reproduces the measured steady-state conditions of the system with acceptable margins. 
The nodalization may be considered qualified when it has a geometric fidelity with the 
system, it reproduces the measured steady-state condition of the system, and it 
demonstrates satisfactory time evolution conditions (D’Auria et al., 1999). However, 
sometimes a nodalization qualified to simulate determined condition may not be suitable to 
simulate other type of situation being necessary modifications and re-qualification. 
Sensitivity analysis including systematic variations in code input variables or modelling   
parameters, must be used to help identify the important parameters necessary for an 
accident analysis by ranking the influence of accident phenomena or to bound the overall 
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results of the analysis. Results of experiments can also be used to identify important 
parameters (Reis et al., 2011). 
5. Safety analysis criteria  
The acceptance criteria are essential to classify the results obtained from a safety analysis 
and they may be specified as basic and specific. Basic acceptance criteria are usually defined 
as limits set by a regulatory body. The specific acceptance criteria are used to include 
additional margins beyond the basic acceptance criteria to allow for uncertainties and to 
provide additional defence in depth. The margin between results predicted by the analysis 
and the acceptance criterion is related to the uncertainties. If a result has low uncertainty, a 
small margin to the acceptance criteria may be acceptable. In general, the adequacy of the 
margin with the acceptance criterion is demonstrated by using a conservative analysis to 
meet the acceptance criterion (IAEA, 2008).  
Deterministic techniques are the main tools used in the analyses of research reactors. These 
techniques are often related with the conservatism, commonly knew as conservative 
approach. On the other hand, best estimate method provides a realistic simulation of a 
physical process to a level commensurate with the currently known data and knowledge of 
the phenomena concerned. A best estimate analysis must be supplemented by an 
uncertainty analysis. Application of best-estimate (realistic) computer codes to the safety 
analysis of nuclear plants implies the evaluation of uncertainties. This is connected with the 
(imperfect) nature of the codes and of the process of codes application. The source of 
uncertainties affects the predictions by best-estimate codes and must be taken into account 
(D’Auria, 2004). 
6. Reactor parameters in the safety analysis  
The safety analyses are used in several areas including design, licensing, support for 
accident management and emergency planning. Reactor parameters and some operating  
conditions considered in the safety analysis can be summarized in: state of the reactor 
operation, core power, core inlet temperature, fuel element cladding temperature; system 
pressure, core flow, axial and radial power distribution and hot channel factor; reactor 
kinetics parameters, fuel and moderator temperature reactivity coefficients, void reactivity 
coefficient, available shutdown reactivity worth and insertion characteristics of reactivity 
control and safety devices. 
The evaluation of the safety of research reactors includes firstly the determination of the 
reactor response to a range of postulated initiating events (PIEs) covering all supposed 
possible types of events. Several selected PIEs for research reactors have been classified and 
summarized as follows (IAEA, 2005):  
a. Loss of electric power supplies; 
b. Insertion of excess reactivity; 
c. Loss of flow; 
d. Loss of coolant; 
e. Erroneous handling or failure of equipment; 
f. Special internal events; 
g. External events; 
h. Human errors. 
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The PIEs in each group should be evaluated to identify the events that would be limiting, 
and from there the events selected for further analysis should be indicated. Such events 
would include those having potential consequences that bound all other PIEs in the group.  
For example, to TRIGA reactors, due the passive nature of the reactivity feedback during a 
temperature excursion, few PIEs would be applied since any increase in core temperature 
has a negative reactivity effect, causing a passive reduction in reactor power to limit a 
temperature excursion reactor. In spite of this, some perturbation situation may occur 
disturbing the normal reactor operation, as a condition of forced recirculation off. The 
event can be caused by the recirculation pump failure e can be classified inside the event 
number 3 described before. Annex B presents an example of simulation of this event using 
a TRIGA model in the RELAP5 code with results very approximate from the experimental 
data.  
7. Conclusion 
This Chapter has drawn the attention to specific features related to the safe utilization of 
research reactors. A summarized state-of-the-art about research reactors was presented.  
As it was illustrated, the rising interest in the commercial exploitation of these types of 
nuclear reactors is justified by the several applications using mainly their neutrons 
generation. Due the considerable age of the majority of research reactors in operation 
around the world, it is necessary to address deficiencies and new requirements that evolve 
over time. Works have been performed with the aim of either re-establish performance that 
has degraded over time, maintain performance in the face of changing conditions or adapt 
to new customer or regulatory demands. As part of these efforts, several codes have been 
used focusing special attention for the research reactors safety analysis including thermal 
hydraulic analysis, fuel investigation, reactor physics and structural studies. Codes 
internationally recognized, accepted and validated are essential in reactor safety analysis 
that are used in several areas including design, licensing, support for accident management 
and emergency planning. 
An important aspect in the applicability of a code to reactor safety analysis is its direct 
relation with its qualification which must be rigorously documented. Moreover aspects 
connected to the validation, uncertainty analysis and sensitivity analysis must be carefully 
considered for a correct application of a nuclear code for the simulation of reactor model.  
Examples of application of two types of codes widely used for research reactors analysis are 
being presented in the Annex A and B (MCNP and RELAP5 codes, respectively). These 
Annexes present results of simulations performed at the Nuclear Engineering Department 
of the Federal University of Minas Gerais for the TRIGA IPR-R1 research reactor in Brazil. 
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ANNEX A. Example of MCNP code application to IPR-R1 research reactor 
The Annex A and also the Annex B are based in the IPR-R1 research reactor and they are a 
summary of the works (Guerra et al., 2011) and (Reis et al., 2010), respectively.  
AI. Introduction  
The IPR-R1 is a reactor type TRIGA, Mark-I model that is installed at Nuclear Technology 
Development Centre (CDTN) of Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), in Belo 
Horizonte, Brazil. It is a light water moderated and cooled, graphite-reflected, open-pool 
type research reactor. IPR-R1 works at 100 kW but it will be briefly licensed to operate at 250 
kW. It presents low power, low pressure, for application in research, training and 
radioisotopes production. The fuel is an alloy of zirconium hydride and uranium enriched 
at 20% in 235U.   
The IPR-R1 reactor has a Rotary Specimen Rack, RSR, outside the reactor, and it is 
composed by forty irradiation channels in a cylindrical geometry. Moreover, tangent to 
annular reflector, there is a Pneumatic Tube where the samples also can be inserted to 
irradiation. Therefore, the IPR-R1 has three facilities for sample irradiation: the Central 
Thimble, the Rotary Specimen Rack and the Pneumatic Tube. Figure A1 shows the radial 
and axial core configuration. The IPR-R1 has the main nuclear applications related with 
neutron activation analysis (NAA), training of operators for nuclear power plants and 
experiments in neutronic and thermal hydraulic. 
 
 
Fig. A1. Core upper view and pool of the IPR-R1 TRIGA 
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The IPR-R1 has been simulated using the code MCNPX2.6.0 (Monte Carlo N-Particle 
Transport eXtend). The goal was to evaluate the neutronic flux in a sample inserted in the 
RSR channels. In each simulation the sample was placed in a different position, totalling 
forty positions around the RSR. The results obtained from the calculation show good 
agreement in relation to experimental data.   
AII. Modelling  
The reactor model was developed using MCNP5 and MCNPX codes where 500 active cycles 
were calculated with 1000 neutrons per cycle. The simulations executed in MCNPX code, 
considers 1.0 hour of irradiation (time of sample irradiation) with 0.1 MW (currently TRIGA 
reactor power). The simulated model was based on previous studies where the reactor core 
has the same features of the IPR-R1 geometry described before. The configured geometry is 
the same to MCNP5 and the MCNPX 2.6.0. The core was configured considering a cylinder 
containing water, fuel elements, radial reflectors, central tube (or central thimble), control 
rods and neutron source. Each rod has a coordinate value. They were filled according to 
their individual characteristics. Around the core there is the RSR which has groove to insert 
the samples to irradiation. The configured core is inside the pool where water surrounds the 
core and the RSR. However, the model of this work presents some improvements. 
Table A1 presents the cylinders dimensions which are inside of RSR. In addition, Figure A2 
illustrates the axial and radial view of the simulated model. 
 
Cylinder Material Inner Radius (cm) Radial Thickness (cm) Height (cm) 
Aluminum 1.50 0.10 20.0 
Polystyrene 1.10 0.30 7.90 
Polyethylene 0.48 0.07 0.55 
Table A1. Dimensions of the simulated cylinders inside Rotary Specimen Rack 
 
 
Fig. A2. Axial and radial view of the reactor TRIGA IPR-R1 simulated in MCNP5 and 
MCNPX codes 
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AIII. Results and conclusions 
The assembly of the three cylinders was positioned in 40 different positions of the RSR to 
calculate the thermal neutron flux (energies of 0.5 eV or smaller) inside of the polyethylene 
cylinder that contains the sample. The Figure A3 shows the thermal neutron flux simulated 
by MCNP5 and MCNPX codes. It is possible to see clearly the behaviour of the thermal 
neutron flux around the core reactor. The neutron fluxes vary at each position and changes 
over the RSR. In spite of the good agreement of the most of the calculated points some 
differences were observed. These differences must be justified by a theoretical analysis and 
using a statistical program. 
 
 
Fig. A3. Axial and radial view of the reactor TRIGA IPR-R1 simulated in MCNP5 and 
MCNPX codes 
Although the neutron flux value was calculated in 40 positions in the RSR, the reference 
work presents only 11 experimental data. Table A2 presents the values of thermal neutron 
flux calculated by the codes MCNP-4B, MCNP5 and MCNPX 2.6.0. The results are being 
compared with experimental data and the error is presented in percentage. 
Eight positions present differences smaller than 10% and three positions present differences 
smaller than 21%. In this way, it is possible to conclude that the most of the calculated 
results are in good agreement with the experimental measurements. 
The results showed that there is good agreement between the experimental data and the 
values calculated by the used codes. The errors presented by the most of estimated flux are 
smaller than 10% and three positions presented differences between 10 and 21%. The tool 
employed by MCNP5 and MCNPX 2.6.0 estimate the flux average inside of the cylinder 
which contains the sample. However, the used codes have other method to calculate the 
neutron flux as Forced Collision, Point Detectors, Spherical Detector, etc. These tools may 
improve the results decreasing the differences between experimental data and the calculated 
values. For more details of this work see (Guerra et al., 2011). 
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Future woks will simulate the IPR-R1 employing other method to flux calculate. The 
information about neutron flux predicted by MNCP5 and MCNPX 2.6.0 can improve NAA 
where the sample activity can be estimated knowing neutron flux. Furthermore, these codes 
can characterize the neutron flux in other parts of the reactor where experimental measuring 
is difficult to be obtained. 
 
Previous Studies Present Study 
Model 1  
(MCNP 4B) 
 Model 2  
(MCNP5) 
Model 3 
 (MCNPX) 
Position 
RSR 
Experi-
mental 
Value Value Error Value Error Value Error 
1 6.69 6.77 1.18 6.11 8.67 7.14 6.30 
3 6.55 6.65 1.50 6.60 0.76 6.50 0.76 
7 6.35 6.67 4.80 5.79 8.82 6.32 0.47 
10 5.99 6.90 13.19 6.44 6.99 6.24 4.01 
24 6.94 6.98 0.57 6.33 8.79 6.97 0.43 
25 6.45 6.86 5.98 6.91 6.66 6.54 1.38 
29 7.32 6.86 6.28 6.57 10.25 6.77 7.51 
34 7.30 6.73 7.81 5.90 19.18 5.77 20.96 
35 7.18 6.72 6.41 7.00 2.51 6.29 12.40 
38 6.58 6.80 3.24 5.76 12.46 5.58 15.20 
40 6.16 6.73 8.47 5.91 4.06 6.51 5.38 
Table A2. Thermal neutron flux (x 1011 n/cm-2s-1) 
ANNEX B. Example of RELAP5 code application to IPR-R1 research reactor 
BI. Introduction  
The RELAP5 system code was developed to simulate transient scenarios in power reactors 
such as PWR and BWR but recent works have been performed to investigate the 
applicability of the code to research reactors operating conditions with good results. 
Specifically, the TRIGA reactors are constructed in a variety of configurations and 
capabilities, with steady-state power levels ranging from 20 kilowatts to 16 megawatts 
offering true "inherent safety". TRIGA is a pool-type reactor that can be installed without a 
containment building being designed for use by scientific institutions and universities for 
purposes such as graduate education, private commercial research, non-destructive testing 
and isotope production. 
In the present work, the IPR-R1 TRIGA reactor, Mark-I model, installed in Brazil, in 
operation since 1960, has been modeled for RELAP5 code with the aim of to reproduce the 
measured steady-state as well as transient conditions. The development and the calculation 
for the validation of a RELAP5 model for the IPR-R1 TRIGA research reactor have been 
presented. The version MOD3.3 was used to perform the simulations. The current results 
obtained with the developed nodalization demonstrate that the IPR-R1 TRIGA model is 
representative of the reactor behaviour considering steady-state and transient operation 
conditions as it is being described in the next sections.   
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IPR-R1 presents low power, low pressure, for application in research, training and 
radioisotopes production. The reactor is housed in a 6.625 meters deep pool with 1.92 meters 
of internal diameter and filled with light water. A schematic reactor diagram is illustrated in 
the Figure B1. 
 
 
Fig. B1. Schematic representation of the IPR-R1 (out of scale, measure in mm) 
The main aim of the water in the pool is for cooling, as well as moderator, neutron reflector 
and it is able to assure an adequate radioactive shielding. The reactor cooling occurs 
predominantly by natural convection, with the circulation forces governed by the water 
density differences. The heat removal generated from the nuclear fissions is performed 
pumping the pool water through a heat exchanger. The core has a radial cylindrical 
configuration with six concentric rings (A, B, C, D, E, F) with 91 channels able to host either 
fuel rods or other components like control rods, reflectors and irradiator channels. There are 
in the core 63 fuel elements constituted by a cylindrical metal cladding filled with a 
homogeneous mixture of zirconium hydride and Uranium 20% enriched in 235U isotope. 
There are 59 fuel elements covered with aluminium and 4 fuel elements with stainless steel.  
BII. Modelling  
Each of the 63 fuel elements was modelled separately and 63 heat structure (HS) 
components were associated with 13 corresponding hydrodynamic pipe components 
constituting 13 hydrodynamic channels (201 – 213), as can be verified in Figure B2.  
Figure B3 shows the RELAP5 general nodalization developed to simulate the IPR-R1. The 
reactor pool was modelled using two pipe components, each one composed by ten volumes. 
As it can be verified by the Figure B3, both components (020 and 050) have their volumes 
connected by single junctions to characterize a cross flow model. This model improves 
transient predictions as it will be clearly demonstrated in the transient results. A time 
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dependent volume was used to simulate the atmospheric pressure on the pool surface. The 
natural convection system and the primary loop circulation have been modelled. The 
secondary loop, composed mainly by the external cooling tower was not modelled in the 
present nodalization because the primary circuit was sufficient to guaranty the heat removal 
of the coolant. 
 
 
Fig. B2. Representation of the 13 TH channels in RELAP5 model 
 
 
Fig. B3. IPR-R1 TRIGA nodalization in the RELAP5 model 
The point kinetics model was used in the current model. A detailed representation of each 
element is, however, essential to properly take into account the radial power distribution 
associated with the position of the fuel elements. The axial power distribution was 
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calculated considering a cosine profile and taking into account also that the power is cut off 
in the extremes of the element due the presence of the graphite as it is sketched in the Figure 
B4. Although the above modelling procedure is approximated, it is used here to maintain 
the actual axial and radial power distribution fixed. 
 
 
Fig. B4. Prediction of the axial power distribution function in a TRIGA fuel element 
BIII. Steady state results  
The validation of a RELAP5 nodalization implicates that the model reproduces the 
measured steady-state conditions of the system with acceptable margins. The nodalization 
may be considered qualified when it has a geometric fidelity with the system, it reproduces 
the measured steady-state condition of the system, and it demonstrates satisfactory time 
evolution conditions. The RELAP5 steady state calculation has been performed at 50 and 100 
kW. The temperature values at the inlet and outlet of the thermal hydraulic channels 3, 8 
and 13 calculated using RELAP5 can be verified in the Tables B1 and B2, for 50 e 100 kW, 
respectively. The calculated values were compared with the available experimental data 
(inlet and outlet channel temperature). Chromel-alumel calibrated thermocouples were used 
to collect the coolant temperature data and the measured values have a maximum error of 
±1°C. 
As it can be verified in the Table B1, considering operation at 50 kW, the results of the 
RELAP5 code are in good agreement with the experimental data. The error obtained using 
the RELAP5 calculation is into the range of the maximum acceptable error suggested for 
coolant temperature (0.5 %) by the RELAP5 users.  
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Outlet Channel Temperature (K) Inlet Temperature (K)  
TH 
Channel 
Experi- 
mental RELAP5 Error (%)* 
Experi- 
mental RELAP5 Error (%)* 
3 300.0 298.4 0.5 294.1 294.7 0.1 
8 298.0 296.4 0.5 296.1 294.7 0.5 
13 298.0 296.4 0.5 0.4 294.7 0.5 
* error = 100 X (Calculation – Experimental)/Experimental 
Table B1. Experimental and calculated results at 50 kW of power operation 
Results performed at 100 kW of power operation are shown in Table B2. The error found for 
RELAP5 calculation is a few overestimated in comparison with the error suggested for 
coolant temperature (0.5 %) by the RELAP5 users. However, considering the error from the 
experimental data (±1°C) the values predicted using RELAP5 are perfectly acceptable for the 
present model validation process for operation power up to 100 kW. 
 
Outlet Channel Temperature (K) Inlet Temperature (K)  
TH 
Channel 
Experi- 
mental RELAP5 Error (%)* 
Experi- 
mental RELAP5 Error (%)* 
3 304.0 301.3 0.9 294.0 295.7 0.6 
8 300.5 298.8 0.8 295.5 295.7 0.1 
13 301.5 298.8 1.1 296.5 295.7 0.3 
* error = 100 X (Calculation – Experimental)/Experimental 
Table B2. Experimental and calculated results at 100 kW of power operation 
Figures B5 and B6 show the RELAP5 calculation for the inlet and outlet temperature for the 
TH channel 1, at 50 and 100 kW of power, respectively. Such channel was chosen because it 
concentrates the HS with higher values of radial power. As it can be verified, after about 
2500 s of calculation, the temperatures reach steady-state condition. The temperature stable 
values are in good agreement with the experimental available data. 
BIV. Transient results  
In spite of the IPR-R1 to be inherently safe, situations that can disturb the normal reactor 
operation are possible to occur. The RELAP5 model presented in this work has 
demonstrated to reproduce very well the steady-state conditions. Therefore, in addition to 
the validation of the modelling process, a transient event was investigated using the code 
and the results has been compared with available experimental data. The investigated event 
is the forced recirculation off and may be caused by the recirculation pump failure, bringing 
the reactor to operate in natural circulation conditions.  
In the experiment, the reactor operated during about 2.5 hours with the forced cooling 
system switched off and with an indication of 100 kW at the linear neutronic channel 
(Mesquita et al., 2009). The measurements have demonstrated an average temperature-rise 
rate of about 4.8°C/h. At inlet and outlet of a thermal hydraulic channel the temperature 
values were verified to increase about 5.3 °C/h in both cases.  
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Fig. B5. Inlet and outlet coolant temperature for the channel 1 at 50 kW predicted by the 
RELAP5 
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Fig. B6. Inlet and outlet coolant temperature for the channel 1 at 100 kW predicted by the 
RELAP5 
To perform the simulation using the RELAP5, the valve in the primary system (number 600 
in the nodalization) has been closed at 3000 s of calculation after the system to reach steady-
state condition. After the beginning of the transient, the temperatures increase as 
consequence of no energy removal from the pool since the primary was off (see Figure B7). 
After the beginning of the transient, the coolant temperature at inlet and outlet TH channel 1 
increased gradually with rates of about 4.9°C/h and 4.6°C/h, respectively, demonstrating 
very good agreement with the experimental available data. 
The insertion of the cross flow model in the pool nodalization makes possible better removal 
of heat from the core during natural circulation condition due improvement on the coolant 
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Fig. B7. Inlet and outlet coolant temperature for the channel 1 at 100 kW predicted by the 
RELAP5 after forced recirculation off at 3000 s 
flow between the pool pipe volumes. Figure B8 illustrates the coolant temperature code 
prediction considering the nodalization presented in this paper and that in the nodalization 
without cross flow model, both at 100 kW of power operation. The curves show clearly that 
the model using cross flow presents a temperature-rise rate (4.9°C/h) much more 
approximated to the experimental (4.8°C/h) than that without cross flow model (30.0°C/h). 
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Fig. B8. Forced recirculation off transient prediction using two types of pool nodalization 
BV. Conclusion  
Considering the three basic aspects necessary to qualify a nodalization for a system 
(geometric fidelity, reproduction of the measured steady-state conditions and satisfactory 
time evolution conditions), it is possible to conclude that the RELAP5 model presented in 
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this work was qualified to represent adequately the IPR-R1 TRIGA research reactor in 
steady-state as well as in transient situations. 
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1. Introduction 
The Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) is one of the most important design basis accidents 
(DBA). In light water reactors, particularly the pressurized water reactor (PWR), the severity 
of a LOCA will limit how high the reactor power can operate. In the regulatory analysis 
(USNRC, 1987), it was estimated that if the peak cladding temperature (PCT) during a 
LOCA decreases by 100°F, it would be possible to raise the plant power by 10%. The 
revision of 10 CFR50.46 in 1988 stated that two kinds of LOCA licensing approaches can be 
accepted, namely the realistic and Appendix K methodologies. The realistic licensing 
technique describes the behavior of the reactor system during a LOCA with best estimate 
(BE) codes. However, the uncertainties of BELOCA analysis must be identified and assessed 
so that the uncertainties in the calculated results can be estimated to a high confidence level. 
Alternatively, the Appendix K approach will guarantee the conservatism of the calculation 
results, instead of answering the analytical uncertainty. It is widely believed that the realistic 
approach can more precisely calculate the sequences of a LOCA accident, and therefore 
provides a greater margin for the PCT evaluation. The associated margin can be more than 
200K (Westinghouse, 2009). However, the development of a realistic LOCA methodology is 
long and costly, and the safety authority is highly demanding in their approach to evaluate 
uncertainties. Instead, implementation of evaluation models required by Appendix K of 10 
CFR 50 (USNRC, 1988) upon an advanced thermal–hydraulic platform, such as RELAP5-3D 
(RELAP5-3D Code development Team, 1998), TRAC (Liles et al., 1981), CATHARE (Bestion, 
1990) et al., also can gain significant margin in the PCT calculation. For instance, the PCT of 
Taiwan’s Maanshan Nuclear Power Plant calculated by the latest Westinghouse Appendix K 
Evaluation Model BASH (Westinghouse, 1987) is 445°F (2170°F→1725°F) lower than that of 
1981´s calculation (Taipower Company, 1982). 
To develop a new Appendix K LOCA licensing tool using the most advanced version of 
RELAP5, namely RELAP5-3D, the compliance of the advanced RELAP5-3D code with 
Appendix K of 10 CFR 50 has been evaluated, and it was found that there are nine areas 
where code assessment and/or further modifications were required to satisfy the 
requirements set forth in Appendix K of 10 CFR 50. All of the ten areas have been evaluated 
 
Nuclear Power - System Simulations and Operation 
 
44 
and the RELAP5-3D has been successfully modified to fulfill the associated requirements. It 
was also demonstrated that all the phases of both LBLOCA and SBLOCA can be covered in 
RELAP5-3D/K.  
To quantify uncertainty in BELOCA analysis, generally there are two categories of 
uncertainties required to be identified and quantified, which involve model uncertainties 
and plant status uncertainties. Particularly, it will take huge effort to systematically quantify 
individual model uncertainty of a best estimate LOCA code. Instead of applying a full ranged 
BELOCA methodology to cover both model and plant status uncertainties, a deterministic- 
realistic hybrid methodology (DRHM) was also developed to support LOCA licensing 
analysis with RELAP5-3D/K. Regarding the DRHM methodology, Appendix K deterministic 
evaluation models are adopted to ensure model conservatism, while CSAU methodology 
(Boyack, B., et al., 1989) is applied to quantify the effect of plant status uncertainty on PCT 
calculation. Generally, DRHM methodology can generate about 80-100K (Liang, et al., 2011) 
margin on PCT as compared to traditional Appendix K bounding state LOCA analysis.  
2. Development and assessment of RELAP5-3D/K  
To develop an Appendix K version of RELAP5-3D, the best-estimate version of RELAP5-3D 
was modified and assessed (Liang et al., 2002) to fulfill requirements set forth in Appendix 
K of 10CFR50. Nine build-in models in RELAP5-3D need to be modified and assessed (Schultz 
et al., 1999), which include (1) Metal-Water Reaction Rate; (2) Discharge Model; (3) ECC 
Bypass Model; (4) Critical Heat Flux During Blowdown; (5) Post–CHF Heat Transfer During 
Blowdown; (6) Prevention from Returning to Nucleate Boiling and Transition Boiling Heat 
Transfer Prior to Reflood; (7) Core Flow Distribution During Blowdown; (8) Reflood rate for 
PWR; and (9) Refill and Reflood Heat Transfer for PWRs. Separate-effects experiments were 
applied to assess specific code models and ensure that each modification can function 
properly. The separate effects assessment cases for each modification are summarized in 
Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Matrix of Separate-effect assessments 
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2.1 Code modification and Separate-effect assessments 
2.1.1 Metal-water reaction rate 
Since melting of fuel cladding is not the applicable domain, the parabolic rate low from the 
Baker-Just model (Baker et al., 1962) would be applied to calculate the fuel oxidation from 
zirconium-water reaction. Once the oxidation thickness has been evaluated, the associated 
amount of reaction heat added to the cladding and hydrogen generation also would be 
calculated. The Cathcart data (Cathcart, 1977) was used to assess the implementation of the 
Baker-Just models into RELAP5-3D. Cathcart measured the isothermal reaction rates of 
Zircaloy-4 tubes in steam at elevated temperatures. After the specified oxidation time, the 
tube was removed and the oxide thickness was measured using standard metallographic 
techniques. Typical assessment calculation is shown in Figure 1. It can be seen that at a 
higher bath temperature (1500°C), the conservatism of the Baker-Just model is very clear. 
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Fig. 1. Oxidation thickness of zirconium 4 (temperature 1504°C) 
2.1.2 Discharge model 
The Moody model (Moody, 1965) for the calculation of two phase choked flow and the 
Henry Fauske model (Fauske et al., 1971)for the single phase liquid choked flow were added 
to RELAP5-3D to make a break flow evaluation model. Regarding applying the Moody 
model, the stagnation conditions (po, ho) need to be derived from the cell center immediately 
upstream of the exit plane. The stagnation enthalpy can be calculated from the cell center 
properties as: 
 
2 2
0 ( )(1 ) ( )2 2
f g
f g
v v
h h x h x= + − + +  (1) 
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where the local enthalpies, fluid velocities and flow quality are evaluated at the equilibrium 
condition at the cell center. By assuming an isentropic process, the stagnation pressure can 
then be obtained from the local entropy defined by the cell center properties and the 
stagnation enthalpy through steam table iteration: 
  ( ), ( , )o o oP P h s h P=  (2) 
Data from Marviken Test 22 (Erickson et al., 1977) was used to assess the implementation of 
the Moody model. Marviken Test 22 was a full-scale critical flow test. The break was 
connected to the bottom of a large pressure vessel. The pressure vessel, which was originally 
part of the Marviken Nuclear Power Station in Sweden, was 5.2 meters in diameter and 24.6 
meters tall. The vessel initially contained regions of subcooled liquid, saturated liquid and a 
steam dome. The assessment calculations against measured break flow are shown in Figure 
2. The conservatism of the Moody model in two-phase choked flow was demonstrated. 
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Fig. 2. Comparison of measured and calculated break flow 
2.1.3 ECC bypass model  
During the ECC bypass period, the emergency coolant would be held in the upper 
downcomer region. Those ECC water would accumulate in the inlet lines, and then leave 
RCS through the break without taking decay heat from the reactor core, until the vapor flow 
from the core can no longer sustain the water in the downcomer. The downcomer flooding 
model derived from the UPTF full-scale test (Siemens, 1988) was applied to determine when 
the ECC water could penetrate the downcomer through the RELAP5-3D regular CCFL input 
process. The UPTF downcomer flooding model is: 
 *1/2 *1/22.193 0.6208g fj j+ =  (3) 
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According to the requirement, before the end of the bypass period all the injected ECC water 
needs to be removed from the system. To fulfill the ECC subtraction requirement, a set of 
time dependent junction and volume (TMDPJUN, TMDPVOL) would be connected to the 
cold leg of the broken loop close to the downcomer. Equal amount of injected ECC water 
will be forced to be on-line removed from the reactor system by this artificial set of 
TMDPJUN and TMDPVOL before the end of ECC bypass. The boron transport calculation 
of RELAP5-3D can indicate when the end of ECC bypass takes place. This boron model will 
trace the transport of the borated ECC water. Once the borated ECC water penetrates the 
downcomer and reaches the lower plenum, a signal of the end of ECC bypass will be 
generated and the ECC subtraction scheme via the TMDPJUN and TMDPVOL will be 
automatically terminated. The comparison of actual injected ECC water in the LOFT L2-5 
(Davis, 1998) and the one calculated by the Appendix K model is shown in Figure 3. 
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Fig. 3. Comparison of measured and  calculated ECC water 
2.1.4 Critical heat flux during blowdown 
The set of three Appendix K CHF correlations used in RELAP4/MOD7 (Behling et al., 1981) 
would be adopted, which includes B&W-2, Barnett and Hughes (modified Barnett) 
correlations, to cover the pressure range of interest. For the high-pressure range (P>10.34 
MPa), B&W-2 was applied; for the medium pressure range (8.96 MPa>P>6.89MPa), Barnett 
correlation was applied; for the low-pressure range (P < 5 MPa), the modified Branett was 
adopted. For pressures between ranges, interpolation by pressure was applied to calculate 
the correspond CHF: 
  
( ) ( )
L HH CHF L CHF
CHF
H L
P P q P P q
q
P P
− + −= −  (4) 
where index H and L represent the high and low ends of the interpolation range. Rod 
bundle heat transfer tests (Yoder et al., 1982) performed in the Thermal-Hydraulic Test 
Facility (THTF) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) were used to assess the CHF 
model and film boiling heat transfer. These tests were performed using an 8 ×8 fuel bundle. 
The rod geometry was representative of 17 ×17 fuel bundles, and the full-length bundle was 
electrically heated and had uniform axial and radial profiles. Three tests were used for 
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assessment the CHF calculation, which include tests 3.07.9B, 3.07.9N and 3.07.9W. The range 
of conditions during this test was representative of those expected during a large break 
LOCA. A typical comparison of the location first experiencing CHF is shown in Figure 4. It 
can be seen that the CHF location predicted by the EM models was conservatively lower. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Comparison of measured and calculated surface temperatures for THTF-307.9B test 
2.1.5 Post-CHF heat transfer during blowdown 
Two correlations suggested by Appendix K of 10 CFR 50 were adopted to calculate film 
boiling and transition boiling heat transfer. For the stable film boiling, Groeneveld 5.7 was 
applied, while the McDonough-Milich-King correlation was used for transition boiling heat 
transfer. Once CHF has occurred, the greater heat flux would be applied which were 
calculated by either the film boiling or transition boiling correlations. As stated in Appendix 
K, the Groeneveld correlation shall not be used in the region near its low-pressure 
singularity. As suggested by INEEL (Schultz et al., 1999), for high flow ( *1/2 *1/2 1.36g fj j+ >  
for up flow, *1/2 *1/2 3.5g fj j+ > for downflow) if pressure is less than 1.38 MPa, the modified 
Dittus-Boelter correlation can be used to replace the Groeneveld correlation. If the core flow 
is not high, the modified Bromley correlation by Hsu with convection can be used to correct 
the low-pressure singularity. Typical assessments against THTF tests for film boiling heat 
transfer of the EM model are shown in Figure 5. As for the assessment of transition boiling 
heat transfer, THTF transition test with power ramping (THTF-303.6AR) was adopted. A 
typical comparison is shown in Figure 6. 
2.1.6 Prevention from returning to nucleate boiling and transition boiling  
As required by Appendix K, during the blowdown phase once CHF occurs, transition 
boiling and nucleate boiling heat transfer shall not be reapplied for the remainder of the 
LOCA blowdown, unless the reflood phase of the transition has been entered. Assessment 
of the artificial prevention algorithm is shown in Figure 7. This figure depicts the mode 
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change with and without the prevention algorithm. It can be seen that nucleate boiling heat 
transfer was successfully prevented by the algorithm which modifies the existing heat 
transfer logic. 
 
  
Fig. 5. Comparison of measured and calculated temperature changes for film boiling 
assessment 
 
 
Fig. 6. Comparison of measured and for transition boiling assessment 
2.1.7 Core flow distribution during blowdown 
To fulfill the requirement of taking into account cross flow between regions and any flow 
blockage calculated to occur during blowdown as a result of cladding swelling or rupture, 
the feature of the cross flow junction of the RELAP5-3D would be applied. In cross flow 
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junctions, the transverse momentum convection terms are neglected. Therefore, there is no 
transport of x-direction momentum due to the flow in the transverse direction. To assess the 
calculation of core flow distribution under flow partial blockage, two EPRI flow blockage 
tests (Tapucu et al., 1984) were adopted in which single-phase liquid and two-phase 
air/water were used for a range of blockages and flow conditions. The comparisons of the 
calculated channel pressure distribution for the unblocked channel of the two-phase test 
against measurements is shown in Figure 8. 
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Fig. 7. Heat transfer mode calculated by the modified RELAP5-3D with & w/o nucleate 
boiling lock-out 
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Fig. 8. Comparison of measured and calculated pressure distributions of the blocked 
channel 
2.1.8 Reflood rate for PWRs 
According to Appendix K of 10 CFR 50, the calculated carryover fraction and mass in 
bundle needs to be verified against applicable experimental data. In the existing PSI reflood 
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model (Analytis, 1996) of RELAP5-3D, the modified Bestion correlation was used for 
interfacial drag in vertical bubbly-slug flow at pressures below 10 bars to replace the EPRI 
correlation. Above 20 bars the EPRI correlation was used. Between 10 and 20 bars the 
interfacial drag was interpolated. To assess the performance of the PSI model in the best 
estimate version of the RELAP5-3D, five FLECHT-SEASET tests (31504, 31203, 31302, 31805 
and 33338) (Loftus et al., 1980) were adopted. For the first four forced reflood tests, the 
flooding rates ranged from 0.81 inch/s to 3.01 inch/s. As for the last gravity-driven reflood 
test, the flooding rate was up to 11.8 inch/s during the accumulator injection period. Typical 
assessments were shown in Figures 9 and 10. Through the assessments against five reflood 
tests, it was found that the PSI model could predict the flooding rate reasonable well but 
with enough conservatism. 
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Fig. 9. Comparison of measured and calculated carryover fractions 
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Fig. 10. Comparison of measured and calculated bundle masses 
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2.1.9 Refill and reflood heat transfer for PWRs 
During reflood phase, the RELAP5-3D PSI model was adopted to fulfill the Appendix K 
requirement for a flooding rate greater than 1 inch/sec with necessary modifications. In the 
PSI model, a modified Weisman correlation calculating the heat transfer to liquid and a 
modified Dittus-Boelter correlation calculating the heat transfer to vapor replace the Chen 
transition boiling correlation. As for film boiling, heat transfer to liquid uses the maximum 
of a film coefficient contributed by the modified Bromley correlation, and a Forslund-
Rohsenow coefficient. In addition, radiation to droplets is added to the final film-boiling 
coefficient to liquid. The heat transfer to vapor for film boiling is the same as the one for 
transition boiling, which was calculated by the modified Dittus-Boelter. As required by the 
Appendix K of 10 CFR 50, when the flooding rate is less than 1 inch/s, only steam cooling in 
the PSI model was allowed. Assessment calculations were performed to against the five 
FLECHT SEASET tests discussed above. To bind the peak cladding temperature (PCT) span 
on each measured fuel rods at the same elevation, the calculated heat transfer coefficient 
calculated by the original PSI model was reduced by a factor of 0.6 for the flooding rate 
greater than 1 inch/sec to ensure reasonable conservatism. Typical comparison of the PCTs 
is shown in Figures 11. While the comparison of heat transfer coefficients is shown in 
Figures 12. 
 
  
Fig. 11. Comparison of measured and calculated peak cladding temperatures 
2.2 RELAP5-3D/K integral-effect assessments 
To verify the overall conservatism of the newly developed Appendix K version of RELAP5-
3D, 11 sets of integral LOCA experimental data covering SBLOCA and LBLOCA for both 
PWR and BWR, were applied, as listed in Table 2 and Table 3 for both PWR and BWR 
respectively. In this paper, only integral assessments LOFT LBLOCA experiment L2-5 
(Anklam et al., 1982) and SBLOCA S-LH-1 (Grush et al., 1981) were summarized. 
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Fig. 12. Comparisons of measured and calculated heat transfer coefficients 
 
Cases L2-3 L2-5 Lp-Lb-1 S-06-3 L3-7 S-LH-1 IIST 
Break Size 200% 200% 200% 200% 0.1% 5% 2% 
Break 
Location Cold Leg Cold Leg Cold Leg Cold Leg Cold Leg Cold Leg Cold Leg 
Notes RCP Running 
RCP 
Tripped 
Higher 
Power 
RCP 
Running 
Without 
Core 
Heatup 
With Core 
Heatup 
With 
Core 
Heatup 
Table 2. Matrix of PWR LOCA integral effect assessments 
 
Cases TLTA 6425 FIST 6DBA1B FIST 6LB1A FIST 6SB2C 
Break Size 200% 200% 100% 2% 
Break Location Recir. Line Break Recir. Line Break LPCI Line Break Recir. Line Break 
Notes   ADS Actuation HPCS Unavailable 
Table 3. Matrix of BWR LOCA integral effect assessments 
2.2.1 LBLOCA assessment 
In the assessment of LOFT L2-5, important parameters including break flow, downcomer 
water level and hot spot heat transfer coefficient calculated from both evaluation model 
(EM) and best estimate (BE) model were shown in Figures 13, 14 and 15 respectively. It can 
be seen that results from EM model are relatively conservative. The comparison of peak 
cladding temperature (PCT) against measurement was shown in Figure 16. The calculated 
PCT from EM model clearly bounds not only the BE PCT but also all the measurement 
scatterings. The conservative PCT calculated by RELAP5-3D/K against LBLOCA experiments 
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from both LOFT and Semi-scale was summarized in Table 4 and the conservative trend is 
shown in Figure 17. It can be seen that RELAP5-3D/K can conservatively predict PCT by 60-
260 K. 
 
  
Fig. 13. Comparison of break flow of LOFT LBLOCA L2-5 
 
 
Fig. 14. Comparison of downcomer water level of LOFT LBLOCA L2-5 
2.2.2 SBLOCA assessment 
SBLOCA experiment Semi-Scale S-LH-1 is a typical 5% cold break. Most important SBLOCA 
phenomena were involved in S-LH-1 experiment, which includes early core uncover caused 
by the core level depression, loop seal clearance and later core heat up caused by core boiled 
off. The calculated break flow, core water level and PCT against S-LH-1 (5% SBLOCA) were 
shown in Figures 18, 19 and 20 respectively. The conservatism of RELAP5-3D/K in SBLOCA 
analysis generally can be observed. 
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Fig. 15. Comparison of core heat transfer coefficient of LOFT LBLOCA L2-5 
 
  
Fig. 16. Comparison of peak cladding temperature of LOFT LBLOCA L2-5 
 
 
Fig. 17. Conservative trend of PCT calculated by RELAP5-3D/K 
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Fig. 18. Comparison of breaks flow of semiscale SBLOCA S-LH-1 
 
Cases Measured  PCTs (°K) 
PCTs by BE  
Model (°K) 
PCTs by EM  
Model (°K) 
PCT (°K)  
(PCTEM-PCTexp) 
L2-5 1057.2 998.6 1123.1 65.9 
L2-3 898.3 938.1 1094.6 196.3 
LP-LB-1 1252.4 1290.5 1343.4 91.0 
S-06-3 1061.2 1123.7 1320.5(1271.2*) 259.3(210.0*) 
TLTA6425 608.9 599.7 745.0 136.1 
FIST 6DBA1B 646.9 691.3 714.9 68.0 
Table 4. Summary of LBLOCA assessments 
 
 
Fig. 19. Comparison of core water level of semiscale SBLOCA S-LH-1 
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Fig. 20. Comparison of peak cladding temperature of semiscale SBLOCA S-LH-1 
3. Deterministic-realistic hybrid methodology for LOCA licensing analysis  
Instead of applying a full ranged BELOCA methodology to cover both model and plant 
status uncertainties, a deterministic-realistic hybrid methodology (DRHM) was developed 
to support LOCA licensing analysis with RELAP5-3D/K. In the DRHM methodology, 
Appendix K evaluation models are still adopted to ensure conservatism of physical model, 
while CSAU methodology is applied to quantify the effect of plant status uncertainty on 
PCT calculation. To ensure the model conservatism, not only physical model should satisfy 
requirements set forth in the Appendix K of 10 CFR 50, sensitivity studies also need to be 
performed to ensure a conservative plant modeling. 
 
 
Fig. 21. PCT safety margins calculated by BE and appendix K LOCA methodologies 
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To statistically consider the plant status uncertainties, which involve uncertainties of plant 
initial condition, accident boundary condition and plant system settings, the NRC endorsed 
CSAU methodology is applied. Three major elements are involved in the CSAU methodology, 
which are (I) requirements and capabilities, (II) assessment and ranging of parameters and (III) 
sensitivity and uncertainty analysis. Since Appendix K conservative models will be adopted to 
cover physical model uncertainties, model assessments stated in element II are not related. 
Instead, ranking and ranging of plant status uncertainty would be the major focus. The 
resulting PCT by using DRHM method theoretically can be lower than the PCTAPK but higher 
than the PCT95/95 (PCT calculated by BELOCA methodology) as illustrated in Figure 21. 
In DRHM methodology, six sequential steps are included, which are (1) ranking of plant 
status parameters, (2) ranging of plant status uncertainties, (3) development of a run matrix 
by random sampling, (4) using conservative E.M. model to perform LOCA analysis of each 
trial, (5) statistical analysis of calculated figure of merit (PCTs) and (6) determine licensing 
value of PCT. The procedure of DRHM is shown in Figure 22 and each step will be 
elaborated as following: 
 
Item Number Uncertainty Attributes Plant Parameters 
1 Break Type 
2 Break Area 
3 Core Average Linear Heat Rate 
4 Initial Average Fluid Temperature 
5 Pressurizer Pressure 
6 Accumulator Liquid Volume 
7 Accumulator Pressure 
8 Accumulator Temperature 
9 Safety Injection Temperature 
10 Peak Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (FQ) 
11 Peak Hot Rod Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor (FDH) 
12 Axial Power Distribution (PBOT) 
13 Axial Power Distribution (PMID) 
14 Off-Site Power 
15 ECCS Capacity 
Table 5. Major plant status parameters 
(1) Ranking of plant status parameters 
Plant parameters which will affect LOCA analysis can be generally divided into three 
groups, namely plant initial conditions, accident boundary conditions and plant system 
settings. Essential plant parameters need to be identified and ranked to limit the scope of 
uncertainty analysis. Typical PWR important plant status parameters are listed in Table 5. 
Major plant status parameters generally involve system initial conditions, core initial 
conditions, ECCS initial conditions, boundary conditions and system settings. 
(2) Ranging of plant status uncertainties 
To define the uncertainty of a plant parameter, not only the uncertainty range needs to be 
quantified, but also the distribution function needs to be specified. Three different kinds of 
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Ranking of Plant Status Parameters 
PCTi Distribution Check
(Goodness of fit)
PCT95/95,L max(PCT95/95 , PCT1st /PCT2nd)
Ranging of Parameter Uncertainty &
Distribution Identification
Development of Run Matrix by Random 
             Sampling (59/124 trials )
Using RELAP 5 - 3D/K to perform LOCA 
Analysis of Each Trail, PCTi , i = 1,N
                PCTi , N=1,59 
                          or 
                PCTi , N=1,124
          PCT95/95 PCT1st , N=59 (1 output)
                                    or 
          PCT95/95 PCT1st , N=124 (3 outputs)
Calculate the Value of PCT95/95 
Yes
No
Non-parametric
Approach
Parametric
Approach
Plant Boundary 
Conditions
Plant Initial 
Conditions
Plant System 
Settings
Penalized of Un -
ranged Parameters 
Parameter Bias
=
<
<
 
Fig. 22. Procedures of DRHM methodology 
elements contribute the total uncertainty of a particular plant status parameter, which 
involve measurement uncertainty, fabrication uncertainty and normal operational range. 
For instance, the uncertainties of system pressure and coolant average temperature (Tavg) are 
majorly contributed by measurement uncertainty. While for the uncertainty of the total 
peaking factor (FQ), measurement uncertainty, fabrication uncertainty and operational 
uncertainty are all involved. The associated range of operational uncertainty of FQ can be 
determined by the nominal technical specification value (typically 2.274) and statistical 
upper bounding operating value (typically 2.000). As for the determination of power shape, 
the traditional bounding shape will be relaxed by sampling realistic operating shapes. Each 
 
Nuclear Power - System Simulations and Operation 
 
60 
operating power shape can be divided into three segments, Pmid, Pbot and (1- Pmid-Pbot). With 
the sampling values of FΔH, FQ, Pmid and Pbot, a unique power shape can be defined as shown 
in Figure 23. 
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Fig. 23. Sampling of power shapes 
(3) Development of a run matrix by random sampling 
Once the major system parameters have been identified and ranged, random sampling of 
each parameter needs to be performed to generate a run matrix. Typical parameter samplings 
of FQ, Prcs, Tavg and Pacc are shown in Figure 24. The run matrix needs to consist of trials of 59 
sets, 93 sets or 124 sets according to the order statistic method (David and Nagaraja, 1980). 
 
 
Fig. 24. Typical parameter sampling 
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(4) Using conservative plant E.M. model to perform LOCA analysis of each trial 
Conservative plant E.M. model will be applied to analyze each trial to calculate the PCT of 
each LOCA event. Regarding the conservative plant E.M. model, requirements of Appendix 
K for physical models will be satisfied, and a conservative plant specific model will be 
implemented based on sensitivity studies. Since RELAP5-3D/K is an Appendix K version of 
RELAP5-3D, it will be adopted to build a plant specific model. 
(5) Statistical analysis of calculated figure of merit (PCTs) 
Once the PCT of each trial can be calculated, both parametric (Devore, 2004) and non-
parametric statistical approaches (David and Nagaraja, 1980) can be applied to determine 
the statistical upper tolerance limit. The parametric approach can directly calculate the 
PCT95/95 while the non-parametric approach can conservatively estimate of value of PCT95/95.  
Non-parametric approach  
In this approach, it is not necessary to identify the distribution of PCT outcomes. If only one 
outcome is cited from each trail, the Wilk’s formula (David & Nagaraja, 1980) can be applied 
to calculate the estimator the 95/95 upper tolerance limit.  
 1 Nβ γ= −  (5) 
where β is the confidence level, γ is the tolerance interval and N is the required number of 
samples. According to the Wilk’s formula, the 95/95 value can be conservatively estimated 
by either the greatest PCT from 59 trials, the 2nd highest value of PCT from 93 trials or the 
3rd highest value of PCT from 124 trials. That is: 
 95/95 1 (59)stY Y≈  or 95/95 2 (93)ndY Y≈   or  95/95 3 (124)rdY Y≈  (6) 
If more than one outcome needs to be cited from each trial, the Guba’s formula (Guba and 
Makai, 2003) can be used: 
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where N is the sample size and P is the number of output variables. If output variable is 
only one, the Guba formula will reduce to Wilk’ formula. 
Parametric approach 
In this approach, the distribution of outcome needs to be identified by using fitting test, such 
as goodness-of-fitting test. If a certain distribution can be identified, such as normal 
distribution or uniform distribution, the population mean (μp) and population standard 
deviation (σp) can be projected by sample mean (μs) and sample standard deviation (σs) 
under a certain confidence level, such as 95%. The sample mean (μs) and sample standard 
deviation (σs) are: 
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If normal distribution can be assumed by goodness-of-fitting test, the μp and σp under a 
given confidence level can be expressed as:  
  ( 1) /p s st n nαμ μ σ⎡ ⎤≤ + − ∗⎣ ⎦  (9) 
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2
2
1
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( 1)
s
p
n
nα
σσ χ −
−≤ −  (10) 
where tα(n-1) is the student t variable at (1-α) confidence level under (n-1) degree of 
freedom, 21 ( 1)nαχ − − is 2χ variable at (1-α) confidence level under (n-1) degree of freedom. 
Once μp and σp are projected at 95% confidence level (μp,95% , σp,95% ), the 95/95 coverage can 
be directly expressed as: 
 95/95 ,95% ,95%1.645p pY μ σ= +  (11) 
 
(6) Determine licensing value of PCT 
If both parametric and nonparametric approaches and be applied to calculate the 95/95 
upper tolerance limit, then the maximum value of these two calculations will be defined as 
the licensing value of PCT. That is: 
 
 sin 95/95max( , )Licen g orderPCT PCT PCT=  (12) 
 
where PCT95/95 is the PCT statistical upper bounding value determined by the parametric 
approach, and PCTorder is the PCT statistical upper bounding value determined by non-
parametric order statistic method. 
4. Application of DRHM on PWR LBLOCA analysis with RELAP5-3D/K 
To demonstrate the benefit of DRHM method for LOCA analysis, uncertainty ranges and 
distributions of each essential plant parameter identified by Westinghouse (Westinghouse, 
2009) are applied to analyze LBLOCA using DRHM method for the Taiwan Maanshan 3-
loop PWR plant. The resulting PCT by DRHM method will be compared with the PCT 
calculated by traditional Appendix K bounding parameter analysis.  
In Maanshan DRHM LBLOCA analysis, 59 trails are generated by random sampling of 
major plant parameters listed in Table 5. The resulting PCT of each trail are shown in Figure 
25 and the greatest PCT among 59 sets is 1284.6K. Therefore, the PCT95/95 estimated by order 
statistic method is: 
 
 [ ]95/95 , 1,59 1284.6order iPCT PCT Max PCT i K≈ = = =  (13) 
 
Furthermore, the 59 sets of PCT were also arranged into six groups in sequential order for 
goodness of fitting test by using the Pearson Chi-squares test statistic (Devore, 2004): 
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Fig. 25. Calculated PCT of each trial figure 
where n is the total number of samples, ni is the number of samples in group i and pˆ  is the 
probability estimated by integration over group i with standard normal distribution 
function. The Pearson Chi-squares test statistic will be checked with the Chi-squares critical 
value, 2 ( 1)k rαχ − −  where k is the number of group (k=6) and r is the number of unknowns 
(r=2). A rejection region at (1-α) confidence level will be defined by 2 ( 1)k rαχ − −  as : 
 2 2 ( 1)k rαχ χ≥ − −  (15) 
Therefore, the successful condition of goodness-of-fit test at 95% confidence level will be: 
 2 2 20.05( 1) (3) 7.815k rαχ χ χ< − − = =  (16) 
Since 2χ  is 4.376 and it is less than the Chi-squares critical value ( 20.05(3) 7.815χ = ), therefore 
the distribution normality can be accepted and the classical parametric approach can be 
applied to project the μp and σp base on the μs and σs under a giver confidence level. Under 
95% confidence level the population mean value of PCT can be no greater than:  
 ,95% ( 1) * / 967.6p s st n n Kαμ μ σ⎡ ⎤≤ + − =⎣ ⎦  (17) 
and the population standard deviation of PCT can be no greater than: 
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As a result, the PCT95/95 calculated by parametric approach is: 
 95/95 ,95% ,95%1.645 * 1272.9p pPCT Kμ σ= + =  (19) 
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Comparing PCT95/95 (1272.9K) and PCTorder (1284.6K), it can be seen that statistical upper 
bounding values of PCT calculated by both parametric and nonparametric approaches are 
quite close. 
To further demonstrate the benefit of DRHM method, sensitivity studies of major plant 
parameters were performed to identify the bounding state covering associated parameter 
uncertainties. In the bounding state analysis, the worse combination of either lower bounds 
or upper bounds of parameters are investigated. The bounding state was identified to be the 
upper bounding values of reactor power, FQ, FΔH, Tavg, and accumulator temperature and 
pressure, as well as the lower bounding values of system pressure, ECC temperature and 
accumulator water volume (Liang, 2010). Results of bounding state analysis were shown in 
Figure 26, and the PCT of bounding states was identified to be 1385.2K. Resulting PCTs 
from DRHM method and bounding state analysis were shown in Figure 27. It can be seen 
that the additional PCT margin generated by statistically combining plant status 
uncertainty, compared to traditional bounding state analysis, can be as great as 100K. A 
similar application of DRHM on the LOFT L2-5 based on the same plant status uncertainty 
was also performed (Zhang et al., 2010), and the resulting PCT analysis is shown in Figure 
28. It can be observed that a comparable margin of PCT also was indicated. Furthermore, the 
standardized regression coefficient (SRC) method was also applied to analyze the 
importance of each parameter uncertainty of Maanshan plant, and the result is shown in 
Figure 29. It can be seen that parameter uncertainties of accumulator settings (pressure, 
liquid volume and temperature), ECC injection temperature, Tavg and power shape are 
relatively important. 
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26. Bounding state analysis of PCT 
5. Conclusions 
Licensing safety analysis can only be performed by approved evaluation models, and E.M. 
models are composed by two major elements, which involve qualified computational codes 
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and approved methodology. It is well recognized that B.E. analysis with full-scoped 
uncertainty quantification can provide significant safety margin than traditional conservative 
safety analysis, and the margin can be as great as 200K for LOCA analysis. Although a best-
estimate LOCA methodology can provide the greatest margin for the PCT evaluation during 
a LOCA, it generally takes more resources to develop. Instead, implementation of 
evaluation models required by Appendix K of 10 CFR 50 upon an advanced thermal-
hydraulic platform can also gain significant margin on the PCT calculation but with fewer 
resources. An appendix K version of RELAP5-3D has been successfully developed and 
through though assessments, the reasonable conservatism of RELAP5-3D/K calculation was 
clearly demonstrated in whole area of a LOCA event, which covering hydraulics and heat 
transfer in the phases of blowdown, refill and reflood. 
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Fig. 27. Comparison of PCTs from both DRHM and bounding appendix K analysis for 
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Fig. 28. Comparison of PCTs from both DRHM and bounding state analysis for LOFT L2-5 
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Fig. 29. Importance analysis of plant status parameters 
Instead of applying a full scoped BELOCA methodology to cover both model and plant 
status uncertainties, a deterministic- realistic hybrid methodology (DRHM) was developed 
to support LOCA licensing analysis. In the DRHM methodology, Appendix K deterministic 
evaluation models are adopted to ensure model conservatism, while CSAU methodology is 
applied to quantify the effect of plant status uncertainty on PCT calculation. To ensure the 
model conservatism, not only physical model should satisfy requirements set forth in the 
Appendix K of 10 CFR 50, sensitivity studies also need to be performed to ensure a 
conservative plant modeling. To statistically quantify the effect of plant status uncertainty 
on PCT, random sampling technique is applied, and both parametric and non-parametric 
methods are adopted to calculate or estimate the statistical upper bounding value (95/95). 
When applying the DRHM for LBLOCA analysis, the margin generated can be as great as 
80-100K as compared to Appendix K bounding state LOCA analysis. 
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Norway 
1. Introduction 
All software systems can contain faults. In critical systems, this problem is alleviated by 
controlling the possible effects of a fault being executed, typically through techniques for 
achieving fault tolerance. Ensuring that failures are properly isolated, and not allowed to 
propagate, is essential when developing critical systems.  
In much of the research on error propagation analysis the focus has been on probabilistic 
models. While these models are well suited for quantitative analysis, they are usually not 
very specific with regard to the actual mechanisms that might allow a failure to propagate 
between entities. Quantitative analysis is often applied on code level and not seen as 
influenced by and in conjunction with the operating system. A more detailed insight into the 
actual mechanisms can be beneficial to decide whether or not error propagation is a concern 
for a given source code.  
A method for studying mechanisms of error propagation between software processes was 
proposed in (Sarshar, 2007). This chapter describes the method, which (1) facilitates the 
study of error propagation between software processes; (2) identifies mechanisms for error 
propagation; and (3) provides means to determine whether these can be automatically 
detected by a static analyser. In this context a process represents a program in execution, 
typically managed by an operating system. Processes can communicate with each other via 
inter-process communication and their shared resources. Examples of shared resources can 
be the operating system itself and the memory. The analysed problem is how one process 
can cause another process to fail and concerns interaction methods available in the source 
code of a program. The work criteria and scope are described in the following: 
• Consider processes running on a single CPU computer with an operating system. 
• The method should only require the source code and minimal manual input to work. 
• The source code must compile without any errors prior to the analysis. 
• The primary interest is to determine whether error propagation is a concern or not. 
This chapter further reports on the applicability of the method in a case where a module of a 
core surveillance framework named SCORPIO has been analysed. The framework is a 
support system for nuclear power plants supporting monitoring and prediction of core 
conditions.  
Some of the terminologies used in this chapter are briefly described in the following (Storey, 
1996): 
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• A fault – is a defect within the system. 
• An error – is a deviation from the required operation of the system or subsystem. 
• A system failure – occurs when the system fails to perform its required function. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a definition of error propagation, 
describes the mechanisms of error propagation, and previous work on the topic. Section 3 
describes the proposed method for studying error propagation between software processes. 
Section 4 reports on the applicability of the method on one module of the SCORPIO 
framework. Section 5 addresses the main results. Section 6 discusses the work while section 
7 provides conclusions and comments on future work.  
2. Background 
This section gives a definition of error propagation, describes the mechanisms of error 
propagation, operating systems and related work on the topic. 
2.1 Error propagation 
In our work, error propagation is defined as the situation where an error (or failure) 
propagates from one entity to another (Sarshar et al., 2007). Errors can propagate between 
different types of entities, including: physical entities, processes running on single or 
multiple CPUs, data objects in a database, functions in a program, and statements in a 
program. Our approach concerns propagation of errors between processes running on a 
single CPU computer. 
Systems of interest in our work have not been limited to those that are safety critical only, 
e.g. systems that are directly involved in controlling a nuclear reactor. A problem of 
particular interest is the possible negative effect a low criticality application might have on a 
higher criticality application by means of error propagation because they share common 
resources. 
Programs make use of interaction methods provided by the underlying operating system to 
communicate with each other, or make use of shared resources. These services are provided 
through the system call interface of the operating system, and are usually wrapped in 
functions available using standard libraries. Such interaction methods can cause errors and 
provide mechanisms for error propagation. A coding fault which may be manifested as an 
error may in principle be anything, e.g. an incorrect instruction or an erroneous data value. 
It may be manifested inside a local function or an external function. The propagated error 
need not be of the same type in different functions, e.g. an instruction error in one function 
realization causes a data error in another. Even if an error is propagated to one function, this 
does not necessarily mean that the source function fails functionally. The propagated error 
may only be a side-effect in this function. Another type of error related to function usage is 
error caused by passing illegal arguments to functions or misusing their return variables. 
Error propagation between two programs may occur even if both programs individually 
operate functionally correct. This can e.g. be caused by erroneous side effect in the 
implementation or execution of the programs. There are two situations possible for how one 
process can cause another process to fail: 
• One process experiences a failure, which then causes another process to fail. 
• One process propagates a fault to another process while not failing itself. 
According to (Fredriksen & Winther, 2007), possible ways of characterizing error 
propagation is as either intended or unintended communication or as resource conflicts. 
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Error propagation in intended communication channels might consist of erroneous data 
transfer through parameters or global variables. Writing to the wrong addresses in memory, 
due e.g. to faulty pointers, exemplifies error propagation through unintended channels. 
Processes that demand high processor load so that other processes cannot execute are 
examples of resource conflicts which could cause error propagation. This indicates that error 
propagation between functions can occur in at least two ways: 
• An error in one function is transferred via a communication channel to another 
function, for example through passing of arguments or return value. 
• The execution of one function interacts with another function in an unintended and 
incorrect way, due to an error, and causes the second function to fail. 
Thus error propagation can take place via the intended communication channels, i.e. those 
that are used by the set of functions to fulfil their tasks. It is also possible that an error in one 
function generates a communication channel that is not intended and propagates the error 
through this. 
2.2 Operating systems 
The references (Nutt, 2004; Bacon & Harris, 2003; Bic & Shaw, 2003; Tanenbaum & 
Woodhull, 2006; Stallings, 2005) cover the basic principles of a number of important 
operating systems. 
With respect to the Linux operating system and its kernel, one source to its understanding is 
given in (Bovet & Cesati, 2003). Here, the authors describe the kernel components from how 
they are built to how they work. (Beck et al., 2002) explains what is in the kernel, and how to 
write kernel code or a kernel module. The work in (Bic & Shaw, 2003) explains process 
management and interaction in the UNIX operating system, and in (Pinkert & Wear, 1989), 
the authors describe all major components of an operating system down to the pseudo code 
level. The authors employ a generic approach and present the fundamental concepts 
involved, alternative policies from which a designer can choose, and illustrative 
mechanisms for implementing selected policies. 
In (Kropp et al., 1998), the Ballista methodology is applied on several implementations of the 
POSIX operating system C language API. The methodology is for automatic creation and 
execution of invalid input robustness tests designed to detect crashes and hangs caused by 
invalid inputs to function calls. The Ballista POSIX robustness test suite was ported to ten 
operating systems where even in the best case, about half of the functions had at least one 
robustness failure. The results illustrate that error propagation is a concern in operating 
systems. 
A study of operating system errors found by automatic and static compiler analysis applied 
to the Linux and OpenBSD kernels is reported in (Chou et al., 2001). Static analysis is 
applied uniformly to the entire kernel source. The scope of errors in the study is limited to 
those found by their automatic tools. These bugs are mostly straightforward source-level 
errors. They do not directly track problems with performance, high-level design, user space 
programs, or other facets of a complete system. (Engler et al., 2000) examines features of 
operating system errors found automatically by compiler extensions. Some of the results 
they present include the distribution of errors in the kernel: the vast majority of bugs are in 
drivers.  
Our approach focuses on analysing user space programs. We examine how the operating 
system manages processes and provides services to user programs through the system call 
interface, but we do not analyse its code. We assume that the operating system performs its 
 
Nuclear Power - System Simulations and Operation 
 
72 
intended functions correctly and that it is implemented correctly. Instead, we analyse the 
system call interface and other process interaction mechanisms to identify whether these 
may cause error propagation. 
2.3 Related work 
Error propagation analysis has to a large extent been focused on probabilistic approaches 
(Hiller et al., 2001, Jhumka et al., 2001; Nassar et al., 2004; Abdelmoez et al., 2004) and model 
based approaches (Voas, 1997; Michael & Jones, 1997; Goradia, 1993).  
In (Hiller et al., 2001), the concept of error permeability is introduced as a basic measure 
upon which a set of related measures is defined. These measures guide the process of 
analysing the vulnerability of software to find the modules that are most likely to propagate 
errors. Based on the analysis performed with error permeability and its related measures, 
how to select suitable locations for error detection mechanisms (EDMs) and error recovery 
mechanisms (ERMs) are described. Furthermore, a method for experimental estimation of 
error permeability, based in fault injection, is described and the software of a real embedded 
control system analysed to show the type of results obtainable by the analysis framework. 
The results show that the developed framework is very useful for analysing error 
propagation and software vulnerability, and for deciding where to place EDMs and ERMs. 
The paper (Jhumka et al., 2001), assess the impact of inter-modular error propagation 
between embedded software systems. They develop an analytical framework which enables 
to systematically design software modules so the inter-modular error propagation is 
reduced by design. The framework is developed using influence and separation metrics, 
then the framework is validated using fault injection experiments, which artificially inject 
faults and errors into the system. Influence metric is in their paper referred to as the 
probability of a module directly influencing another module, i.e., when no other module is 
considered while separation metric is referred to as the probability of a module not 
influencing another one when all other modules are considered. The results showed that the 
analytical framework can predict the influence value between a pair of modules very 
accurately. 
The study of software architectures is an important discipline in software engineering, due 
to its emphasis on large scale composition of software products, and its support for 
emerging software engineering paradigms such as product line engineering, component 
based software engineering, and software evolution. Architectural attributes differ from 
code-level software attributes in that they focus on the level of components and connectors, 
and that they are meaningful for architecture. In (Abdelmoez et al., 2004), focus is on a 
specific architectural attribute, which is the error propagation probability throughout the 
architecture, e.g. the probability that an error arising in one component propagates to other 
components. Formulas for estimating these probabilities using architectural level 
information are introduced, analysed, and validated.  
In (Voas, 1997), error propagation between commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components is 
analysed using an approach termed interface propagation analysis (IPA). IPA is a fault-
injection based technique for injecting ’garbage’ into the interfaces between components and 
then observing how that garbage propagates through the system. An example, if component 
A produces information that is input to component B, then the information is corrupted 
using fault injection techniques. This simulates the failure of component A. After this 
corrupt information is passed into B, IPA analyses the behaviour of B (or components 
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executed after B) to the information. IPA analyses the behaviour of a component by looking 
for specific outputs that the user wants to be on the lookout for. 
(Michael & Jones, 1997) presents an empirical study of an important aspect of software 
defect behaviour: the propagation of data-state errors. A data-state error occurs when a fault 
is executed and affects a program’s data-state, and it is said to propagate if it affects the 
outcome of the execution. The results show that data-state errors appear to have a property 
that is quite useful when simulating faulty code: for a given input, it appears that either all 
data state errors injected at a given location tends to propagate to the output, or else none of 
them do. These results are interesting, because of what they indicate about the behaviour of 
data-state errors in software. They suggest that data state errors behave in an orderly way, 
and that the behaviour of software may not be as unpredictable as it could theoretically be. 
Additionally, if all faults behave the same for a given input and a given location, then one 
can use simulation to get a good picture of how faults behave, regardless of whether the 
simulated faults are representative of real faults. 
Goradia (Goradia, 1993) addresses test effectiveness, i.e. the ability of a test to detect faults. 
This thesis suggests an analytical approach, introducing a technique of dynamic impact 
analysis using impact graphs to estimate the error propagation behaviour of various 
potential sources of errors in the execution. The empirical results in the thesis provide 
evidence indicating a strong correlation between impact strength and error propagation. 
The time complexity of dynamic impact analysis is shown to be linear with respect to the 
original execution time and experimental measurements indicate that the constant 
proportionality is a small number ranging from 2.5 to 14.5. Together these results indicate 
that they have been fairly successful in their goal of designing a cost effective technique to 
estimate error propagation. However, they also indicate that to reach the full potential 
benefits of the technique the accuracy of the estimate needs to be improved significantly. In 
particular, better heuristics are needed for handling reference impact and program 
components tolerant to errors in control paths. 
Research on error propagation has identified frameworks and techniques for estimating 
error propagation, e.g. in (Jhumka et al., 2001; Goradia, 1993). In difference, our goal is to 
identify sources and mechanisms for error propagation in order to identify potential error 
propagation scenarios and remove the failures to improve software. 
3. Method of analysis 
A method for analysing the interfaces between processes and their shared resources in the 
search for mechanisms for error propagation is provided in (Sarshar, 2007; Sarshar et al., 
2007). This section describes this method which starts out by investigating how processes 
are managed in the relevant operating system, enabling us to identify process characteristics 
relevant to error propagation. The output of this step includes a list of system calls in the 
system call interface of the operating system. Secondly, the identified interaction methods 
are analysed using Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) (Stamatis, 1995). This 
approach helps to identify types of code characteristics that might be a concern in relation to 
error propagation. The method of analysis can be summarized in three steps:  
1. Examination of the operating system for how it interacts with and manages processes to 
obtain an overview of e.g. a list of system calls and common resources;  
2. Analysis of the interaction methods using Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) to 
identify possible faults that can cause error propagation to occur; and  
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3. Determination of how the mechanisms can be recognized in source code. 
The method was developed for C code under the Linux operating system as a case. C was 
chosen because it is a widely used programming language and Linux because it is an open 
source operating system. In section 4, the method is applied on one module of the SCORPIO 
framework. 
3.1 How processes run in operating systems 
Processes are managed by the operating system. An operating system provides a variety of 
services that programs can utilise using special instructions called system calls. The typical 
functions of an operating systems kernel are: process management, memory management, 
input and output management, and support functions. In Linux, the kernel components 
managing processes are the following: 
• Signals: the kernel uses signals to call into a process. 
• System calls (explained below). 
• Process manager and scheduler: creates, manages and schedules processes. 
• Virtual memory: allocates and manages virtual memory for processes. 
A process interface to the operating system is either a result of the use of system calls or 
through direct memory access. Use of a pointer in the C language is an example of accessing 
memory without the use of the system call interface. In Linux, system calls are implemented 
in the kernel. When a program makes a system call, the arguments are handled in the 
kernel, which takes over the execution of the program until the call completes (Mitchell et 
al., 2001). System calls are usually wrapped in the standard C library and may require some 
parameters and return a value. Examples of system calls are low-level input and output 
functions, such as open() and read(). The system calls of Linux can be grouped into the 
following categories (Silberschatz et al., 2005; Bic & Shaw, 2003): 
• Process management: create/terminate process, load, execute, end, abort, get/set 
process attributes, wait for time, wait/signal event, allocate and free memory. 
• File management: create/delete file, open, close, read, write, reposition, get/set file 
attributes. 
• Device management: request/release device, read, write, reposition, get/set attributes, 
logically attach or detach device. 
• Inter-process communication: the transfer of data among processes. 
• Communications: create, delete connection, end, receive messages, transfer status 
information, attach or detach remote device. 
• Miscellaneous services: get/set time or date, system data. 
The essence of our approach is to identify mechanisms for error propagation that have 
characteristics detectable when analysing source code. We can therefore narrow down our 
scope to include those parts of the operating system which fulfil this requirement. The 
kernel components that allow interaction directly in source code of a program include the 
system call interface and signals. Language specific traps and pitfalls (Hatton, 1995; Koenig, 
1989) might also open ways for an error to propagate. Programming errors can give 
variables incorrect values that can lead to failures. Our analysis does not specifically address 
general programming errors, but errors related to invoking system calls. 
We focus here on programs written to run in user space, and exclude programs written for 
kernel space, as they have their own kernel API which provide services for kernel 
programming.  
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Figure 1 shows a simple illustration of the channels available in source code of a program 
for interaction with the operating system and its resources. These include the system call 
interface, signals, and traps and faults, with arrows indicating the interactions. 
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Interrupt 
handler
Event
 
Fig. 1. Illustration of the interaction methods of the operating system on processes 
An interrupt is a condition that can cause the normal execution of instructions to be altered. 
Interrupts and exceptions are known as signals and are used to notify a process of certain 
faults by the kernel (Pinkert & Wear, 1989): 
• Completion of an input or output operation. 
• Division by zero. 
• Arithmetic overflow or underflow. 
• Arrival of a message from another system. 
• Passage of an amount of time. 
• Power failure. 
• Memory parity error. 
• Memory protect violation. 
A signal might also be altered from another program using the system call interface.  
In source code, interaction with the operating system is only available through the system 
call interface. It is therefore not necessary to examine how processes are handled and 
managed at deeper levels. 
3.2 Identify system call failures causing error propagation 
In the proposed method, each system call is analysed using FMEA. The purpose is to 
identify failure modes that can cause errors to propagate to other processes or the operating 
system. The focus in this analysis is on failure modes that have characteristics in the source 
code of a program.  
FMEA is a well-known analysis method for risk and reliability analysis. The basis for this 
analysis is a description of a system in terms of its components and the communication 
between them. For each of the components in the system, the aim is to identify all potential 
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modes of failure, by investigating the following questions for each component and 
communication unit, based on the FMEA framework: 
• What can go wrong? (failure mode) 
• How can this occur? (failure cause/mechanism) 
• Which consequences will this have on the further actions and messages? (failure effects 
via error propagation) 
In our method, the FMEA is targeted on the system call as a component and the focus is on 
its usage in source code of a program. Once the failure modes have been identified, we 
determine their potential effects on local and system processes to determine whether any of 
these can cause error propagation. This can be done in two ways: 
• The effect is described in the system call documentation as an error the function can 
return. 
• The effect is determined using fault injection in test programs. 
The failure effects will provide information on the severity of failures and help us provide 
possible mitigation actions.  
3.3 Identify the failure mode characteristics in source code 
The aim of step three of the method is to determine whether the failure modes identified in 
the previous step are present in the source code of a program. For each failure mode that can 
cause error propagation, we determine its characteristics in code so it can be detected when 
analysing an application’s source code. We then examine some existing code analysis tools 
to check whether any of these will recognise the failure modes, and if they do, determine 
whether they identify all of them. The next step is to develop an algorithm for identifying 
the failure modes in source code, including how to traverse and check the code for the 
identified failures. The result is a prototype tool which demonstrates that failures causing 
error propagation can be detected by analysing source code. 
The steps of the method are performed only once for an operating system and programming 
language combination. The prototype tool is run for each application source code we wish 
to analyse for error propagation. 
4. Case on SCORPIO 
SCORPIO (Surveillance of reactor CORe by Picture On-line display) is a core surveillance 
framework for nuclear power plants, and is developed at the Institute for Energy 
Technology (IFE). The framework is a support system for the monitoring and prediction of 
pressurized water reactors (PWR), boiling water reactors (BWR) and VVER (Russian design 
series of PWRs) core conditions and is running on several reactors worldwide (Barmsnes et 
al., 1997). The framework has passed established system tests including factory acceptance 
testing and site acceptance testing.  
The general SCORPIO framework is illustrated in Figure 2. The module administrator is a 
program that connects the modules to the graphical user interface made using ProcSee (IFE, 
2010). ProcSee is a versatile software tool for developing and displaying dynamic graphical 
user interfaces, particularly aimed at process monitoring and control. All data exchanged 
between the modules and the operator is transmitted through this program. The Software 
Bus handles the communication between all modules. In the case study, the input data 
processing (IDATP) module of the framework has been assessed. The IDATP module 
consists of 30 files and approximately 5300 lines of code. 
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Fig. 2. The general SCORPIO framework 
The source code of the IDATP module is first examined to identify which calls it performs to 
system and library functions. The attributes passed to these external functions and the 
values retrieved are stored for later analysis. 
 
Function System call Library call Description 
close x  Close a file descriptor 
execvp  x Execute file 
fclose  x Close a stream file 
fopen  x Open a stream file; convert file to stream 
fprintf  x Formatted output conversion to a given stream 
fscanf  x Input format conversion 
memcpy  x Copies n bytes from memory area source to memory area destination 
memset  x Fill memory with a constant byte 
pipe x  Creates a pair of file descriptors 
printf  x Formatted output conversion to standard out stream 
shmget x  Allocate a new shared memory segment 
signal x  Signal handling 
sprintf  x Formatted output conversion to a given character string 
sscanf  x Input format conversion 
strcat  x Concatenate two strings 
strcmp  x Compare two strings 
strlcpy  x Copy string 
strlen  x Calculate  length of string 
strncmp  x Compare two strings 
Table 1. Analysed system and library calls 
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4.1 Applying the analysis 
Each system and library function of the IDATP module is analysed using FMEA with focus 
on identifying failure modes that can cause the module or the system itself to encounter 
failure. A failure mode specifies how an entity may fail. An entity may be e.g. a variable, 
used as either an argument passed to a function or used as a return variable.  
The system manuals for these calls form the basis for this analysis. The IDATP module 
makes use of several system and library calls. A subset of 19 of these functions, listed in 
Table 1, were analysed using FMEA.  
To exemplify the analysis, we focus on the shmget() system call to demonstrate the usage of 
the method in the following. Thus emphasis is on the steps involved in performing the 
analysis and understanding the analysis object.  
The shmget() system call creates or allocates a new shared memory segment for inter-
process communication (IPC) between processes. This IPC provides a channel for 
communication between processes using the memory. The main services related to shared 
memory are shmget(), shmat(), shmctl(), and shmdt(). Other calls related to shared memory 
include services for managing semaphores. The relation between these calls are as follows: 
A process starts by issuing a shmget() system call to create a new shared memory with the 
required size. After obtaining the IPC resource identifier, the process invokes the shmat() 
system call, which returns the starting address of the new region within the process address 
space. When the process wishes to detach the shared memory from its address space, it 
invokes the shmdt() system call. 
We begin with an examination of the system call documentation and then perform FMEA 
on the function. When performing the analysis, the aim is to identify failure modes caused 
by wrong usage of the service in source code, and determine their effects on local and 
system processes. The focus is on those failure modes causing error propagation. 
The synopsis for the shmget() function: 
 
# include <sys/types.h> 
int shmget(key_t key, size_t size, int shmflg); 
 
The shmget() function returns the identifier of the shared memory segment associated with 
the value of the argument key. A new shared memory segment, with size equal to the value 
of size rounded up to a multiple of PAGE_SIZE, is created if: 
• key has the value IPC_PRIVATE, or 
• key is not IPC_PRIVATE, no shared memory segment corresponding to key exists, and 
IPC_CREAT is specified in shmflg 
PAGE_SIZE, IPC_PRIVATE and IPC_CREAT are definitions within the operating system. 
IPC_PRIVATE is not a flag field but a key_t type. If this special value is used for key the 
system call ignores everything but the least significant 9 bits of shmflg and creates a new 
shared memory segment, on success. The value of shmflg’s least significant 9 bits specify the 
permission mode, the permissions granted to the owner, group, and world. 
The FMEA process starts with identifying failure modes. Table 2 illustrates identified failure 
modes for the shmflg parameter of shmget(). This is an excerpt from the complete FMEA 
sheet for this function. 
For each identified failure mode, we now examine its effects on the process itself (indicates 
“local effect” in the FMEA sheet) and on other processes (indicates “system effect” in the 
FMEA form). Some of these failure modes are detected by the system call; the function exits 
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with return value equal to -1, which indicates an error, and the external variable errno is set 
appropriately. Many of these are described in the manual pages and can be identified as the 
failure effect on the local process. However, not all failure modes are represented as error 
cases in the manual pages. We make use of test programs to identify these. 
 
Reference Variable Failure mode 
F.29.3.A Parameter shmflg Not specified at all 
F.29.3.B Parameter shmflg Is not one of IPC_CREAT, IPC_EXCL, SHM_HUGETLB or SHM_NORESERVE 
F.29.3.C Parameter shmflg Is of wrong type 
F.29.3.D Parameter shmflg No permission mode is set 
F.29.3.E Parameter shmflg Access permission is given to all users, instead of user only 
F.29.3.F Parameter shmflg Permission mode is write when it should have been  read 
F.29.3.G Parameter shmflg Permission mode is read when it should have been write 
F.29.3.H Parameter shmflg Permission mode is set without user access 
F.29.3.I Parameter shmflg IPC_EXCL specified without IPC_CREAT 
F.29.3.J Parameter shmflg Wrong flag specified i.e. IPC_CREAT | IPC_EXCL when not intended 
Table 2. Failure modes for parameter shmflg for the shmget() system call 
A test program is written to execute a failure mode while the failure effect is monitored. 
Such test programs have the possibility to execute an injected failure mode.  
Based on such test programs one can determine the effect of failure modes. E.g. the effect for 
failure mode F.29.3.D ”no permission mode is set” was determined to be: no processes can 
access the shared memory segment unless they are privileged. Checking the value of the 
parameter shmflg to identify whether the permission mode is set is easily done performing 
static analysis, thus this failure mode can be detected in source code.  
Table 3 shows the complete FMEA for the failure modes related to the shmflg parameter of 
shmget() from Table 2.  
Similarly, the remaining system and library calls are analysed. The failure modes identified 
in the analysis of these calls are related to passing of arguments and handling return values, 
and can be grouped as follows: 
• Argument refers to uninitialized variable/pointer. 
• Argument is of different type than specified in function definition. 
• Argument refers to null-pointer. 
• Argument is freed. 
• Argument refers outside an arrays size. 
• Argument is an array of chars which is not null-terminated when required. 
• Return value is not retrieved from a non-void function. 
• Return value is not checked to determine successful call. 
• Return value is not used in scope. 
These failure modes are then compared with the checks that existing tools perform to 
determine whether any of these are present in their checks. 
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Ref. Failure mode Local effect System effect Conclusion 
F.29.3.A Not specified at all - - Does not compile 
F.29.3.B Is not one of 
IPC_CREAT, 
IPC_EXCL, 
SHM_HUGETLB or 
SHM_NORESERVE 
Unknown flag and 
permission is set 
Segment may not 
be created or 
accessed 
Detectability in 
source code must 
be determined 
F.29.3.C Is of wrong type Uses the int value 
of the type if 
possible, unknown 
flag and 
permissions are 
set on segment 
Segment may not 
be created or 
accessed 
Detectable in 
source code 
F.29.3.D No permission mode is 
set 
The process 
cannot access the 
shared memory 
segment unless it 
is run in 
privileged mode 
Other processes 
cannot access the 
shared memory 
segment unless 
they are run in 
privileged mode 
Detectable in 
source code 
F.29.3.E Access permission is 
given to all users, 
instead of user only 
- Other users can 
access the shared 
segment 
Detectability in 
source code must 
be determined 
F.29.3.F Permission mode is 
write when it should 
have been  read 
Can write to 
segment when not 
intended 
Other processes 
can write to 
segment when 
not intended 
Detectability in 
source code must 
be determined 
F.29.3.G Permission mode is 
read when it should 
have been write 
Cannot write to 
segment 
Other processes 
cannot write to 
segment 
Detectability in 
source code must 
be determined 
F.29.3.H Permission mode is set 
without user access 
The process 
cannot access the 
shared segment 
unless it is run in 
privileged mode 
- Detectable in 
source code 
F.29.3.I IPC_EXCL specified 
without IPC_CREAT 
Exits with error if 
segment already 
exists 
- Detectable in 
source code 
F.29.3.J Wrong flag specified 
i.e. IPC_CREAT | 
IPC_EXCL when not 
intended 
Tries to create 
instead of getting 
identifier for the 
shared segment 
- Detectability in 
source code must 
be determined 
Table 3. Example of FMEA for the parameter shmflg of the shmget() system call 
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4.2 Analysis tools 
There are several existing analysis tools which identify different types of errors. These tools 
include both static and dynamic analysis methods. In (Sarshar, 2007), over 20 tools were 
examined and compared to determine what kind of errors they detect. Of these tools, one 
group performs checks on passing of arguments, another group warns if a return value is 
not retrieved and a third group warns about sequential issues. The tool Splint (Secure 
Programming Lint, 2008) was the only tool which gave warnings on all three groups. 
Therefore, Splint was chosen for assessment of our source code in part three. None of the 
tools performed checks on argument values and they did not check all argument types to be 
correct.  
Based on the available documentation on existing analysis tools, we assume that some 
tools can check arguments and some tools can check the return value for the following 
issues: 
• Types – assignment of variables, passing arguments of different type than function 
expects. 
• Null pointers – a common cause of failures is when a null pointer is dereferenced. 
• Definitions – all function parameters and global variables used by a function must be 
defined before a call, and the return value must be defined after the call. 
• Allocations – concerns: reallocating storage when there are other live references to the 
same storage, or failing to reallocate storage before the last reference to it is lost. 
• Aliasing – program errors often result when there us unexpected aliasing between 
parameters, return value, and global variables. 
An important difference between the identified failure modes from the FMEA and the 
checks existing tools perform is to check a variable value in the context of the relevant 
function it is passed to. E.g. the system call shmget() has an argument of type size_t; As a 
data type, the variable must be checked to be of correct type and its value must be checked 
to be within the variable limits. Most existing analysis tools do these checks. But, in the 
context of the function the argument is passed to, the variable must be checked to determine 
e.g. whether its value is smaller than the maximum size of a shared memory segment (set by 
the operating system). 
The next step was to assess the source code for the identified failure modes that existing 
tools do not check for. To automate this process, we made use of a prototype tool described 
in (Sarshar & Winther, 2008). The tool was modified for this study and its purpose was to 
identify different attributes for each argument that was passed to a given function. If 
statically detectable, the following attributes were determined; the argument type, value, 
name, whether it was an array and if so, its size. This information was used as input to 
check the arguments for the potential failure modes. Several of these checks were 
automated; however, a majority was done manually by examination of the argument 
attributes against the FMEA sheets for each function. 
Splint was also applied on the source code of our case study with the checks described in the 
list above. However, the tool can also do more powerful checks enabled by source code 
annotations. Annotations are stylized comments that documents assumptions about 
functions, variables, parameters and types and follow a predefined syntax. To use the more 
powerful checks, the source code must be edited to add notations. This requires time and 
effort and was not applied in this case study. The use of annotations for more powerful 
checks applies to most static analysis tools. 
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5. Results 
A subset of 19 external calls has been analysed using FMEA to identify potential failure 
modes that can cause a process to fail or propagate error. The examined functions were 
called 309 places in the source code. 
In 242 of the cases, the return value from an external call was not retrieved or checked. In 
general, the return value often indicates whether a function succeeded or failed for some 
reason. If such failure is not handled, unexpected runtime errors can occur in a software 
system. As an example, consider an application which writes some data to a file regularly. 
The file is opened for reading successfully and the write function is called without checking 
its return value. If the file was inaccessible (e.g. lost connection to server) the write function 
would return a value indicating an error. If the error is not handled explicitly, a runtime 
error may occur. Such an error often causes the operating system to give an error message to 
the user and then terminates the application that caused the error. All unsaved data will be 
lost in such events. However, not all calls are this crucial; it is more vital that the return 
value from an open or write function is handled than the return value of a print to screen 
function. 76 of the ignored return cases were for a print function. 
Several of the examined functions had potential failure modes regarding the content of 
arguments they receive. In example, char arrays passed to a group of functions must be null-
terminated and for another group they must not contain a given character. Our assessment 
of the code did not identify any of these failure modes in the module. 
The source code was also assessed using the tool Splint which gave near 2000 warnings on 
the source code of the module. Table 4 (Sarshar, 2009) presents warnings given by Splint 
and number of instances. In general, the tool reports many false positive warnings (which 
add noise to the results and make it harder to spot the real problems). Though the number 
of cases for the warnings on incompatible types and dangerous comparison are equal, there 
is no relation between them. 
 
Warning on Cases 
Incompatible types 444 
Dangerous comparison 444 
Variable declared but not used 50 
Value used before definition 160 
Variable initialized to null value 14 
Dangerous assignments 237 
Test expression issues 163 
Storage not released before return 37 
Return value ignored 212 
Possible buffer overflow with sprintf() 23 
Arrow access of non-pointer 54 
Other warnings 162 
 
Table 4. Group of warnings given by the tool Splint 
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Assessment of many existing systems in the industry can only be performed on the available 
source code, and often, the specification is not available. This is where static analysis is 
useful, some tools only need the source code to perform their analysis. However, if 
annotations are necessary to perform an assessment, expertise on the system is required.  
The method proposed to use FMEA on system calls to identify potential failure modes and 
then assess the source code for these potential failures. The intention was not to develop yet 
another tool, therefore the identified failure modes were checked against the ones that 
existing tools check. An interesting approach would be, if possible, to write these failure 
modes as additional checks for existing tools. A disadvantage of the FMEA analysis is that it 
only identifies a small fraction of the potential failure modes and it requires expert 
knowledge on the system calls. 
System and library calls are complex functions which interact with the kernel of the 
operating system. The process of analysing such functions takes time and effort, but it only 
needs to be performed once for each function. The result from this analysis indicates that it 
is necessary to examine the source code of applications for failures related to system call 
usage. 
The source code of the input data processing module of the SCORPIO framework was 
assessed using our approach and using the tool Splint. The user of analysis tools must be 
critical to the results as all vulnerabilities are not guaranteed to be found, and identified 
vulnerabilities are not all real problems. Splint gave a lot of warnings which were false 
positives while the checks from the FMEA performed by us gave few false positives. The 
reason for this is that we used a prototype tool to help us identify variable attributes, but the 
checks were done manually. Performing manual checks is time consuming, but reduces the 
chance of false positives since the analyser is required to have insight of the application. 
Furthermore, it is difficult, if not impossible, to control and check the value of variables that 
are passed to system services when performing static analysis. 
Through the process of analysing the source code of the module, failure modes with the 
potential to cause harm at runtime as an effect of fault triggering and error propagation 
have been identified. These failure modes are related to usage of services provided by the 
underlying operating system. Though the arguments sent to such functions are valid and in 
accordance with the documentation, the majority of the potential failure modes detected in 
the code were related to handling of return values from these functions. 
We did not expect that this assessment would identify any serious failures in the code, and 
the result demonstrates that this expectation is valid. Potential failures related to usage of 
operating system services would have been identified using our method and none of the 
potential failures identified is likely to cause the module to fail. However, taking these 
results into account in new releases of the module will reduce its vulnerability. 
6. Discussion 
The methodology was applied on a subset of system calls, some of them related to shared 
memory. This target was found to be suitable because it involved an intended channel for 
communication between processes through a shared resource; the memory. We also 
performed FMEA on other system calls to evaluate whether the method is applicable to a 
wider class of functions and not restricted to those related to shared memory. The errors 
identified in this approach are erroneous values in the variables passed to the system call 
interface and errors caused when return, or modified, pointer variables are not handled 
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properly. From the analysis we know not only which functions behave non-robustly, but 
also the specific input that results in errors and exceptions being thrown by the operating 
system. This simplifies identification of the characteristics an error has in code, making it 
easier to locate errors. 
The method for analysing error propagation between processes primarily focuses on how 
the process of interest can interact with and affect the environment (the operating system 
and other processes). A complementary approach could be to analyse how a process can be 
affected by its (execution) environment. In (Johansson et al., 2007), the authors inject faults 
in the interface between drivers and the operating system, and then monitor the effect of 
these faults in the application layer. This is an example where processes in the application 
layer are affected by their execution environment. Comparing this method to our approach, 
it is clear that both methods make use of fault injection to determine different types of 
failure effects on user programs. However, the examination in (Johansson et al., 2007) only 
concerns incorrect values passed from the driver interface to the operating system. Passing 
of incorrect values from one component to another is a mechanism for error propagation 
and relates to problems for intended communication channels. Fault injection is just one 
method to evaluate process robustness in regards to incorrect values in arguments. In our 
work, we examine the failure effects of several mechanisms: passing of arguments and 
return values, usage of return values, system-wide limitations, and sequential issues. These 
methods complement each other. 
Understanding the failure and error propagation mechanisms in software-based systems 
will provide the knowledge to develop defences and avoid such mechanisms in software. It 
is therefore important to be aware of the limitations for the proposed approach. This 
analysis only identifies failure modes related to the usage of system calls in source code. 
Other mechanisms for error propagation that do not involve usage of the system call 
interface will not be covered by this approach. This approach, however, complements 
existing methods and static analysis tools. An infinite loop structure in code is one example 
of a failure mode that does not make use of system calls. This failure mode can cause error 
propagation because it uses a lot of CPU time/resources. 
The FMEA method worked well on system calls and identified failure modes that could 
cause error propagation between processes. However, the identified failure modes from the 
FMEA do not apply directly to other operating systems. A new analysis must be performed 
for a new programming language and operating system combination. Even though several 
operating systems provide the same functionality, e.g. usage of shared memory, the 
implementation of the service will be different. Thus, some of the failure modes may be 
similar, yet their effects may not. And, in contrast to general FMEA approaches which 
analyse functionality of software systems, our aim was to identify failure modes related to 
the interaction of a program with operating system services. 
7. Conclusion  
The analysis and results from this case shows that the approach facilitates the detection of 
potential failure modes related to the use of the system calls in operating systems. However, 
this is without further analysis about their actual impact in the SCORPIO framework. Future 
extension of the work can include examining the potential impact of these failure modes. 
With so many potential failure modes it also seems that there needs to be some way to 
prioritize or target the “important” failures that should be fixed based on the study. For 
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example, the missing return values seem to become critical errors only under maintenance, 
if the return values can change. Even though this is valuable to uncover, it would be more 
valuable to quantify which potential failures would be critical if they occurred under the 
current operational mode and which would not. This would help to indicate the usefulness 
of the technique and provide some evidence that the failures occur with sufficient frequency 
to justify the definition of a technique that targets them. Further extension of the work can 
include exploring alternative techniques or quantify effort required to conduct this type of 
analysis to make it easier to determine the trade-offs of using this technique in practice, 
providing a quantitative analysis of the types of failure modes the analysis uncover and 
providing usage guidelines to the practitioner. 
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Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis in  
Support of Plant Operation  
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Spain 
1. Introduction 
Many different engineering tasks are performed in support of operation of nuclear power 
plants with the aim of carrying out an effective and safe exploitation. Among such activities 
maintenance, core follow-up, refuelling and analyzing operating experience are the most 
commonly cited. Thermal-hydraulic analysis is an important issue that could help many 
different aspects of the engineering activity taking care of plant operation. 
Integral Plant Models prepared using system codes are a valuable tool to carry out 
analytical activities devoted to contribute to engineering support to plant operation. 
Most of the issues and tasks presented in the chapter are part of the job description of the so 
called thermalhydraulic analyst supporting plant operation (Reventós, 2008). Usually, this 
analyst is an engineer belonging to the technical team that takes care of engineering plant 
support. In many plants such engineer takes care of plant models and he personally 
performs at least the first approach analysis of any of the issues involved. Depending on the 
amount of work needed to carry out each specific analysis the whole work or only a part of 
it is done by him. In the first case the benefits are clear since he knows the plant and he uses 
the information produced or treated by the team he belongs to. In the second case, when the 
amount of work is too large, the thermalhydraulic analyst will take care of the technical 
subcontracting of the analysis. The benefits in this latter case are also clear since he is 
coordinating a task well known to his own calculating experience.           
This chapter has three different sections. The first one gives some detail on thermal-
hydraulic analysis tasks related to operation. The second clarifies some features that are 
specific of Integral Plant Model. Especially, it establishes how the nodalization is qualified. 
Finally, the third briefly presents some relevant results of one example of analysis 
performed in such context along with the concise description of other two cases. 
2. Thermalhydraulic analysis tasks related to Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) 
operation 
A tentative list of issues concerning the contents of this section could be the following: 
Thermal-hydraulic analysis of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and Emergency 
Operating Procedures (EOP) sequences, Dialogue with regulatory body and fuel designer, 
Analysis of actual transients, NPP start-up tests analysis, Transient analysis for training 
support, Design modifications and Improvement of plant availability.  
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Safety Reports from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and specially (IAEA, 2002) 
and (IAEA, 2006) are strongly related to the mentioned list of tasks. These documents were 
developed based on broad international consensus and they describe types and rules for 
performing computational analyses devoted to both being built and operating plants. The 
purpose of this section is not to describe every related task but to add some aspects that are 
specific of the functions of the analyst working in support of plant operation.  
In fact every utility or every manager having the responsibility of organizing engineering 
support to plant operation decides which tasks are to be fulfilled by the thermalhydraulic 
analyst. Since it is clear that the best estimate (BE) prediction of a scenario helps 
communication on any engineering subject related to dynamic behaviour, it is difficult to 
know what comes first task definition or analytical capabilities. In many occasions managers 
decide to integrate the analyst in the engineering group dealing with support to plant 
operation. Group objectives are clear and depending on the proved analytical capabilities of 
the simulating tools the thermalhydraulic analyst results become useful for different 
purposes.     
The thermal-hydraulic analysis of PSA sequences is a well known engineering activity. PSA 
sequences analyses are normally performed using integral BE plant models (Reventós, 
2007a) (Reventós, 2006). These are a kind of studies that fit perfectly in the job description of 
the analyst. Again IAEA rules are normally followed and no additional comments are 
needed. It is also one of these pieces of work that are usually subcontracted to engineering 
companies due to the amount calculations needed. 
Something similar occurs with the analyses devoted to Emergency Operating Procedures 
(EOPs) validation. In fact they are, from calculation point of view quite close to those related 
to PSA. Integral Plant Models prepared using BE system codes are again the suitable tool for 
the analysis. 
As an enhancement the last two activities BE calculation results are also useful to the 
dialogue with regulatory body or fuel designer. Sensitivity calculations on the treated 
scenarios help understanding the related engineering judgements.   
The analysis of operating experience is a quite complex activity that needs to coordinate the 
efforts of many different engineering teams belonging to the utility itself and external 
organizations. The study of actual transients occurred in the plant usually involves different 
approaches. The simulation of actual transients produces in-depth knowledge of their 
dynamic behaviour. It is also helpful to investigate and to determine the cause-effect 
relationships of the occurred transient (Reventós, 1993) (Reventós, 2001) (Llopis, 1993a). One 
of the most powerful arguments in favour of these kinds of analysis is that they provide the 
possibility of generating time trends of functions and magnitudes that are not collected by 
plant instrumentation. Last section of this chapter shows an example of this capability. 
As it usually happens with experiments performed in test facilities, start-up tests of NPP 
need also pre and post test calculations. The pre-test or the predictive study of NPP start-up 
tests is extremely helpful for the test coordinator in order to avoid unexpected interactions 
and delays that could give rise to economic losses (Llopis, 1993b). Competitiveness goals of 
the electricity business have led the company running the plant to minimize the number of 
start-up tests to be performed. This kind of analysis helps to reduce the number of tests to 
only those that have proven benefits for both operation and safety. The expected benefit is 
usually either better knowledge of dynamic behaviour or the correct performance of a 
system or instrument. Apart from these important activities related to start-up tests, 
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standard post-test analyses could also become very significant. Important adjustments of the 
plant model arise very often from the studies carried out as post-test analyses.    
Besides these basic activities presented above there are other less common tasks that are 
carried out in many cases by the analyst. Among such tasks one can find activities related to 
training and also all the studies intending to clarify systems interactions.  
The former include not only the validation of plant training simulators but also the analyses 
devoted to direct training actions. 
The latter needs some explanation on how it came to engineering organizations. The progress 
of BE codes development came out with new codes with a high performance in simulating 
not only core or primary system thermalhydraulics but also controls, other hydrodynamic 
systems and core neutron-kinetics. This development ended with powerful control blocks, 
with a huge amount of logic and real variables and the capability of using control equations 
to simulate many different phenomena quite far from the original intended uses. Such 
innovative uses started with plant design modifications analyses, having the goal of 
establishing the impact that modifications in components or systems may have on the 
interactive global operation of the plant. And later on, other subjects came out like set-point 
adjustment, other technological changes, or even the improvement of plant availability. 
3. Integral plant model 
This section clarifies some features that are specific of Integral Plant Models. Especially, it 
establishes how the nodalization is qualified. For this reason this part will emphasize two 
different aspects. The first is related to the main differences between the nodalizations used 
in safety analysis and those used for this particular aim. The second one is the special 
qualification process needed for the model in order to properly fulfil the objective of 
contributing to plant operation support. Although extensive technical literature exists aimed 
at establishing the requirements needed to qualify a NPP model, most of this literature is 
focused on qualifying a model for licensing uses.  
The first task to be performed is selecting the code to be used. Taking into account the list of 
issues presented in the last section, a BE code seems the right option. Maybe some aspects of 
the presented issues could be solved by conservative or simplified codes but it is generally 
accepted that a BE code provides the right approach for support of operation issues.    
The options are not many, since only a few BE codes exist. Codes like Relap5, TRACE or 
Cathare are the most used currently. The right code has to be available for the engineering 
organization and properly documented and maintained. Documentation of a code is the so 
called code manual which includes a huge amount of information on how the code 
calculates as well as how one can certify that the calculation is performed properly. Code 
manuals follow an established organization that includes: 
• Code structure 
• System models and solution methods 
• User’s guide and input requirements 
• Developmental assessment 
• Models and correlations 
• User’s guidelines 
• Validation of numerical techniques 
• Summaries of independent code assessment reports 
• Programmers manual 
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Once the code has been selected, the next task is analysing the available design information 
of the plant such as drawings, equipment specifications, data sheets and descriptive 
documents produced by component manufacturers. All this information is used to prepare 
the nodalization: control volumes are defined with junction data, as well as all the details 
needed. Figure 1 shows an example on the relationship between a drawing of a detail of the 
reactor vessel and the corresponding nodalization diagram. Following the code manual all 
this information is organized as an input deck that will be read by the code. The input deck 
use to be a text file. All these tasks are properly documented in a “Nodalization Description 
Report”. Strict maintenance is performed by up-dating both the input deck and the 
descriptive documents. Quality assurance of these activities is an important issue related to 
establishing procedures and keeping data bases for control changes. 
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Fig. 1. Reactor vessel: detailed drawing and nodalization 
The main differences between the nodalizations used in safety analysis and those used for 
this particular aim are drawn from what is specified in the previous section. Since the 
analyst wants his plant model being valid for a large amount of cases, the model has to be 
quite complete.  
Examples of such differences are the following. For instance, in nodalizations used in safety 
analysis, control systems are often omitted, since many analyses have to be performed 
assuming that they fail. 
Manual action model can be another example. In many safety scenarios manual actions are 
not considered following the design basis specification. A similar comment can be done for 
neutron-kinetic model, interlocks or non-safety systems. 
If the analyst wants to be able to study actual transients in normal or abnormal operation, at 
a definite time of the cycle, the most relevant control systems have to be implemented in the 
model as well as neutron-kinetic model, interlocks and non-safety systems. The limits or 
borders of the nodalization depend on the scenario to be simulated and following the 
purpose of the analyst tasks the model intents to cover an important part of the plant. For 
this reason such nodalizations are often called Integral Plant Models. Sometimes, once a 
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particular study is started, some specific development is performed in order to complete the 
scope needed to simulate the scenario to be analyzed.   
Figure 2 shows an example of the main nodalization diagram of an Integral Plant Model 
used for such purpose. Some other diagrams representing: safety injection systems, steam 
lines, main and auxiliary feed-water, and detailed diagrams of vessel, pressurizer and steam 
generators are also part of the supporting documentation. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Example of main nodalization diagram 
Figure 3 shows an example of a logic diagram implemented for another similar model. 
Quite a great number of control systems with a degree of complexity as in the case of Figure 
3 are usually included in an Integral Plant Model.  
Once the model has been prepared including all specific features and the input deck 
describing the plant is ready, the nodalization has to be qualified. A general strategy 
(Reventos, 2007a) distinguishes between Basic and Advanced Qualification Processes. Both 
are considering comparisons between the results of the simulations and data collected by 
plant instrumentation. As a general statement when predictions are reasonably close to 
actual time trends (see figure 4) the nodalization is considered to be validated. The number 
of compared parameters and their significance are an important point. Figure 4 shows the 
time trends of Steam Generator narrow range level in a load rejection transient. As can be 
seen, the predicted values are in close agreement with actual ones. 
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Fig. 3. Example of a logic diagram 
Basic Qualification process is usually performed following guidelines and widely 
recommended good practices. Recommendations can be found in different publications 
among them: the code manual itself (see chapter called User’s guidelines) and also some 
specific reports of international organizations like OECD/CSNI (Ashey, 1998) and IAEA 
(IAEA, 2002). Different existing methodologies devoted to certify the acceptability of the 
qualification process are available. Most of them follow similar rules and steps like steady 
state and transient qualification (Berthon, 2005) and Kv scaled calculations (Martínez, 2008). 
The methodology described in the article (Petruzzi, 2005) is especially relevant and complete 
since it uses not only qualitative comparisons of calculated and experimental time trends 
but also it evaluates quantitatively the accuracy of the simulation.  
The second level is the so-called AQP and is carried out if the model is to be used not only 
for licensing but also for each type of transient analysis presented in the previous section. 
The description of the methodology can be found in (Reventós, 2007a), along with some 
detail on the most specific difficulties usually encountered in such process. 
The most important thing that needs to be considered in this additional plant specific 
process is the availability of plant data related to meaningful sets of qualification transients. 
Dynamic transient behaviour is not frequent in operating plants. The number of scheduled 
tests is also limited. Some start-up tests are performed at the beginning of each cycle, but 
others are only repeated from time to time. 
Plants can undergo major design modifications such as Steam Generator replacement. As 
validation is plant specific, changes have to be considered. It could be said that after any 
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important modification a new model qualification is needed. Fortunately, some essential 
systems and components remain the same and this will be useful in order to reduce 
engineering effort. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Comparison between calculated and predicted time trends 
The concept of configuration is highly helpful for a fruitful use of the limited amount of 
available plant data of meaningful sets of transients suitable for validation. A plant 
configuration is the state of the plant for a period of time in which no important changes are 
made. It is understood that important changes are those related to heavy equipment 
replacement, essential system modification and power level variation. Examples of 
configuration descriptions of a given plant along with some comments on distinctive 
features could help to illustrate this issue. 
Some conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the information above. Old 
configurations have usually two important problems: low quality of data and a lack of 
detailed as-built information. In spite of this, they have a very interesting advantage: a large 
amount of unexpected transients. Current configurations also have advantages and 
disadvantages. Among the former: high quality of data and proper documentation of new 
systems. Among the latter: the limited number of unexpected transients and start-up tests. 
Taking all the above-mentioned features into account, a careful selection of transients is 
usually performed along with the identification of systems that remain unchanged in the 
different configurations. These identification tasks define the qualification process, which 
relies on the comparison of plant data and model prediction for the selected transients.   
The AQP is a progressive activity that confers an important level of qualification to the 
Integral Plant Models and provides the procedure to improve this level gradually after the 
analysis of transients that may occur in the future. 
The plan has three main steps: 
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• Preparing the qualification matrix. 
• Executing assessment calculations. 
• Performing comparison and final evaluation. 
 
 
Table 1. Ascó configurations 
The qualification matrix is prepared by establishing a list of plant transients suitable for 
qualification and another list of systems and components needed for advanced qualification. 
The first list is prepared in a comprehensive way. Some decisions can be made in order to 
obtain a good level of qualification with reasonable effort. Some configuration can be 
interesting due to the number of unexpected transients but the engineering effort to 
maintain the corresponding model could be excessive. In this case, it is better to discard the 
configuration provided that there are sufficient recorded transients in the rest of the 
configurations.  
The second list has to be prepared to identify which systems and components have had a 
significant effect on the transients analysed to date or intended to be analysed in a near 
future. Following what has been established in the previous section, this includes a complete 
set of calculations related to PSA and others to EOP analysis. 
Once both lists were ready, the information was organized, as can be seen in Figures 5 and 
6. The former is the qualification matrix and the latter shows a detailed part of it. Each 
transient is set to a column (i) and each system or component to a line (j). In the box 
corresponding to column i and line j, one or two names of parameters are set. These are the 
key parameters to check the correct functioning of system j, which is properly recorded in 
transient i.  
If the key parameter of a system or component is properly documented in more than one 
transient, the input is adjusted to simultaneously match, or at least to reasonably approach, 
all the different recorded behaviours. In this way the matrix helps the analyst to keep track 
of his experience and make it useful for future modelling tasks.  
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Fig. 5. Qualification matrix 
 
 
Fig. 6. Detailed box of the qualification matrix 
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The matrix is also helpful for new studies. The analyst, knowing the relevant aspects of the 
scenario to be studied, could easily check in the table if the model used is properly qualified. 
The matrix can also be easily enhanced either by adding columns related to new suitable 
transients or adding new lines related to systems needed for qualification. 
 
4. Example cases 
This section briefly presents some relevant results of one example of analysis performed 
along with the concise description of other two cases. All the considered cases are related to 
actual situations in which the scenarios were studied by analysts using thermal-hydraulic 
codes and prepared nodalizations.  
The example presented is the analysis of a reactor trip operating event due to high variation 
of neutron flux occurred in the Vandellòs-II NPP. More detail can be found in (Reventós 
2010). 
The transient was initiated by an electrical grid disturbance due to a storm, which caused 
disconnection of the main output switch, while the in-site electrical equipment switch 
remained connected. The plant therefore started operating on auto-consumption. Due to the 
loss of off-site power, the reactor and the turbine tripped and natural circulation was 
established. Later on, off-site power was recovered and operators brought the plant to Hot 
Zero Power (HZP). 
The initial phase started with the loss of off-site power and lasted until the reactor trip. The 
sequence of events that caused the shutdown of the reactor lasted less than 1.0 second and is 
not easily studied mainly because of the short time of occurrence and also because of the 
relatively high time step of the collected time-trends. The post-trip event list did not help 
much. 
The only symptom that pointed to a credible explanation was related to some primary flow 
data recorded by plant instrumentation. These data revealed that in 2.0 seconds the primary 
flow increased by about 4 or 5%. 
Since the plant was on auto-consumption, the electrical frequency could have increased and 
could have resulted in the subsequent increase of the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) speed. 
This suspicion needed to be confirmed. A calculation was performed in order to corroborate 
this hypothesis. 
In order to approximate their real behaviour, different values of RCP speed were introduced 
in the BE model as a boundary condition until the primary flow increased by about 4 or 5%, 
as had been observed in the plant. This flow increase produced a decrease in moderator 
temperature that could not be measured by usual temperature instruments (Figure 7) in the 
first second after the initiating event. 
A calculation, using an Integral Plant Model, produced the evolution of temperature node 
by node for the whole core. Results were analyzed for all nodes and the temperature 
corresponding to the central node is shown in Figure 8. This decrease in core temperature 
produced an increase in power due to the effect of moderator temperature (Figure 9). This 
figure shows the power increase until the inflection due to the beginning of rod insertion at 
0.6 seconds and the full decrease of power after time=1.0 second as an effect of the negative 
reactivity introduced. It must be pointed out that the time of insertion is about 1.5 seconds 
which is consistent with the power time trend.  
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Fig. 7. Calculated average temperature 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Calculated temperature of core central node 
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Fig. 9. Calculated nuclear power 
Although the neutronics of the Integral Plant Model used, is usually not very detailed (it is a 
point-kinetics model), it is capable of predicting the increase in reactor power due to 
moderator temperature decrease and, as a consequence, the reactor trip due to high 
variation of neutron flux. 
The model has been extremely useful in clarifying the sequence of events corresponding to 
the transient that actually occurred in the plant on December 2, 1991. The study provided an 
answer to the concerns of the person responsible for operation related to the scenario and 
was also helpful to identify the inadequacy of thermocouple location as a design deficiency. 
This identification was a necessary step previous to its replacement that took place soon 
after the event. 
The analysis is a good example of how integral plant models can result in a real benefit as 
part of the support activities to the operation of a nuclear power plant. 
The transient was included in the Qualification Matrix and it is currently being re-analyzed 
after any major change performed in the model.  
Operating events, as the one depicted above, are maybe the most significant analyses 
performed for support of plant operation. Other cases are analyzed. Two concise descriptions 
are presented below.  
Some analyses are performed, as the one that follows, in strong connection to both EOP and 
PSA.  Studies like this one are maybe not the more significant but they are for sure the most 
usual. The studied sequence consists in a total loss of Feed Water (FW).  
EOP/PSA transient analyses are traditionally performed using Integral Plant Models. 
Results were a successful first approach to operation support and the study was carried out 
following some concern of the person responsible of plant operation. More detail on the 
analysis can be found in (Reventós, 2007b). 
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After the total loss of FW takes place, heat transfer from the primary to the secondary side 
degrades and causes a decrease of the SG level. Once this symptom has been detected, the 
procedure starts by opening 1 PORV and actuating 1 HPIS train. Water injected into the 
primary system at low temperature is heated by decay power and comes out through the 
relief valve. The procedure results in a pressure decrease which means that energy 
produced is completely extracted. 
The base case brings the plant to a safe situation without violating design limits as hot rod 
clad temperatures show a general decreasing trend during the whole transient. The 
calculation properly captures the main relevant thermal-hydraulic features of the scenario. 
Once the base case was successfully simulated, a strategy was defined to answer the 
following questions: 
• Impact of PORV and HPIS partial availability (less than 2 PORV or 2 HPIS trains) 
• Maximum time to start the procedure after the level symptom occurs    
• Relevant heat sink recovery phenomena (although recovery actions are quite fast, they 
involve different components and need some time) 
The answers to the questions were obtained and the operation team got a better general 
picture of the scenario and related phenomena. As obviously each answer has an impact on 
the others, the strategy applied was to launch quite a large number of combined scenarios in 
order to cover different situations that could potentially occur. For a given combination of 
component availability, a series of different procedure starting times have been tried and for 
each of these calculations heat sink recovery was also imposed at different times. The total 
number of cases was 61. In this case the complete set of calculations was performed by the 
analyst.  
The next concise description presented in the current context is not related to transient 
analysis but to slow degradation of a very significant component: the steam generators of a 
PWR plant. The study was carried out for Ascó NPP. 
Due to some problems related to the material used in manufacturing steam generator tubes, 
degradation was taking place and the probability of having a tube rupture was increasing 
from cycle to cycle. To face the problem the team giving support to plant operation, started 
with different engineering actions, most of them were design modifications related to the 
chemistry of the secondary circuit devoted to replace materials that were supposed to power 
corrosion. At each reload an Eddy current extensive inspection was carried out in order to 
quantify the degradation and as a consequence to make a decision on which tubes needed to 
be plugged. The problem was quite serious because in few years the number of plugged 
tubes increased at an important rate.  
Using the Integral Plant Model of Ascó NPP, an analysis was carried out. The results 
obtained became interesting information to help decision making. The work done faced both 
realistic modelling of actual situations and predictive simulation of eventual future 
plugging. 
After each reload and following the actual tube plugging, the plant model was adjusted with 
realistic criterion. The specific development of the model was to decrease heat exchange 
surface from primary to secondary side and also to reduce the primary flow area following 
the actual plugging. The model stabilized at a slightly different working point. Maybe the 
more interesting parameters to check were the secondary pressure and the stabilized 
position of turbine valve. Such stable values of Pressure and valve position are shown in 
Figure 10 along with model predictions as a function of plugging percentage. Checking and 
comparing such parameters provided additional validation for the specific situation. The 
validated model could then be used for the usual purposes maintaining its accuracy. 
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Fig. 10. Secondary pressure and turbine valve position vs. SG tube plugged percentage 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Thermal power vs. SG tube plugged percentage 
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The predictive simulation of eventual future plugging was even more interesting. 
Symmetric and asymmetric configurations were modelled at an increasing plugging 
percentage and key parameters were evaluated. When plugging percentage increased 
secondary pressure decreased and turbine valve stabilized at a wider position to 
compensate and allow the nominal value of steam mass flow (see Figure 10). Once turbine 
valve at certain plugging percentage reached the fully wide open position the secondary 
system stopped being able to extract all the thermal power produced. As shown in Figure 
11, higher plugging percentages resulted in a thermal power smaller than the nominal one.  
The predictive simulation gave quite clear results about 3 o 4 cycles (at that time Ascó follow 
12 months cycles) before the eventual decrease of thermal power. The results of this 
analysis, along with other technical studies, became extremely helpful for making the 
decision of steam generator replacement. The decision was made on time and the 
replacement was carried out successfully.    
5. Conclusions 
This chapter has shown the relevance of thermal-hydraulic analysis devoted to give support 
to plant operation. Integral Plant Models prepared using system codes, and properly 
qualified, are a valuable tool to carry out the studies presented.  
It has also been shown the significance of tasks to be performed by the so called 
thermalhydraulic analyst supporting plant operation. If this analyst belongs to the technical 
team that takes care of engineering plant support, his studies become more effective.  
Taking care of plant models and personally performing at least the first approach analysis of 
any of the issues involved, is a suitable strategy. Depending on the amount of work needed 
for each specific analysis, the whole work or only a part of it is done by him. Benefits are 
clear in both cases. 
The examples presented or briefly described illustrate the job of performing termalhydraulic 
calculations as a first approach of the analysis of plant dynamic behaviour. 
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1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we investigated an appropriate way to predict neutronics and thermal-
hydraulics parameters in a large scale VVER type nuclear reactors. A computer program is 
developed to automate this procedure using Artificial Neural Network (ANN) method. The 
neutronics and thermal-hydraulics codes are connected to each other and then the neural 
network method use results with different configuration of a suggested core for prediction. 
The main objective of this research is to develop fast and first estimation tool (a software) 
based on ANNs which allows large explorations of core safety parameters. This tool is very 
useful in reactor core design and in-core fuel management or loading pattern optimization. 
Therefore, herein, an overview study on the multiphysics/multiscale coupling methods for 
designing current and innovative VVER  systems by coupling neutronics parameters (using 
MCNP 5) and thermal-hydraulics simulator (e.g., COBRA-EN) are carried out. This work is 
aimed to extend the modeling capabilities of coupled Monte Carlo/Subchannel codes for 
whole core simulations based on pin-level in order to address many problems e.g. higher 
burn-up, Mox-fuels, or to improve the performances and accuracy of reactor dynamics. 
Verification and validation of the above development are the main concern and important 
procedures and therefore taking into account using experimental data or another code-to-
code benchmarking. Finally the extended simulation capabilities should be applied to 
analyze a selected VVER reactor and we present our input computer codes for interested 
readers. Also, our future designed user friendly Artificial Neural Network (ANN) software 
would be given for everyone who wants to get it.  
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNNP), a VVER-1000 Russian model, was simulated during 
the first plant operational period using WIMS and CITATION codes (Faghihi et al., 2007). 
Modelling of all rods (including fuel rods, control rods, burnable and non-burnable poison 
rods) and channels (including central guide channel, measuring channel) were carried out 
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using the WIMS code. Moreover, modelling of the fuel assemblies and reactor core is 
completed using the CITATION code. The multi-group constants generated by WIMS for 
different fuel configurations are fed into CITATION. In our past mentioned article, average 
burn ups and calculated reactivity coefficients from Beginning of Cycle (BOC) to Middle of 
Cycle (MOC) for the VVER-1000 BNPP were carried out. A thermal-hyraulics analysis for 
the VVER-1000 were employed using COBRA-EN code (Mirvakili et al., 2010). Moreover, a 
13×13 square array fuel assembly core of a 1000 MWe Westinghouse reactor was 
investigated and its “Prompt reactivity coefficient”, which is an important factor in the 
study of nuclear power excursions, and also “power coefficient of reactivity” were 
calculated using MCNP-5 (Faghihi and saidinezhad, 2011).  MCNP 5 has seven new features 
with respect to the older ones and complete description along with a list of bug fixes are 
listed in its release notes (MCNP-5 Team, 2008).  
In the incoming sections we will investigate ANNs theory and then we introduce with 
MCNP and COBRA-EN code as our toolboxes for the reactor neutronics and thermal 
hydraulics feedbacks 
2. Neutronics codes 
A literature review of available coupled codes for application to LWR's analysis has been 
conducted to investigate their capabilities for VVER applications. In order to identify the 
types of codes coupled, different types of methods implemented into neutronics codes and 
thermal-hydraulics codes need to be discussed. The neutron flux can be predicted with 
diffusion codes, deterministic codes and Monte Carlo methods. 
2.1 Diffusion and transport codes 
Diffusion codes solve the neutron diffusion equation to obtain the neutron flux, from which 
the power distribution is computed. They use macroscopic cross section data for neutron 
particles, processed usually from two or more energy groups. The modeling of a reactor core 
or fuel assembly is homogenized for the diffusion approximations to be valid. Diffusion 
codes have been well suited to analyze reactors, which are designed with relatively 
homogeneous distributions of fuel, moderator and absorber materials. However, with 
higher heterogeneity such as in the VVER or HPLWR (High-Performance Light-Water 
Reactor) fuel assembly, the simplified model will produce inaccurate results. Details of the 
VVER fuel assembly such as coolant density in different sub-channels and power 
distribution of different fuel rods, which are needed in the coupling, cannot be obtained. 
Until now, coupling experience for PWR and BWR reactor have been with diffusion codes 
coupled with system codes, which have been applied for various transient analysis. For 
transient analysis diffusion codes and system codes are restricted to simplified geometries 
and their application cannot be extended to complex geometries such as for fuel assembly 
design of a VVER. The neutronic code PARCS (Purdue Advanced Reactor Core Simulator) 
developed at the Purdue University is used to predict the dynamic response of the reactor to 
reactivity perturbations such as control rod movement or change in temperature/fluid 
conditions in the reactor core. A coupling interlace of PARCS with TRAC-M, a system code, 
was completed by Miller et al. The coupled code was tested using the OECD PWR main 
steam line break (MSLB). The coupled TRAC-M/PARCS was also applied for turbine trip 
(TT) transient analysis of the OECD/NRC BWR by Lee et al. The PARCS code has also been 
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coupled with the system code RELAP5 for analysis of the peach bottom turbine trip (TT), 
Salah et al. 
DYN3D is a neutron kinetic code developed to investigate reactivity transients in the reactor 
core with hexagonal or quadratic fuel assembly. The neutron diffusion equations are solved 
for two groups. An internal coupling approach of DYN3D with ATHLET is a system code 
that has been developed by Grundmann et al. The coupled code DYN3D/ATHLET has been 
applied for analysis of BWR TT transient. 
The SKETCH-N code solves neutron diffusion equation in x-y-z geometry for steady state 
and neutron kinetic problems. The code treats an arbitrary number of neutron energy group 
and delayed neutron precursors. The SKETCH code has been implemented into thermal- 
hydraulic code TRAC for analysis of rod injection transients Asaka et al. 
NEM (Nodal Expansion Method) is a 3-D multi-group nodal code developed and used at 
the Pennsylvania State University for modeling both steady state and transient core 
conditions. The code has options for modeling 3-D Cartesian, cylindrical and hexagonal 
geometry. NEM has been coupled to the system code TRAC-PF for MSLB transient analysis 
of a PWR Ivanov et al. and  Ziabletsev et al. and for BWR core transient, NEM has been 
coupled with TRAC-BFI by Fu et al. 
NESTLE is a multi-dimensional neutron kinetic code developed at the North Carolina State 
University. It solves the two group or four group neutron diffusion equations in Cartesian 
or hexagonal geometry. 
QUABOX is a neutron kinetic code developed in the 70s at GRS in Germany for 3-D core 
neutron flux and power calculations in steady state and transient conditions. It solves the 
two-group neutron energy diffusion equation through local polynomial approximation of 
the neutron flux. The QUABOX code has been coupled with ATHLET internally for analysis 
of the OECD/NRC BWR turbine trip benchmark by Langenbuch et al. A serial coupling is 
applied. The T-H code ATHLET makes the first calculation step and when it is finished the 
core model QUABOX/CUBBOX calculates the same step for the neutronics on the same 
computer. 
PANBOX is a three dimensional neutron kinetics code coupled with a multidimensional 
core thermal-hydraulics module, developed to perform PWR safety analysis and transients 
in which power distribution is significantly affected. The time-dependent few-group 
diffusion equation is solved in Cartesian geometry using a semi-analytical nodal expansion 
method (NEM). The PANBOX code system has been coupled with the thermal-hydraulics 
system code RELAP for analysis of the OECD/NEA PWR MSLB, Sanchez-Espinoza et al. 
Verification of the coupled PANBOX /RELAP was performed by Jackson et al. for core 
transient analysis. 
CITATION code is a three dimensional, multi group diffusion code (Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, 1972), is used for core simulation. This code was designed to solve problems 
involving the finite-difference representation of diffusion theory treating up to three space 
dimensions with arbitrary group-to-group scattering. Explicitly, finite-difference 
approximation in space and time has been implemented. The neutron flux-eigenvalue 
problems are solved by direct iteration to determine the multiplication factor or the nuclide 
densities required for a critical system. In the input file of this code the macroscopic cross-
sections are required which are prepared by running WIMSD-4 code (Winfrith, 1982). As 
this code uses the transport theory in its calculations, the results have a high degree of 
accuracy. 
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2.2 Discrete-ordinate codes 
Deterministic codes are most commonly based on the discrete ordinates method. They solve 
the Boltzmann transport equation for the average particle behavior to calculate the neutron 
flux. With discrete ordinate methods, the phase space is divided into many small boxes and 
particles are moved from one box to another. If this approach is to be used for modeling a 
VVER fuel assembly, the guide tubes, the coolant sub-channels, and fuel rods will be 
homogenized and the medium is discretized to solve the transport equation. This type of 
geometry modeling will not accurately represent the important design details essential for 
the VVER fuel assembly. Deterministic codes use macroscopic cross section data, which are 
processed from multi-group energies. Processed macroscopic cross section data from 
microscopic scale are required for different parts in the geometry. For complicated 
geometries with varying parameters such as coolant and moderator density, preparation of 
the macroscopic cross section data would also require a lot effort. Therefore deterministic 
codes need to be homogenized for complex geometries. The global solutions are obtained 
with truncated errors. Computer codes based on deterministic methods include DORT, two 
dimensional (X-Y, and R-Z) geometries, TORT, a three-dimensional discrete transport code 
DORT-TD, a transient neutron transport code, KARPOS, a modular system code developed 
by Broeders et al. 
2.3 Monte-Carlo method 
A Monte Carlo method does not solve an explicit equation like the deterministic code, but 
rather obtains the answers by simulating individual particles and recording some aspects 
(tallies) of their average behavior. Monte Carlo codes use a continuous energy scale to 
represent the variation of cross section data. They are widely used because of the capability 
of complex geometries modeling and accurate solution produced with the continuous 
energy scale used to represent the cross section data. Computer codes based on the Monte-
Carlo methods include: MCNP (Monte Carlo N-Particle) is a general-purpose, continuous-
energy, generalized-geometry, coupled neutron/photon/electron transport code. The 
MCNP code for neutronics analysis is described by Briesmesiter, 2000 from the Los Alamos 
National laboratory. Different versions of MCNP have been developed, for example 
MCNP4C for low energy calculation and MCNPX for higher energies. The application of the 
Monte Carlo codes in nuclear energy is increasing for fuel assembly and core design 
analysis typically in BWR where the density varies in the core. Mori et al. has already 
coupled the Monte-Carlo MCNP has been successfully coupled with a thermal-hydraulics 
system code for power and reactivity analysis of a supercritical fast reactor (SCFR) core that 
does not include moderator tubes, hence a simplified design. 
3. Thermal-hydraulics codes 
3.1 System codes or lumped approach 
System codes are based on a lumped parameter approach. This means, for nuclear power 
plant (NPP) application the components in the primary and secondary system are 
represented by a one-dimensional model. Details of a fuel assembly such as moderator rod, 
individual sub-channels for density variation study cannot be revealed through such means. 
The basic equations for continuity, momentum and energy are applied and averaged and 
the thermal-hydraulics properties for each component are obtained. The smallest volume is 
typically a total core or major parts of it. System codes are commonly used in LWR 
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application for different types of transient and safety analysis. Widely used system codes 
include: 
ATHLET, (Analysis of Thermal-hydraulics of LEaks Transient) has been developed by the 
Gesellschaft für Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) for analysis of anticipated and abnormal plant 
transients, small and intermediate leaks and large breaks in light water reactors. The concept 
of ATHLET for analysis of PWR and BWR system has been described by Burwell et al. The 
ATHLET code has been coupled with the 3-D core model neutronic code DYN3D for 
analysis of BWR turbine trip benchmark, Grundmann et al. Validation of the ATHLET 
thermal-hydraulics code for PWR and BWR was presented by Glaeser. The coupling 
interlace of ATHLET with the neutronic core model DYN3D has been reported by 
Langenbuch et al. The coupled code ATHLET- QUABOX/CUBBOX has been used by 
Langenbuch et al. for analysis of the OECD/NRC BWR turbine trip benchmark. 
RELAP (Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program) is used for transient simulation of 
LWRs. It is widely used for LWR transient analysis in PWR and BWR. The RELAP5 code has 
been coupled with point kinetic code for analysis of OCED/NEA PWR MSLB by Sanchez-
Espanioza and Nigro et al. Bovalini et al. reported coupled application of RELAP and 
comparison with different codes for TMI-MSLB. The CATHARE code is used for transient 
analysis of PWR plants, VVER and BWR. The CATHARE code has been coupled with 
CRONOS2-FLICA4 for BWR turbine trip analysis Mignot et al. 
3.2 Sub-channel codes 
Sub-channel codes are used for multi-component modeling in the core. A core is represented 
by the sub-assemblies and the sub-assembly by different sub-channels and other water 
channels and fuel rods. The basic equations are solved for control volumes in the scale of 
sub-channels. The sub-channel codes are capable of three-dimensional geometry modeling. 
Codes that are based on this approach include: 
COBRA (Coolant Boiling in Rod Arrays) is a public computer code used for thermal- 
hydraulics analysis with implicit cross-flow between adjacent sub-channels, single flow and 
homogeneous two-phase fluids. It is used world-wide for DNBR (departure from nucleate 
boiling ratio) analysis in LWR sub-channels as well as for 3-D whole PWR core simulation 
with one or more channels per fuel assembly, Wheeler et al. 
MATRA (Multi-channel Analyzer for steady states and Transient in Rod Arrays) is a sub- 
channel analysis code developed at KAERI (Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute), Yoo 
et al. The main concept of the MATRA code is based on COBRA. 
The STAFAS (Sub-channel Thermal-hydraulics Analysis of Fuel Assembly under Supercritical 
Conditions) code was developed by Cheng et al. It is based on the concept of the COBRA 
code but includes special features of the HPLWR such as: downward flow of the moderator 
water and incorporates steam table that allows the prediction of supercritical water 
properties. The code is flexible and allows for complex geometry modeling. Heat transfer 
from solid surfaces can be easily implemented. The present version of the STAFAS code is 
for steady state conditions and single-phase flow only. 
FLICA-4 is a thermo-hydraulic code developed at the French Atomic Energy Commission 
(CEA) for computing three-dimensional, transient or steady, two-phase flows in nuclear 
reactors. The code is described in the paper by Allaire for 3-D transient computation. The 
FLICA code has been coupled with the system code CATHARE and CRONOS2, a 3D 
neutronics code for computation of a BWR turbine trip, Mignot et al.  
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No. Title and authors Coupled codes NPP Transient type ef. 
PWR RIA 
BWR 
(Ringhals-1) 
Stability 
benchmark 
cases 
1 
Coupling of the Thermal-hydraulics  
Code TRAC 
with 3-D Neutron Kinetics Code SKETCH-N
H. Asaka, V.G. Zimin,  
T. Iguchi, Y. Anoda 
J-TRAC 
TRAC-BF1 
Sketch-N 
BWR Instabilities 
2 
Core-wide DNBR Calculation 
 for NPP Krško MSLB 
I-A. Jurkoviá, D. Grgiá, N. Debrecin 
RELAP5/ MOD3.2 
COBRA III C 
QUABOX/CUBBOX 
PWR 
(NPP Krško) MSLB 
PWR B&W 
TMI-1 
3 
MSLB Coupled 3-D  
Neutronics/Thermal-hydraulics 
Analysis of a Large PWR  
Using RELAP5-3-D 
F. D’Auria, A. Lo Nigro,  
G. Saiu, A. Spadoni 
RELAP5/MOD3.2 
NESTLE 
AP-1000 
MSLB 
RELAP5/MOD3.2.2 
PARCS 
RELAP5/MOD3.2.2 
QUABBOX 4 
TMI-1 MSLB Coupled 3-D Neutronics/ 
Thermal-hydraulics Analysis: 
 Application of RELAP5-3-D and Comparison 
with Different Codes 
R. Bovalini, F. D’Auria,  
G.M. Galassi, A. Spadoni, Y. Hassan 
RELAP5/3-D 
NESTLE 
PWR  
(B&W  
TMI-1) 
MSLB 
5 
PWR REA Sensitivity Analysis of 
TRAC-PF1/NEM Coupling Schemes 
N. Todorova, K. Ivanov 
TRAC-PF1 
NEM 
PWR (B&W)  
TM-1 REA 
6 
Coupled 3-D Neutronic/Thermal-hydraulics 
Codes Applied to 
Peach Bottom Unit 2 
A. Ma Sánchez, G. Verdú , A. Gómez 
 
BWR 
(Peach 
Bottom  
Unit 2) 
TT 
7 
Study of the Asymmetric Steam Line Break 
Problem by the Coupled Code System 
KIKO3D/ATHLET 
Gy. Hegyi, A. Keresztúri, I. Trosztel 
ATHLET 
KIKO3D VVER 440 MSLB 
LOFW 
Station black 
out 
8 
Development of Coupled Systems of 
3-D Neutronics and Fluid-dynamic System 
Codes and their Application  
for Safety Analysis 
S. Langenbuch, K. Velkov,  
S. Kliem U. Rohde, M. Lizorkin,  
G. Hegyi, A. Kereszturi 
ATHLET 
DYN3D 
BIPR-8 
VVER-1000 
MCP stop 
9 
VIPRE-02 Subchannel Validation 
Against NUPEC BWR  
Void Fraction Data 
Y. Aounallah, P. Coddington 
VIPRE-02 ARROTTA BWR 
Void 
fraction 
validation 
study 
10 
High Local Power Densities Permissible 
at Siemens Pressurised Water Reactors 
K. Kuehnel, K.D. Richter,  
G Drescher, I. Endrizzi 
PANBOX PWR 
Maximum 
local heat 
flux investi-
gation 
ATWS: Anticipated Transient without Scram;   RIA: Reactivity Induced Accident;  
REA: Rod Ejection Accident;   MCP: Main Coolant Pump;   LOFW: Loss Of proper Feed Water 
Table 1. Overview of 3-D coupled neutronics/thermal-hydraulics calculations available 
from the literature 
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No. Title and authors Coupled codes NPP Transient type ef. 
11 
Analysis of a Boron Dilution Accident for 
VVER-440 
Combining the Use of the Codes DYN3D and 
SiTap 
U. Rohde, I. Elkin, V. Kalinenko 
SiTap 
DYN3D VVER 440 RIA 
Grid 
frequency 
error 
injection test 12 
RELAP5-PANTHER Coupled  
Code Transient Analysis 
B.J. Holmes, G.R. Kimber,  
J.N. Lillington, M.R. Parkes 
RELAP5 
PANTHER 
PWR 
(Sizewell-B) 
Single 
turbine 
trip event 
13 
TACIS R2.30/94 Project Transient Analysis for 
RBMK Reactors 
H. Schoels, Yu. M. Nikitin Nikiet 
FLICA GIDRA SADC 
DINAO 
CRONOS 
QUABOX/CUBOX 
RBMK 
(Smolensk 3) RIA 
14 
PWR Anticipated Transients Without 
SCRAM Analyses Using PVM Coupled 
RETRAN and STAR 3-D Kinetics Codes 
M. Feltus, K. Labowski 
RETRAN 
STAR 3-D PWR ATWS 
15 
Development and First Results of 
Coupled Neutronic and Thermal-hydraulics 
Calculations for the  
High -performance LWR 
C.H.M. Broeders, V. Sanchez-Espinoza, A. 
Travleev 
RELAP5 
KAPROS HPLWR FA tests 
16 
Analysis and Calculation of an 
Accident with Delayed Scram 
on NPP Greifswald using the 
 Coupled Code DYN3D-ATHLET 
S. Kliem 
ATHLET 
DYN3D 
VVER-440
(Greifswald) 
Delayed 
scram 
17 
Multi-dimensional TMI-1 Main Steam Line 
Break Analysis Methodology using TRAC-
PF/NEM 
K. Ivanov, T. Beam, A. Baratta, A. Irani, N. 
Trikouros 
TRAC-PF 
NEM 
PWR  
(B&W TMI-1) MSLB 
18 
Realistic and Conservative Rod Ejection 
Simulation in a PWR Core at HZP, EOC 
with Coupled PARCS and RELAP Codes 
J. Riverola, T. Núñez, J. Vicente 
RELAP 
PARCS 
Three-loop 
PWR 
Peripheral 
rod ejection 
19 OECD/NRC BWR  Benchmark 3rd Workshop 
ATHLET 
QUABOX/CUBBOX 
BWR Peach 
Bottom TT 
ATWS: Anticipated Transient without Scram;   RIA: Reactivity Induced Accident;  
REA: Rod Ejection Accident;   MCP: Main Coolant Pump;   LOFW: Loss Of proper Feed Water 
 
Table 1.(continues) Overview of 3-D coupled neutronics/thermal-hydraulics calculations 
available from the literature 
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3.3 Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) codes 
The strategy of CFD is to replace the continuous domain with a discrete domain using a grid. 
The geometry is discretized with a typical mesh size of less than a volume and the thermal- 
hydraulics properties are computed for every grid point defined. The conservation equations 
for mass momentum and energy are solved in a discrete form. Any complex geometry is 
possible, the extremely fine resolution costs computation time. The CFD approach is mostly 
preferred for small geometries. Existing CFD codes include: FLUENT, CFX. 
4. Coupled neutronic and thermal-hydraulics computer codes for LWR 
An overview of available coupled neutronics/thermal-hydraulics code published up to now 
has been reported in table 1. This table summarizes a list of coupled codes for PWR, BWR to 
date, with the computer codes described in the previous chapters. 
4.1 Requirements to the coupling algorithm 
Detailed description of the interlace requirement to couple thermal-hydraulics code to 3-D 
neutronic code has been reported by Langenbuch et al. The objective to couple neutronics 
code with a thermal-hydraulics code is to provide an accurate solution in a reasonable 
amount of CPU time. For the present study, the basic components that are considered for 
the coupling methodology include: 
4.2 Coupling method 
There are two different ways of coupling, internal and external coupling. With internal 
coupling the neutronics code is integrated within the thermal-hydraulics code. While with 
external coupling, the two codes run externally and exchange information between each 
other.  
4.3 Spatial mesh overlay 
Accurate mapping of mesh or volumes between the two codes is important to exchange 
information between each other. 
4.4 Coupled convergence schemes 
A convergence scheme of the two codes needs to be defined. For a final convergence of the 
coupled codes, independent convergence in the individual codes is required. 
5. Theory of Artificial Neural Network (ANN) 
An ANN consists of simple computational units called neurons and it is characterized by a 
network structure. The neurons connected to each other with different connection strengths. 
The strength of a connection between neurons is called weight. The types of ANNs are 
different and associated with applications. The artificial neural networks have a wide 
variety of applications in nuclear engineering. Some of the basic related researches are listed 
below: 
• Fuel management optimization (Faria and Pereira, 2003) 
• Prediction of core parameters (Gazula and Bohr, 1992) 
• Plant control and monitoring (Uhrig, 1995) 
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• Nonlinear dynamics and transient diagnosing (Adali et al., 1997) 
• Two-phase flow study (Tambouratzis  and Pazsit, 2009) 
• Signal validation method (Ikonomopoulos and Van Der Hagen, 1997) 
In some investigations to speed up effectively optimization process a very fast estimation 
system of core parameters has been introduced and developed using cascade feed forward 
type of artificial neural networks. 
5.1 ANN designing 
Among the literature, there are different types of available network architectures. The most 
popular neural network is Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) network. This later has been 
chosen because of its high performance in predictive tasks (Erdogan and Geckinli, 2003; 
Souza and Moreira, 2006) and to let comparison with the results issued from our 
calculations. In MLP, various neurons are arranged in different layers called input, hidden, 
and output. Fig. 1 shows a typical scheme of the three layers neural network.  The neurons 
in the first layer correspond to independent input variables of the problem and transmit the 
input values to the succeeding layer. After the input layer, there may be one or more hidden 
layers. They receive the weighted combination of input values from the preceding layer and 
produce an output depending on their activation function (Jodouin, 1994). As shown in 
figure 1, the weights are determined and adjusted, through an iterative and a back-
propagation process, minimizing a quadratic error function. Thus, to make use of an 
appropriate Artificial Neural Network, one must fine-tune the following items as their 
incidence on the prediction parameters are of a crucial importance. 
The items of interest are as follow: 
1. Activation function, 
2. Performance function, 
3. Training algorithms.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Typical architecture of Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) neural network 
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5.2 Cascade feed forward neural networks 
A general type of feed-forward ANNs consists of a layer of inputs, a layer of output 
neurons, and one or more hidden layers of neurons. Figure 2 shows a general type of a three 
layers feed-forward ANN. Typically feed-forward ANNs are used to parameter prediction 
and data approximation. 
 
 
Fig. 2. A general type of three layered feed-forward ANNs 
A cascade type of feed-forward ANNs consists of a layer of input, a layer of output neurons, 
and one or more hidden layers. Similar to a general type of feed-forward ANNs, the first 
layer has weights coming from the input. But each subsequent layer has weights coming 
from the input and all previous layers. All layers have biases. The last layer is the network 
output. Each layer’s weights and biases must be initialized. A supervised training method is 
used to train considered cascade feed forward ANNs. 
5.3 Training and activation functions 
The training process determined through a back propagation algorithm which minimizes a 
quadratic error between the desired and network outputs. The gradient descent method 
with momentum weight/bias learning rule has been used to train considered ANNs. It is a 
developed algorithm of the basic back propagation algorithm (Hagan et al., 1995; Rumelhart 
et al., 1986a,b). A net input (Vj) to a neuron in a hidden layer k is calculated by this formula 
(Eq. (1)). 
 
1
n
j ji i j
i
V W θ θ
=
= +∑  (1) 
Where n is the number of k-1 layer neurons for a general type of feed-forward ANNs and 
the number of all of the previous layer neurons for a cascade type of feed-forward ANNs. 
Weights are noted by Wji; and the threshold offset by θj. 
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The output of the neuron Oj is given by an activation function. An activation derivative 
function effects on neuron outputs to compress propagated signals and simulate the 
nonlinearity of the complex systems. Many different activation functions are used in feed-
forward ANNs. There are several types of activation functions such as Linear (Eq. (2)), Log-
Sigmoid (Eq. 3), Tan-Sigmoid (Eq. 4) functions, etc. 
 ( )j jO Pureline V=  (2) 
 ( )( )( ) 1 / 1 jVj jO Logsig V e−= = +  (3) 
 ( )2( ) 2( )( ) 1 /(1j jV Vj jO Tansig V e e− −= = − +  (4) 
In this learning method, which is a batch training method, weights and biases are only 
updated after all the inputs and targets are presented to ANNs. Then the average of system 
error (Eq. 5) should be minimized to increase learning performance. 
 ( )2
1 1
1 ( ) ( )
2
N M
AV j j
i j
E d n O n
N = =
= −∑∑  (5) 
Where dj(n) is the desired output; and Oj(n) is the network output. N and M are the total 
number of training data sets and the number of neurons of the output layer. In the gradient 
descent method improved values of the weights can be achieved by making incremental 
changes Δwji proportional to ∂EAV/∂Wji (Eq. 6). 
 AVji
ji
EW
W
η ∂Δ = − ∂  (6) 
Where the proportionally factor η is called the learning rate. Large values of η in the 
gradient descent formulation may lead to large oscillation or divergence. One attempt to 
increase the speed of convergence while minimizing the possibility of oscillation, or 
divergence, involves adding a momentum term to the basic gradient descent formulation. In 
this case the weight vector at time index (k+1) is related to the weight vectors at time 
indexes (k) and (k-1) by this formula (Eq. 7). 
 ( 1) ( ) ( 1)EW k W k W k
W
η β∂⎡ ⎤+ = − + Δ −⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦
 (7) 
Then the new weights for step (k+1) are given by: 
 ( 1) ( )ji j j jiW k O W kηδ βΔ + = + Δ  (8) 
Where a momentum coefficient, or an acceleration parameter β is used to improve 
convergence. The expression of δj is given by: 
 0.5( ) ( )k k k kd O f vδ ′= −  (9) 
 ( )   for hidden neuronsj k k kj
k
f v Wδ δ′= ∑  (10) 
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It should be noted that the technology of ANNs has been still developing. The determination 
of minimum number of necessary hidden neurons and hidden layers is completely practical. 
If the hidden neurons are chosen very small, the network will classify its input in a small 
number of classes (Wilde, 1997). If the hidden neurons are selected extremely large, the time 
of learning process increases ineffectively. Presently, the best method is making an educated 
guess. In this work, after primarily studies some practical tests are suggested and used to 
adjust the main parameters and properties of the ANNs’ structures and used training rule 
(Eqs. 1 through 10). 
5.4 ANN development strategy 
The motivation in using such a computational procedure lies in the fact that it will let us use 
just hundreds of configurations rather than the thousands, in the learning stage, that are 
usually required in typical calculations to ensure reasonable predictions. Hence, as shown in 
Fig. 3, a suitable neural networks development strategy can be tested based on executing the 
following two main calculational stages, in an independent way: learning stage and 
prediction stage. 
 
Initial Core 
cofiguration
Transformation 
Input pattern
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Weights
Calculate 
Output
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Neutronic (Keff, Peaking factor, …)
Thermal -Hydraulic(Heat flux , 
DNBR, CHF) parameters
2
2
Validation
Prediction Stage
Learning Stage
2
 
 
Fig. 3. Overall back-propagation computational strategy for the core parameter prediction 
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The first stage of computational procedure consists of creating suitable networks by 
applying an appropriate learning rule using a desired database. The information required in 
the related database will contain coupled input values with the corresponding target output 
values. These values are used to train the networks until the error reaches a desired value 
stated at the beginning of the learning process. It becomes evident that the quality of the 
results obtained will depend on how well knowledge is capitalized in this database. Hence, 
significant attention will be focused on how well this database will be created. The main 
steps required in the learning process are: 
1. Create the database for training; 
2. Construction of networks for training; 
3. Choosing a learning function; 
4. Train the developed networks; 
The second stage is the prediction one where the weights, from the inter-connected neurons, 
have been adjusted to the desired error in the previous calculations stage. These weights 
will be used in a global computational sequence, to predict the networks outputs when 
unseen data will be presented to the developed networks. This is the power of the network 
approach and one of the reasons for using it. The net is said to have been generalized from 
the training data. This stage is necessary to test the performance of the developed neural 
network. 
5.5 Create data-base for training 
A wide variety of completely different core arrangements are needed to train effectively 
considered ANNs. In this work, the fuel assembly positions are considered changeable in 
calculations. Core calculations have been done by a supporting software tool that will be 
able to calculate neutronic and thermal hydraulic parameters of a typical reactor core. This 
program uses a coupling method to calculate reactor core parameters for desired core 
configuration. Needed parameters for training should be extracted from the software 
calculations. They must be converted to a compatible format to feed desired ANNs. Doing 
this manually takes a long time while some human errors are possible. In this research, a 
data base builder program is designed and used. It is used to create data sets necessary to 
train and test considered ANNs. 
In this research, a software package (Core Parameters Calculator) is developed and used. 
The random state of the software is used to create data sets necessary to train and test used 
ANNs. Many strings composed of specific integer numbers are chosen randomly to form 
different core configurations. For each different state (configuration), Core Parameters 
Calculator software uses MCNP and COBRA-EN code to extract needed neutronic and 
thermal-hydraulics core parameters. During calculation process, MCNP code uses cross 
sections library provided by NJOY program. Then calculated fission powers of fuel rods 
send to Thermal-hydraulics code for calculating of density and temperature distribution of 
fuel and coolant. Finally the results (consist of neutronic and thermal- hydraulic parameters) 
are stored on a local data base table. Figure 4 shows the main diagram of creating desired 
data. 
5.6 Developing of a supporting tool for core parameters calculation 
Due of the strong link between the water (moderation) and the neutron spectrum and 
subsequently the power distribution, a coupling of neutronics and thermal-hydraulics has 
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Fig. 4. The main diagram of creating desired data 
become a necessity for reactor concepts operating at real conditions. The effect of neutron 
moderation on the local parameters of thermal-hydraulics and vice-verse in a fuel assembly 
has to be considered for an accurate design analysis. In this study, the Monte Carlo N-
Particle code (MCNP) and the sub-channel code COBRA-EN (Sub-channel Thermal-
hydraulics Analysis of a Fuel Assembly for LWR) have been coupled for the design analysis 
of a fuel assembly and core with water as coolant and moderator. Both codes are well 
known for complex geometry modeling. The MCNP code is used for neutronics analyses 
and for the prediction of power profiles of individual fuel rods. The sub-channel code 
COBRA for the thermal- hydraulics analyses takes into account the coolant properties as 
well as separate moderator channels.  
The coupling procedure is realized automatically. MCNP calculates the power distribution 
in each fuel rod, which is then transferred into COBRA to obtain the corresponding thermal-
hydraulics conditions in each sub-channel. The new thermal-hydraulics conditions are used 
to generate a new input for the next MCNP calculation. This procedure is repeated until a 
converged state is achieved. The parameters that are exchanged between the two codes for 
the coupling are: power distribution from MCNP code, water density distribution, water 
temperature distribution and fuel temperature distribution from COBRA code, as shown in 
Figure 5. The COBRA-EN code, which is written in FORTRAN language, is modified to 
include the power distribution obtained from neutronics analysis and to be able modeling of 
Russian fuel type.  
The nuclear cross section data library of MCNP must be provided for additional 
temperatures and must be added to MCNP data directory. The cross section data for 
neutron interaction are obtained from the evaluated MCNP libraries ENDF/B. Cross section 
data provided with the MCNP are for a limited number of temperatures. An additional 
library must be constructed from NJOY code with more temperatures (300 K, 500 K, 600 K, 
760 K, 800 K, 1000 K, 1500 K) and is added to the MCNP data directory. The coupled code 
system was tested on a proposed fuel assembly design of a VVER-1000. The coupling 
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procedure presented will also be applicable to other types of reactors with a density 
variation in the core such as in BWR. 
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Fig. 5. Coupled MCNP/COBRA-EN  for joining neutronic –thermalhydraulics are shown 
schematically. The cross sections modification are a major concern which are doen using 
NJOY code 
From the literature review, most of the available coupled codes for neutronics/thermal-
hydraulics are based on diffusion and system codes resulting in a rather coarse resolution of 
the core. For a detailed analysis of a VVER-1000 fuel assembly analysis, diffusion codes and 
system codes are not giving enough local information. All prior application had been to 
PWR and BWR transient analysis. To accurately analyze a VVER fuel assembly a more 
detailed analysis fuel rod wise and sub-channel wise is required to predict a hot spot and 
the temperature distribution around the circumference of a fuel rod. In order to perform 
such detailed analysis of the VVER fuel assembly, a new coupled code system is required. 
From the reviewed neutronics and thermal-hydraulics computer codes, the Monte Carlo 
code and sub-channel codes show to be the best choice of codes to be coupled for detailed 
fuel assembly analysis. Both have similar spatial resolution. The smallest control volume is 
in the order of a few cm in both cases. System codes on the other hand would be too coarse 
for MCNP and CFD codes too fine in resolution. 
6. Conclusions 
Obviously, due to huge files, it is not possible to present our input files ( MCNP and 
COBRA-EN codes) as our suggested package in this chapter, but reader can consult the 
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corresponding author to find the MCNP as well as COBRA-EN input files for simulating a 
VVER-1000 reactors. The MCNP code contains hexagonal core including all core conditions 
such as all control rod inserted (or withdrawn), boric acid inserted, hot full power condition, 
etc. Also, reader can find our COBRA-EN code to undrestand how we can simulate thermal 
hydraulics subchannels of a VVER-1000 reactor. Moreover, as we said previously, 
temperature cross sections modification are carried out using NJOY code and obviously 
reader can receive our modification. These so-called data are used as output data for ANN 
training. If reader are interested, they can consult the corresponding author to get our ANN 
simulator. Basically,  the main objective of  the  ANN software is to obtain fast estimation 
tool which allows large explorations of core safety parameters. This software is very useful 
in reactor core designing and in-core fuel management or loading pattern optimization.  
In due course, verification and validation of the procedures are taking into account using 
available experimental data or other code-to-code benchmarking, and this is an important 
part of  research.  
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1. Introduction 
With over 437 operational power plants, nuclear systems contribute 370705 MW(e) worldwide 
 [1]. The Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) constitute a two-third majority of the operational 
nuclear power plants while the nuclear reactors in planning and construction phases also 
show strong trend towards PWRs. These systems are mainly used as baseline load carriers 
while conventional fossil fueled systems are used for load adjustments and variations  [2]. 
The PWRs have higher than average levels of radiation fields emanating from the corrosion 
and fission product activity  [3]  [4]  [5]. This leads to prolongation of maintenance schedules 
entailing loss of revenues mounting to several million dollars per plant annually  [6]. 
Consequently, the plant availability factors are also lowered. This situation is further 
aggravated due to strong shift of plant age profile toward over 25 years operational range. 
With plant aging, the fuel failures become more frequent which leads to enhancement of 
radiation levels in the primary circuits of PWRs. 
The levels of fission product activity (FPA) have been of concern both from the operational 
as well as from accidental perspectives. These levels are continuously monitored during the 
normal operation of PWRs. The fuel pins develop leakages with their burnup. When the 
failed fuel fraction exceeds a safe limit, replacement of defective assemblies by refueling 
becomes necessary. Therefore, low levels of leaked-out fission products (FPs) in primary 
coolant of PWRs are indicative of the core health  [7]. In the accidental conditions, the total 
value of FPA serves as the available source term that potentially can escape into the 
surroundings  [8]  [9].  
The fission products are released in the fuel matrix during burnup. They escape from the 
ceramic pellets into the gap between pellets and the clad regions. Hyun et al.  [10] have 
developed an analytic method for the fuel rod gap inventory of unstable fission products 
during steady state operation of PWRs. The fission gas bubbles escape from grain corners 
and are interlinked in the open space. The release rate depends on the bubble interlinkage 
along with temperature and burnup. A generalized model for fission product transport in 
the fuel-to-sheath gap was given by Lewis  [11]. Barrachin et al. presented a review of fission 
product behaviour in UO2 fuel  [12].  
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The release of fission products from fuel-clad gap into primary coolant involves clad failure. 
A model describing pallet oxidation, subsequent enhancement of diffusivity and bubble 
formation at grain boundaries, their interlinkage and release into open surfaces, was 
developed by Koo et al  [13].  This model is stochastic in nature and incorporates inherent 
randomness of the underlying physical phenomenon using Monte Carlo method. While the 
prediction based on this model are in good agreement with the corresponding experimental 
measurements in the linear heating regime, strong under-predictions have been reported for 
the remaining regime. The Ivanov’s model  [14] gave good description of various processes 
involved in the release of FPs from the porous ceramic fuel, its leakage from clad and 
mixing with the primary coolant. Theoretical predictions based on this model have been 
reported in good agreement with the corresponding experimental data. 
Combined failures based model has been developed by Clink and Freeburn  [15] which was 
employed in an on-line coolant activity monitoring system. Such systems carryout estimation 
of failed fuel fractions in non-destructive manner. Normally, these systems are designed for 
constant power, steady state operational conditions. The Clinck and Freeburn model was 
observed to under-predict failed fuel fractions even for steady-state operation  [16].   
A theoretical model has been developed by Tucker and white  [17] for the estimation of FPs 
from ceramic UO2 fuel. In this model, first, the probabilities of leakages of FPs from fuel 
interior through grain-edge tunnel pore to outer portions are figured out. These 
probabilities strongly depend on the interconnectivity of pores in the ceramic fuel. A good 
agreement has been reported between theoretical predictions made by using this model and 
the corresponding experimental measurements. 
2. FPA simulation codes 
In view of the importance of the FPA for normal operation as well as for accidental 
scenarios, various computer programs have been developed for its estimation. They fall into 
two basic categories: 
• Point depletion codes 
• Fission Product Transport Codes 
• Empirical 
• Semi-Empirical  
• Mechanistic 
The point depletion codes carryout production, buildup, decay and depletion calculations 
for a wide variety of radionuclides in the core region. As such, they provide reliable 
estimates of radioisotope inventory in the reactor fuel. They typically ignore spatial details 
while retaining spectral details of the neutron field. The widely used WIMS computer code 
 [18] for 1-D transport theory macroscopic group constant generation employs 69-group 
library along with DSN or Stochastic methodology. It performs details buildup, depletion 
and burnup calculations for 35 distinct fission products along with one pseudo, lumped 
fission product. The WIMS code does not perform any further radionuclide transport 
calculations. The CASMO-4  [19] and DRWIN  [20] also belong to the same pin/cell based 
macroscopic group constant generation codes as WIMS and as far as fission products are 
concerned, they are limited to radionuclide inventory calculations for the fuel region. 
The ORIGEN2 computer code  [21] provides extensive radionuclide inventory calculations 
for 950 fission products along with 120 actinides in point-wise buildup and depletion 
manner. While one can manually remove or add radionuclides in refueling options, no 
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attempt is made in the code for the radionuclide transport calculations. An evolved version 
called MONTEBURNS  [22] incorporates spatial details in the depletion/buildup 
calculations by coupling the ORIGEN2 code with the multipurpose radiation transport code 
MCNP  [23].   
The radionuclide transport code category is comprised of three types of computer codes: 
empirical, semi-empirical and mechanistic codes. In the empirical codes, various data fitting 
techniques are used for development of empirical models from detailed experimental 
observations. One advantage of this strategy is that no prior knowledge is required regarding 
the details of the underlying physical processes involved. At the same time, it gives most 
accurate results in the sense that they match the experimental results. Consequently, they 
are extensively used in risk assessment and safety analysis. Lumping of parameters and 
grouping of similar elements simplifies many features of these codes and adds to their 
computational efficiency. The MELCOR  [24] and CORSOR  [25] codes belong to the empirical 
radionuclide transport class of computer programs. While being highly efficient and reliable, 
the empirical codes are valid only in a limited range of parameters. 
The limitations of the empirical models are relaxed somewhat by incorporating detailed 
modeling for a part of the simulation while the remaining part is attempted by using 
empirical approach. The FIPREM  [26] computer code attempts fission product transport 
problem by using empirical Booth equivalent sphere model while detailed diffusion theory 
based finite difference model is employed for fission product transport into gap region.  
The VICTORIA  [27] and ECART  [28] computer codes, being mechanistic in nature, do not 
face strict limits of validation. They carryout simulation of radionuclide transport in much 
broader range of accidental scenarios starting from releases, to dispersion and subsequent 
deposition. Since these computer programs were specifically designed for accident analysis, 
therefore, they cannot be used in normal steady-state or in transient cases. 
Most of the available computer programs for transport analysis of fission product activity 
are focused on accidental analysis. For the analysis of fission product transport in the steady 
state and in transient analysis FPCART-ST computer code has been developed. The details 
regarding the mathematical modeling, computer implementation and results of simulations 
carried out using this code are provided here.  
3. Kinetic modeling 
In these work, a 300 MW(e) PWR has been considered with design specifications as 
provided in Table 1. The primary circuit of a typical PWR with various indicated essential 
components is shown in Fig. 1. The reactor is taken with zero levels of FPA in the primary 
circuit at the start ( 0t = ). The FPA levels in Fuel/Gap/Coolant=F/G/C is governed by the 
following set of ODEs:  
For the fuel region: 
 
 [ ]1, , ,1iF i i ij j F j i i i F ijdN FY P f N v Ndt λ λ σ φ
−
−= + − + +∑ , (1) 
 
for the gap region: 
 
 [ ]1, , , ,1iG i i F i ij j G j i i i G ijdN v N f N Dє Ndt λ λ σ φ
−
−= + − + +∑  (2) 
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and, for the coolant region: 
 1, , , ,1
iC i i
i G i ij j C j i i C ij
dN LDє N f N Q N
dt W W
ηλ λ β τσ φ−− ⎡ ⎤= + + + + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ . (3) 
where, ‘i’ indicates the isotope in the decay chain consisting of four isotopes: 1,2,..., 4i = . 
The values of various parameters used in these simulations are listed in Table 2.  
In order to compute the saturation values of various radioisotopes in the fuel, gap and 
coolant regions one can use the following analytical results: 
For coolant region: 
 1, , ,1
isat sat sat
C i i G i ij j C j i i i ij
Q LN Dє N f N
m m
λ λ η β τσ φ−− ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= + + + + +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ , (4) 
For gap region,  
 [ ]1, , ,1isat sat satG i i F j ij j G j i i ijN v N f N Dєλ λ σ φ−−⎡ ⎤= + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ , (5) 
and for fuel region:  
 [ ]1, ,1isat satF i i ij j F j i i ijN FY P f N vλ λ σ φ−−⎡ ⎤= + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ . (6) 
 
Parameter Value 
Specific power (MWth/Kg. U) 33 
Number of fuel assemblies  194 
In-let coolant temperature (oC) 293 
Out-let coolant temperature (oC) 329 
Power density (MWth/m3) 102 
Fuel pins (rods) per assembly 264 
Fuel material UO2 
Clad material Zilcoloy 
Lattice pitch (mm) 12.6 
Fuel pin outer diameter (mm) 9.5 
Coolant pressure (MPa) 15.5 
Coolant flow rate (Mg/s) 18.3 
Linear heat rate (kW/m3) 17.5 
Average enrichment (%) 3.0 
Core height (m) 4.17 
Core diameter (m) 3.37 
Table 1. Design data of a typical pressurized water reactor  [37]  
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Fig. 1. A three dimensional perspective view of a typical PWR primary system with the 
pressure vessel, heat exchanger, primary pump and pressurizer indicated 
 
Parameter Value 
V (cm3) 1.485×109 
L (g/s) 2.3 
Q (g/s) 470 
D 2.5×10-3 
W (g) 1.072×109 
β 0.001 
F (Fissions/W.s) 3.03×1010 
Po (MWth) 998 
τ 0.056 
Table 2. Values of different operational parameters used in simulations  [37] 
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3.1 Deterministic computational methodology 
Various step involved in the transport of fission products, starting from their release in the 
fuel matrix, their transport from ceramic pores into the fuel-clad gap, their leakage from clad 
into the primary coolant, and subsequent removal by leakages, by filters, by radioactive 
decay etc., is depicted in Fig. 2. The FPA transport model has been implemented in the 
computer program FPCART. It uses LEOPARD  [29] and ODMUG  [30] programs as 
subroutines. The cell averaged multigroup group constant generation is carried out by the 
LEOPARD subroutine while the group fluxes are found by solution of one-dimensional 
diffusion equation in the ODMUG subroutine. In the FPCART code, the system of 
governing ODEs: Eqs. (1) upto (3) are solved numerically using Runge-Kutta (RK) method 
in this program. The RK-numerical provides efficient time domain solution yielding static as 
well as dynamic values of FPAs corresponding to about 50 different dominant fission 
products. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Block diagram of the fission products production and removal mechanism in the 
primary circuit of a typical PWR 
The computational cycle starts with initialization of the variables with 0t = . The group 
constants are generated by the LEOPARD while the group flux are found using ODMUG. 
The values of FPAs in the fuel, gap and in primary coolant are initialized as zeros for the 
Recent Trends in Mathematical Modeling and Simulation of  
Fission Product Transport From Fuel to Primary Coolant of PWRs  
 
129 
cold clean core. In the time loop, the values of FPAs for about 50 different radionuclides are 
calculated using RK-scheme for each next time step. The results are stored in separate data 
files for each fission product chain and for each region. The program allows performing 
these calculations for power as well as flow rate perturbations. 
3.2 Power perturbation model 
The FPCART computer code has built-in model for linear power perturbations. This model 
uses a rate parameter α representing the time rate of change of reactor power. Then, for a 
time range [ ],in mt t the reactor power is calculated using:  
 0( ) ( )P t P f t=   (7) 
where, 
 [ ]
2 0
1,                           
( ) 1 ,
                 
in
m in m
m
t t
f t t t t t t
w w t t
α
≤⎧⎪= − − ≤ ≤⎨⎪ >⎩
 (8) 
Where 
α is slope of the linear change of reactor power;  
tin is start of reactor power perturbation;  
tm is end of the reactor power.  
3.3 Flow-rate perturbation model 
The flow rate perturbation involves primary pump modeling where the balance of angular 
momentum with the frictional deceleration yields  [31]  : 
 21
2 f
dvl C v
dt
ρ ρ= − , (9) 
where, l is the total length of the loop; ρ  is the fluid density; Cf represents total pressure 
loss coefficient; and v is the fluid speed. The Eq. (9) yields the corresponding solution as 
flow rate w(t) is: 
 0( ) 1 pw t w t t⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ , (10) 
where, 0w  represents the steady state value of flow rate; and ( )02p ft l C v=  which is 
typically around 2000 h for transients without boiling crisis.  
4. Stochastic release model 
The release of fission products from fuel pins is essentially a random process as the time of 
clad failure, the amount of release as well as the duration of fission product release cannot 
be specified exactly beforehand. In order to model these aspects in more realistic manner, 
Monte Carlo based stochastic approach has been used in these simulations. The modified 
version FPCART-ST is primarily deterministic-stochastic hybrid code. The sampling of fuel 
pin failure probability distribution function g(t) yields the fuel pin failure time sequence. 
The intensity function ( )tψ  is correspondingly: 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )t g t G tψ = , (14) 
 
 
where, the cumulative probability distribution ( )G t  :  
 
 ( )0( ) exp ( )tG t g s ds= −∫ , (15) 
 
 
serves the normalization. According to the standard rejection technique [??] the probability 
of accepting a fuel failure at tk after tj is found by using a random number ‘η ’ and 
comparing it with the ratio ‘q’: 
 
 ( )
( )
k
j
g tq
g t
= , (16) 
 
and, if qη < , this step is repeated otherwise, tk is accepted as a fuel failure event time. The 
fuel matrix to gap escape rate coefficient takes the form: 
 
 
 [ ]0 0 0 0exp ( ) Fє D є t t D єξ= − − +  (17) 
 
 
where, 0є  is the starting value of burst release rate from a punctured fuel rod; ξ  represents 
the characteristic decay constant for the escape rate ; 0t  is time at which the fuel rod fuel rod 
failure starts; FD  represents the current number of failed fuel rods while 0 1D =  is flag for 
the failure of the current fuel rod. Typical values of these parameters are: 5 17.2 10 sξ − −= ×  
8 1
0 10є s− −= ; 60D =  
5. Results and discussion 
5.1 Buildup of fission products in steady-state  
The FPCART computer code has been used for the simulation of fission product buildup to 
steady state saturation values starting with a cold clean core. For a 300 MW(e) typical PWR, 
the predictions of the FPCART program have been compared with the widely used 
ORIGEN2 computer code and excellent agreement between the corresponding values has 
been found. The observed small difference, of the order of a few percent only, can be 
attributed to difference in the yield of the fission products. The results are shown in Fig. 3. 
The results indicate dominance of 131I, 134Te, 133I and 135I in the saturation values of fission 
product activity in the fuel matrix.  
5.2 135Xe activity under step and ramp power transients 
With largest absorption cross section, 135Xe acts as dominant poison in nuclear reactors. At 
the start of operation, the 135Xe levels are zero which climb to saturation levels with time 
which depend on the power level and time behavior of reactor power during this period. 
FPCART simulations have been carried out for the study of 135Xe transients for step and 
ramp power transients. The results are shown in  Fig. 4. The ramp power transients lead to 
somewhat slower rise to saturation levels as compared with the step power changes. For 
post-scram time periods, the 135Xe levels rise to maximum values; which is followed by 
gradual decrease.  
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Fig. 3. For steady state operation, FPCART predicted saturation values of activities of various 
isotopes in PWR fuel with the corresponding computed data using the ORIGEN2 code  [35] 
 
 
Fig. 4. FPCART simulated variation of 135Xe specific activity with time for step and ramp 
power transients 
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5.3 Fission product activity under pump coast-down 
The pump-coast down belongs to general class of flow rate transients. During these 
transients, the core residence time, and total circuit time along with the effective neutron 
flux values are influenced by the change in flow rate. A decrease in flow rate leads to 
increase in the fission product activity values. In this study, fifteen different radionuclides 
belonging to fission products and their decay chains were selected and their approach 
towards saturation levels was studied under constant power. The pump coast-down was 
initiated when the levels reached sufficiently close to saturation levels. The corresponding 
results are shown in  Fig. 5 where the isotope-wise as well as total activity variations are 
shown after the pump coast-down. It is observed that 133Xe is the main contributor having 
over 40% of total activity. This is followed by 135Xe, 131MXe and 129Te contributing 12.9%, 11% 
and 8.2% of the total activity respectively. During the pump coast-down period, the total 
activity level raises well over 8.6% level before the loss-of-flow signals the reactor shutdown. 
 
 
Fig. 5. FPCART simulated primary coolant total activity due to fission products of a 1000 
MWth PWR for a 2000pt h=  pump coast-down flow rate transient  [36] 
5.4 FPCART simulations of FPA under power transients 
For validation of the three stage deterministic computational methodology of the FPCART 
computer code, its predictions were compared against actual experimental data. In the case 
of BEZNAU (Unit 1)  [32] , the FPCART computed time variation of 131I for various power 
variations during the first cycle have been compared with the corresponding experimental 
measurements. It is clear from  Fig. 6 that FPCART predictions are in good agreement with 
the experimental data throughout time range. A similar trend has been observed in the case 
of 131I activity in the ZORITA  [32] power plant where again the FPCART predictions have 
been found in good agreement with the corresponding experimental measurements as 
shown in  Fig. 7. 
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Fig. 6. For power transients, FPCART predicted values of 131I specific activity variations with 
time compared with the corresponding experimental data for the BEZNAU (Unit-1) power 
plant 
 
 
Fig. 7. For power transients, FPCART predicted values of 131I specific activity variations with 
time compared with the corresponding experimental data for the ZORITA power plant 
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5.5 Stochastic simulations of FPA 
A typical PWR has large number of fuel pins arranged in fuel bundles. They can fail at any 
time due to a wide variety of causes/ reasons. Their failure is essentially a random 
phenomenon. Therefore, stochastic techniques are well suited for the failure modeling. In 
this work, a time sequence of their failure has been generated by sampling time dependent 
intensity function. The escape of fission product and their siblings have been modeled using 
three step deterministic model of FPCART. 
 
 
Fig. 8. For power transients, FPCART predicted values of 131I specific activity variations with 
time compared with the corresponding experimental data for the ANGRA-1 power plant [37] 
The Westinghouse designed ANGRA-1  [33] (657 MWe) nuclear power plant was shut-down 
prematurely in the 4th cycle due to abnormally high levels in the primary coolant. As 
suspected, one sixth of its core had failed resulting in leakage of fission products and their 
daughters into the primary coolant stream. The first 22 days of this event have been 
simulated using the stochastic FPCART-ST computer code. For 131I activity, the predicted 
values for 70% power levels remain within 15% from the corresponding experimental 
measurements. Keeping in view the complex nature of the event being simulated, the 
predictions show good agreement. For larger variations in power level, deviations are found 
in the predictions which may be attributed to variations in the flow rate that have not been 
included in this model. The 131I activity spikes found in experimental data remain smeared 
in the predicted data requiring further investigation regarding couples flow-rate & power 
transients. 
The EDITHMOX  [34] experiments, given in the OECD/NEA/IAEA IFPE database, were 
considered for validation of the FPCART-ST computer code. These experiments are part of a 
broad experimental program conducted a the France’s Siloe research reactor. The 
EDITHMOX experiment was conducted at the Jet Pompe water loop. Release rates of 
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various fission products were studied for mixed-oxide fuel under various conditions of 
burnup and operating power. The FPCART-ST predicted time variation of 85Kr activity for 
various power levels has been found in good agreement with the corresponding 
experimental data available from the EDITHMOX experiment. As shown in  Fig. 9, the 
agreement prevails over most of the measured time while some deviations are observed for 
the first large power drop. This may be attributed to coupling of power transients with flow-
rate perturbations which has been ignored in these simulations. 
 
 
Fig. 9. For power transients, FPCART predicted values of 89Kr specific activity variations 
with time compared with the corresponding experimental data for the EDITHMOX-1  
(Unit-1) power plant  [37] 
6. Conclusions 
The normal operation as well as during the accidental situations, the fission products and 
their daughters play a dominant role toward potentially imparting high levels of exposure 
to radiation workers and general public. A review of research effort devoted to modeling 
and simulation of fission product activity in the primary circuits of typical PWRs has been 
presented in this work. While the mechanistic models have been found superior in the 
context of the range of applicability against the empirical and semi-empirical models, the 
available computer codes are limited to accidental release modeling generally.  
Development of methodology for estimation of FPA levels in the primary loops of PWRs 
during normal steady-state as well as transient conditions has been carried out in this work. 
The aim of this effort is to model FPA releases into primary coolant in the steady state, as 
well as in power and flow-rate transients. For this purpose multi-step model has been 
presented in this work that tracks fission product transport from fuel to fuel-clad gap and 
finally to the primary coolant. The influence of filters, ion-exchanges, leakages, decay etc. 
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has been incorporated in this model. For randomly failing fuel pins, stochastic modeling has 
been carried out for burst releases. The coupled deterministic-stochastic hybrid approach 
has been found effective for large scale fuel failure events. 
The trends towards core life-time extensions and high burn-up cores, coupled with aging of 
the existing fleet of nuclear reactors; it has become imperative to limit fission product 
activity to much lower levels. This is required in order to keep PWRs economically feasible 
against their competitors. 
7. Nomenclature 
Symbol Represents 
,X iN  Number of ith radionuclide atoms in the region:  
Fuel (X=F), Gap (X=G) and Coolant (X=C) 
φ  Neutron flux (#/cm2.s) 
iη  Resin purification efficiency for the ith radionuclide 
Q  Let-down flow rate (g/s) 
iv  Escape rate coefficient of the ith radionuclide 
iσ  Microscopic absorption cross section for the ith radionuclide 
iY  Fission yield of the ith radionuclide  
ijf  Branching ratio ( )i j→  in the ith chain 
β  Bleed-out fraction of the primary coolant for boron chemical control 
L The coolant leakage rate (g/s) 
W The total primary coolant mass (g) 
iλ  Decay constant of the ith radionuclide (s-1) 
F Average fission rate (fissions/W.s) 
P Thermal power of reactor (W) 
D Failed fuel fraction (#) 
τ  Core-to-circuit primary coolant resident time ratio (#) 
DF Number of failed fuel rods 
ξ  Characteristic decay constant for the escape rate ( 1s− ) 
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1. Introduction 
At supercritical pressures the distinction between the liquid and gas phases disappears, and 
any fluid stays in a single continuous phase: no evaporation or condensation is observed. At 
supercritical state the thermo-physical properties of the fluid, such as density and viscosity, 
change smoothly from those of a liquid-like fluid to those of a gas-like fluid as the fluid is 
heated. Because of the single-phase nature, a one-phase model would be ideal for thermal-
hydraulic simulation above the critical pressure. However, in the nuclear power plant 
applications the one-phase model is not sufficient, because in transient and accident 
scenarios, the pressure may drop below the critical pressure, turning the coolant abruptly 
from a one-phase fluid into a two-phase mixture. Therefore the thermal-hydraulic model 
has to be able to reliably simulate not only supercritical pressure flows but also flows in the 
two-phase conditions, and thus the six-equation model has to be used. 
When the six-equation model is applied to supercritical-pressure calculation, the questions 
how the model behaves near and above the critical pressure, and how the phase transition 
through the supercritical-pressure region is handled, are inevitably encountered. Above the 
critical pressure the latent heat of evaporation disappears and the whole concept of phase 
change is no longer meaningful. The set of constitutive equations needed in the six-equation 
solution including friction and heat transfer correlations, has been developed separately for 
both phases. The capability of constitutive equations, and the way how they are used above 
the supercritical pressure point, have to be carefully examined. 
In this article, the thermal hydraulic simulation model, which has been implemented in the 
system code APROS, is presented and discussed. Test cases, which prove the validity of the 
model, are depicted. Finally, the HPLWR concept is used as a pilot simulation case and 
selected simulation results are presented. 
2. Modeling of supercritical fluid thermal hydraulics 
One possibility to maintain separate liquid and gas phases in the supercritical flow model is 
to use a small evaporation heat, and then apply the concept of the pseudo-critical line. The 
pseudo-critical line is an extension of the saturation curve to the supercritical pressure 
region: it starts from the point where the saturation curve ends (the critical point), and it can 
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be thought to approximately divide the supercritical pressure region to sub-regions of 
pseudo-liquid and pseudo-gas. The thermo-physical properties of water and steam undergo 
rapid changes near the pseudo-critical line and therefore the quality and accuracy of the 
steam tables is essential in calculation of flows under supercritical conditions. One difficult 
problem is related to the heat transfer at supercritical pressures; if the ratio of the heat flux 
to mass flux exceeds certain value and flow is directed upwards, the heat transfer rate may 
suddenly be reduced, and remarkable heat transfer deterioration may occur. The same 
phenomena may occur due to flow acceleration. The present heat transfer correlations are 
not able to predict properly this phenomenon. However, in conditions where this heat 
transfer impairment does not occur, heat transfer rates can be predicted with a reasonable 
accuracy using the currently-available correlations. Another issue that has to be taken into 
account in thermal hydraulic simulations of SCW reactors is the possible appearance of flow 
instabilities. Similarly to the boiling water reactors, instabilities in the core of SCWR may 
appear when the ratio of the heat flux to mass flux exceeds a certain value.  
3. Solution principles of the six-equation model 
At present, the system-scale safety analyses of nuclear power plants are generally calculated 
using the six-equation flow model. The safety analyses conducted for a particular nuclear 
power plant include mainly different loss-of-coolant scenarios, where the pressure in the 
primary circuit decreases at a rate depending on the size of the break. This means that also 
in the case of supercritical-water-cooled reactors, boiling may occur during accident 
conditions, and therefore also the simulation tools used for the safety analyses of the 
SCWR's have to be able to calculate similar two-phase phenomena as in the present nuclear 
reactors. A practical way to develop a supercritical pressure safety code, is to take a present 
code and modify it to cope with the physical features at supercritical pressures. 
The six-equation model of APROS used for the two-phase thermal hydraulics is based on 
the one-dimensional partial differential equation system which expresses the conservation 
principles of mass, momentum and energy (Siikonen 1987). When these equations are 
written separately for both the liquid and the gas phase, altogether six partial differential 
equations are obtained. The equations are of the form 
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In the equations, the subscript k is either l (= liquid) or g (= gas). The subscript i refers to 
interface and the subscript w to the wall. The term Γ is the mass change rate between phases 
(evaporation as positive), and the terms F and q denote friction force and heat transfer rate. 
For practical reasons, the energy equation (3) is written in terms of the total enthalpy, which 
equals to conventional “static” enthalpy plus all the kinetic energy: 2stat 2u/1+h=h . 
 
Thermal-Hydraulic Simulation of Supercritical-Water-Cooled Reactors   
 
141 
The equations are discretized with respect to space and time and the non-linear terms are 
linearized in order to allow the use of an iterative solution procedure (Hänninen & Ylijoki). 
For the spatial discretization a staggered scheme has been applied, meaning that mass and 
energy balances are solved in one calculation mesh, and the momentum balances in another. 
The state variables, such as pressure, steam volume fraction, as well as enthalpy and density 
of both phases, are calculated in the centre of the mass mesh cells and the flow related 
variables, such as gas and liquid velocities, are calculated at the border between two mass 
mesh cells. In solving the enthalpies, the first order upwind scheme has been utilized 
normally. In the mesh cell, the quantities are averaged over the whole mesh, i.e. no 
distribution is used.  
In the case of the APROS code, the main idea in the solution algorithm is that the liquid and 
gas velocities in the mass equation are substituted by the velocities from the linearized 
momentum equation. In the momentum equation the linearization has been made only for 
the local momentum flow. For the upwind momentum flows the values of the previous 
iteration is used. In addition the phase densities are linearized with respect to pressure. The 
density is linearized as 
 ( )pp
p
ρ+ρ=ρ nkk
n
k −∂
∂ , (4) 
where the superscript n refers to the value at the new time step. When this linearization is 
made together with eliminating phase velocities with the aid of the linearized momentum 
equation, a linear equation group, where the pressures are the only unknown variables is 
formed. Solution of this equation system requires that the derivatives of density are always 
positive, and also the phase densities obtained from the steam table are increasing with 
increasing pressure. 
In the one-dimensional formulation, phenomena that depend on gradients transverse to the 
main flow direction, like friction and heat transfer between the gas and liquid phases, and 
between the wall and the fluid phases, have to be described through constitutive equations, 
which are normally expressed as empirical correlations. These additional equations are 
needed to close the system formed by six discretized partial differential equations.  
4. Application of the six-equation model to supercritical-pressure flow 
When the six-equation model is applied to supercritical-pressure calculation, the problems 
how the model behaves near and above the critical pressure, and how the phase transition 
needed in two-phase model is handled when the pressure exceeds the supercritical line, are 
inevitably encountered. Above the critical pressure the heat of evaporation disappears and 
the whole concept of phase change is no longer meaningful. The set of constitutive 
equations needed in the six-equation solution includes friction and heat transfer correlations 
that are developed separately for both phases. Also, many of the material properties exhibit 
sharp changes near the pseudo-critical line, and therefore correlations developed for 
subcritical pressures cannot give sensible values, and thus special correlations developed for 
supercritical pressure region have to be used instead. Then, how the transition from the 
subcritical to supercritical takes place, has to be taken into account in developing the 
correlation structure for friction and heat transfer.  The capability of constitutive equations 
and the way how they are used has to be carefully examined (Hänninen & Kurki, 2008).  
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In system codes, the thermo-physical properties of the fluids are often given as tabulated 
values as a function of pressure and enthalpy. Especially for values near the critical point, a 
very dense network of the tabulated pressure and enthalpy points is needed in order to 
ensure the accuracy of the used property values. The heat capacities of the liquid and steam 
approach simultaneously infinity as the latent heat of evaporation approaches zero. In 
addition, the density and viscosity experience the sharp changes near the critical line (see 
Figure 1). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Thermo-physical properties of water near the pseudo-critical line at various 
pressures 
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5. Treatment of phase change 
In order to keep the solution structure close to the original two-phase flow model at the 
supercritical pressure region, the mass transfer rate between the pseudo-liquid and the 
pseudo-gas is calculated and taken into account in the mass and energy equations of both 
phases. At subcritical pressures the mass transfer is calculated from the equation 
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In Equation (5) the heat fluxes from liquid to interface and from gas to interface qil and qig 
are calculated using the interface heat transfer coefficients based on experimental 
correlations. The term qwi is the heat flux from wall directly to the interface used for 
evaporation and condensation. Because at supercritical pressures the mass transfer rate 
doesn't have any physical meaning it was found to be more practical instead of using the 
heat fluxes just to force the state of the fluid either to pseudo-liquid or to pseudo-gas. This 
was done by introducing model for forced mass transfer. In this model the heat flux from 
wall to interface qwi was omitted. The forced mass transfer is then calculated as  
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For the treatment of the pseudo evaporation/condensation the concept of the pseudo-latent-
heat is needed to separate the saturation enthalpies of liquid and gas. By using the pseudo-
latent heat the pseudo-saturation enthalpies of liquid and gas can be expressed as  
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In Equations (7) and (8) the pseudo latent heat hlg is chosen to be small in order to have fast 
enough transition from pseudo liquid to pseudo gas or vice versa. The use of very small 
value for pseudo latent heat (< 100 J/kg) may require small time steps to avoid numerical 
problems. However, it is also important that the transition does not happen too slowly, 
because a state with the presence of two separate phases with different temperatures at the 
same time is not physical.  
The calculated mass transfer rate is taken into account in mass, momentum and energy 
equations of both phases. The pseudo saturation enthalpies are used when the interfacial 
heat transfer rates are calculated to fulfill the energy balances of the two fluid phases.  
The presented model has been widely tested and it works well even for very fast transients 
(Kurki & Hänninen, 2010, Kurki 2010).  
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6. Wall heat transfer 
Above the critical pressure the boiling and condensation phenomena cease to exist and only 
one-phase convection occurs. Due to the pseudo two-phase conditions convection has to be 
calculated for both the liquid and the gas phase. In the model the heat transfer coefficient is 
calculated by weighing the pseudo liquid and gas phase coefficients with the gas volumetric 
fraction, i.e. the supercritical coefficient is calculated as 
 ( ) lps,ps,b Nu1NuNu α+α= g −  (9) 
The subscript b refers to bulk fluid, and the subscripts ps,g and ps,l to pseudo-gas and 
pseudo-liquid. In the model most of time void fraction α is either 1 or 0, i.e. the case where 
liquid and gas are at different state is temporary. The transition speed from pseudo liquid to 
pseudo gas depends on the size of the pseudo evaporation heat and on the model to 
calculate the mass and energy transfer between phases.  
Above the critical pressure point the forced-convection heat transfer from wall to both 
pseudo liquid and pseudo gas is calculated with the correlation of Jackson and Hall (Jackson 
2008). The exponent n depends on the ratios of bulk-, wall- and pseudo-critical temperatures. 
The correlation gives good values for the supercritical pressure heat transfer, but it does not 
predict the deterioration of heat transfer.  
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The heat capacity pc is calculated as an average of values in bulk flow and at wall 
conditions. In the six-equation model of APROS, also three other forced-convection heat 
transfer correlations are available as an option. The commonly used subcritical-pressure 
correlation of Dittus and Boelter gives reasonable values in some situations but in general it 
exaggerates the heat transfer near the critical point. This is due to extreme high heat capacity 
value near the critical pressure point (see Figure 1). 
Two other forced-convection correlations implemented in APROS are those of Bishop and 
Watts and Chou (Watts and Chou, 1982). Again, the correlations give generally sensible 
prediction of the heat transfer coefficient, but only in the absence of the heat transfer 
deterioration phenomena caused by flow acceleration and buoyancy.  
The Watts and Chou correlation uses a buoyancy parameter that tries to take into account 
the density difference between the fluid at wall temperature and the fluid at the bulk 
temperature. 
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For vertical upward flow, the correlation takes the form 
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For vertical downward flow the correlation gives the Nusselt number as 
( )0.295varb 300001NuNu χ+= , 
meaning that heat transfer is enhanced when the influence of buoyancy is increased. 
The term Nuvar takes into account “normal” convection and material property terms 
0.35
bw
0.550.8
bvar /rP0.021ReNu )ρ(ρ= , 
and the buoyancy parameter is defined as 
( )0.5b2.7bb rPRe/rG=χ . 
It can be seen that with the buoyancy parameter from 10-5 to 10-4 the Nusselt number is 
decreasing with increasing values of the buoyancy parameter (about 10 %) and above 10-4 
Nusselt number is increasing. 
This correlation takes into account buoyancy-influenced heat transfer but it does not take 
into account the acceleration-influenced heat transfer impairment. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Heated vertical pipe (IAEA benchmark 1). Effect of different heat transfer correlations, 
calculated with APROS (Kurki 2010). Experimental data are from (Kirillov et. al., 2005) 
APROS includes the four heat transfer correlations which can be used at supercritical 
pressure flows - Dittus-Boelter, Bishop, Jackson-Hall and Watts-Chou. These correlations 
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were used for simulating a test case (Kirillov et. al., 2005), in which the steady-state heat 
transfer behaviour in a heated vertical pipe was analysed for both upwards and downwards 
flows (see Figure 2). The length of pipe was 4 m, the inner diameter was 1 cm, pressure at 
outlet was 24.05 MPa, inlet temperature was 352 ºC and mass flux was 0.1178 kg/m2s. In 
case of upwards flow the weak impairment of heat transfer occurs. It can be seen that the 
Watts-Chou correlation is able to predict this quite well, while the Dittus-Boelter correlation 
gives much too high values. The reason for too high values is that the heat capacity used in 
Prandtl number increase strongly near the pseudo saturation state of 24 MPa. For 
downward flow all of the correlations give sensible values – again Watts-Chou giving the 
closest values. It should be kept in mind that this is only one example. It has been found that 
any of available heat transfer correlations cannot predict the heat transfer impairments at all 
conditions. 
7. Wall friction 
Estimation of two-phase flow wall friction in system codes is generally based on single-
phase friction factors, which are then corrected for the presence of two separate phases 
using special two-phase multipliers. The wall friction factor for single phase flow is often 
calculated using the Colebrook equation, which takes into account also the roughness of the 
wall 
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where ε is the relative roughness of the flow channel wall. 
Because at supercritical pressures the variations of the thermophysical properties as a 
function of temperature may be very rapid, the properties near a heated wall – where the 
skin friction takes place – may differ considerably from the bulk properties. The friction 
factors can be corrected to take this into account by multiplying the factor by the ratio of a 
property calculated at the wall temperature to property calculated at the bulk fluid 
temperature. One of the friction correlations intended for supercritical pressure is the 
correlation of Kirillov 
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This correlation has been formed by multiplying the friction factor correlation of Filonenko 
(the first term) by a correction term based on the ratio of densities calculated at wall and 
bulk temperatures respectively. However, this correlation is valid only for flows in smooth 
pipes. 
Since no wall friction correlation for supercritical-pressure flows in rough pipes is available 
in the open literature, a pragmatic approach was taken in APROS to make it possible to 
estimate the wall friction in such a situation: the friction factor obtained from the Colebrook 
equation is simply multiplied by the same correction term that was used by Kirillov to 
extend the applicability of the Filonenko correlation, thus the friction factor may be 
calculated as 
 
Thermal-Hydraulic Simulation of Supercritical-Water-Cooled Reactors   
 
147 
 
0.4
b
w
col ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
ρ
ρ
f=f  (14) 
It is important to notice that this correlation is not based on any real data, and as such it 
must not be used for any real-life purposes before it has been carefully validated against 
experimental results. Thus, this form of the correlation serves only for preliminary 
estimation of the effect of friction and is mainly intended for reference purposes (Kurki 
2010). 
8. Flow instabilities in heated channels 
In simulating flows and heat transfer at the supercritical pressure region the possibility of 
appearance of flow instabilities should be taken into account. Due to the rapid changes of 
density and viscosity with changing temperature near the pseudocritical line, different types 
of flow instabilities may occur. These instabilities are analogous to those related to boiling in 
vertical pipes, and may be of the Ledinegg or the density-wave-oscillation (DWO) type. 
Useful dimensionless parameters for defining the condition for stable or instable flows in 
heated pipes are the sub-pseudo-critical and trans-pseudo-critical numbers proposed in 
(Ambrosini & Sharabi 2006 and 2008). 
The sub-pseudo-critical number describes the sub-cooling at the inlet of the heated pipe 
section, and is calculated as  
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while the trans-pseudo-critical number represents the proportion of heating power to mass 
flux, and is defined as  
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With these two parameters the threshold for instabilities and the instable and stable flow 
areas can be estimated. 
In the reference (Ambrosini & Sharabi, 2008) the stability boundaries of one particular 
geometry as function of Nspc and Ntpc calculated with RELAP5 are shown. The calculated 
values in the charts have been obtained by simulating the case where the flow under 
supercritical pressure flows through a vertical uniformly heated circular pipe. At the inlet, 
the constant singular pressure loss coefficient of Kin =10.5 and at the outlet the coefficients of 
Kout = 0.0 and 3.0 were applied. The pressure at inlet and at outlet is kept constant, but the 
heating rate is gradually increased, which results in a slowly increasing trans-pseudo-critical 
number. The calculation was repeated with different sub-pseudo-critical numbers 
corresponding to different inlet conditions. With a certain trans-pseudo-critical number, the 
flow changes from stable to oscillating or experiences the flow excursion. In the charts the 
instability threshold is presented when the amplifying parameter Zr has the value zero. The 
instability values above the position, where the second derivative changes strongly, 
represent the Ledinegg instabilities (Nspc about 3). The values below Nspc about 3 stand for 
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density instabilities. As an example, two calculation results obtained with APROS have been 
shown in Figures 3 and 4. In Figure 3 the typical behavior of a DWO-type instability is 
shown. The result representing the Ledinegg instability is presented in Figure 4. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Example of oscillating type (density) instability (IAEA benchmark 2, Nspc = 2.0, Kin = 20, 
Kout = 20), Calculated with APROS 
 
 
Fig. 4. Example of excursion type (Ledinegg) instability (Nspc = 3.0, Kin = 20, Kout = 20), 
Calculated with APROS 
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9. Simulation application – European concept of supercritical reactor 
(HPLWR)  
In an European collaboration project, the concept of a new reactor working under the 
supercritical pressure has been developed (Schulenberg & al. 2008). This concept, called 
High Performance Light Water Reactor (HPLWR), has a three-pass core (Fischer & al, 2009), 
which was introduced to the design for preventing the formation of hot spots in the reactor 
core. The coolant flows through the core three times in the radially separated evaporator, 
super-heater 1 and super-heater 2 sections. Half of the feed water coming into the reactor 
pressure vessel is directed upwards to the upper plenum in order to provide neutron 
moderation for the reactor core and the other half flows to the downcomer, from where it 
continues to the core coolant channels. Also for the moderator, a three-stage flow scheme is 
applied. 
For some preliminary accident analyses of the HPLWR safety concept, the APROS system 
code was used (Kurki & Hänninen, 2010). The intention of calculation was on the other hand 
make a typical large break LOCA analysis and also to verify the feasibility of the tentative 
protection system. The accident which was analysed was a guillotine break of one of the 
four steam lines. The accident was initiated by a 2 x 100 % break between the pressure vessel 
outlet and the main steam line isolation valve. Decreasing pressure at the pressure vessel 
outlet (pout < 225 bar) initiates the reactor scram sequence and closure of the main steam line 
isolation valves (MSIV). The time taken for fully closing the isolation valves is assumed to be 
3.5 seconds. After the MSIV has been shut, the effective break size is 1 x 100 %. 
The calculation results (see Figure 5) suggested that with the assumed protection strategy 
and with the used safety injection capacity the reactor core of the HPLWR can be kept 
sufficiently cooled-down in the case of a large break LOCA caused by rupture of one of the 
four main steam lines, using the designed safety systems. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Results from the HPLWR LB-LOCA simulations: maximum flue cladding temperatures 
(left) and pressures in different parts of the pressure vessel (right) 
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10. Conclusion 
With modifications described in this paper, the six-equation flow model of the system code 
APROS has been updated to work near and above the critical point. By using the concept of 
pseudo saturation enthalpy the two-phase structure can be maintained. The developed 
model for the forced mass transfer enables the numerically stable and fast transition from 
pseudo-liquid to pseudo-gas and vice versa. The model includes a selection of friction and 
heat transfer correlations that the user can choose to be used at supercritical pressures. One 
deficiency is that at the moment there is not any heat transfer correlation which is able to 
calculate the impairment of the heat transfer reliably. In simulating the supercritical flows in 
heated pipes the instabilities due to large density changes is possible. In making simulations 
with system codes or other simulation tools it is necessary to know the limits of these 
instabilities. As an example of the HPLWR LOCA simulation proves the developed model 
can be used for the safety analysis of supercritical-water-cooled reactors.  
11. Nomenclature 
A  area, flow area (m2) 
β  volumetric coefficient of expansion 
f friction factor 
F  friction (N/m3) 
g  acceleration of gravitation (m/s2) 
h  enthalpy (J/kg) 
m?  mass flow (kg/s) 
Nu Nusselt number 
p  pressure (Pa) 
Pr Prandtl number 
q  heat flow/volume 
Re Reynolds number 
T  temperature (ºC or K) 
t  time (s) 
u  velocity (m/s) 
V  volume (m3) 
x  mass fraction 
α  gas volume fraction 
ρ  density (kg/m3) 
Γ  mass transfer (kg/s m3) 
tΔ  time step (s) 
T temperature (C) 
zΔ  mesh spacing in flow direction (m) 
Subscripts 
b bulk 
col Colebrook 
g  gas 
i  interface 
k  phase k (either gas or liquid) 
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kir Kirillov 
l  liquid 
lg evaporation, liquid to gas 
p constant pressure 
pc pseudo critical 
sat saturation 
w wall 
Superscript 
n new value 
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1. Introduction 
A nuclear piping system which is found to be disqualified, i.e. overstressed, in design 
evaluation using linear analysis software in accordance with ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel 
Code, Section III (ASME, 2009a), denoted as ASME III below for convenience, can still be 
qualified if further design requirements can be satisfied in refined nonlinear finite element 
analyses in which material plasticity and other non-linear conditions are taken into account. 
For clarity, a design evaluation using such linear analysis software will throughout this 
chapter be called a linear design evaluation, and a design evaluation involving a non-linear 
finite element analysis a non-linear design evaluation.  
The linear design evaluation according to ASME III is purely based on stress limits. Stresses in 
piping components are first divided into membrane, bending and localized stresses for 
formulation consistency with beam and/or shell structures. Thereafter, stresses are further 
categorized into primary, secondary and peak stresses. The primary stresses are the “not 
self-limiting” part of responses typically resulted from external forces such as dead-weight, 
internal pressure, earthquake and so on, and they are important to avoid catastrophic failure 
and to control plastic deformation. The secondary stresses refer to the “self-limiting” part of 
responses resulted typically from thermal effects and gross structural/material discontinuities, 
and they are responsible for eventually progressive/incremental deformation. The peak 
stresses are the combined “peak” responses which are used to control fatigue failure. In 
ASME III, design criteria are defined in terms of stress intensity or principal stresses. For 
Class 1 piping systems, the criteria are defined by the stress intensity which is the largest 
absolute value of the principal stress difference, or equivalently twice of the maximum shear 
stress, and for Class 2 and 3 piping systems by the largest absolute value of the principal 
stresses. In connection with the design-by-analysis approach, the linear design evaluation is 
performed through comparing stress intensities of above-mentioned stress categories with 
their allowable limits. Among software commercially available for performing such a linear 
design evaluation, PIPESTRESS from DST Computer Services S.A. (DST, 2005) is widely 
used in Sweden. 
Furthermore, the linear design evaluation is conducted for each of the following load sets: 
Design Condition and 4 so-called Service Limits of Level A, B, C and D. For different load 
sets, different design criteria and requirements are used. Through defining various loads 
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into different load sets and using different design criteria and requirements, the safety 
degree consideration and the occurrence probability of a given load can be introduced in the 
design evaluation. 
In accordance with ASME III, non-linear design evaluation is an alternative to the linear design 
evaluation. Depending on which stress intensity limit is violated in the linear design 
evaluation, there are two types of non-linear analysis required in ASME III for the 
alternative non-linear design evaluations: (1) collapse-load analysis and (2) non-linear 
transient analysis. For clarity, such alternative design criteria and requirements which are 
specified in connection with such non-linear analyses are termed hereby as the non-linear 
design criteria and requirements. Such non-linear finite element analyses can generally 
effectively be conducted using general-purpose finite element software, such as ANSYS 
(ANSYS, 2010) and most other well recognized software.  
This Chapter is devoted to describe the general procedure for the alternative non-linear 
piping design and to clarify those relevant non-linear design criteria and requirements. Our 
emphasis will be placed on the later task as unclear and inconsistent issues have been 
observed in ASME III when non-linear design criteria and requirements applied. In recent 
years, quite many non-linear analyses and design evaluations have been conducted in 
Sweden for several power uprate projects. Unfortunately, most of such work has always 
ended with, or can never be ended without, long discussions on such unclear and 
inconsistent issues. 
The Chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2, an overview on loading conditions is 
given. In Section 3, we review the linear design evaluation and discuss the non-linear design 
evaluation for Class 1 piping systems. In Section 4, the review and discussion are continued 
for Class 2 and 3 piping. In Section 5, we briefly address the computational procedures for 
collapse-load analysis and, in Section 6, we discuss the computational procedures for non-
linear transient analysis. Finally, in Section 7 concluding remarks are given. We note that the 
discussion given in this Chapter is mainly based on our experiences on the application of 
ASME III under Nordic conditions, see e.g. Zeng (2007), Zeng & Jansson (2008), Zeng et al. 
(2009, 2010). 
As this chapter covers a large amount of design rules and requirements of ASME III, an 
attempt has been made to keep the presentation brief and concise, yet still sufficiently clear. 
Unless otherwise stated, notations will be kept to be identical to those used in ASME III, 
equations specified in ASME III will not be repeated here unless necessary, and 
fundamental design requirements e.g. Pressure Design etc., will not be discussed here.  In 
particular, the description of the linear design evaluation will be kept brief whenever possible 
and, for a more detailed description, we refer to ASME (2009), Slagis & Kitz (1986), Slagis 
(1987) and references therein.  
2. Load conditions 
The design evaluation rules in ASME III are for Class 1, 2 and 3 piping specified in terms of 
5 loading conditions: Design Condition, and Service limits of Level A, B, C and D.  
Under each loading condition, loads are combined to one or several load set(s) according to 
Design Specifications. The rules for load-combinations are defined in accordance with 
probabilities in which corresponding loads (events) should occur and consequences that 
may result in. Thus, a given load set defines the following: 
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1. Loads and their combinations to be considered in piping analysis. 
2. Stress intensity limits to be used in the subsequent design evaluation.  
In Tab. 1 we show an example of how these load sets are specified in Sweden. The design 
evaluation must be conducted in accordance with this table and the piping design is not 
qualified unless all evaluation rules specified for each load set are met.  
We note that in Tab. 1 notations are of self-explaining, e.g. PD for Design Pressure and SSE 
for Safe-Shutdown Earthquake etc. Rather than explaining how load-combinations are 
defined in Tab. 1, which is not our purpose, we should observe the followings from this 
table:  
1. Loads given under Design Condition are not only static loads of Design Pressure (PD) 
and Dead Weight (DW), but also dynamic loads (GV/SRV1) which represents here 
those generated by opening or closing one safety valve.  
2. Loads in Service limit Level A include static loads (PO+DW) and dynamic loads 
GV/SRV1, where PO denotes the operating temperature. We note that GV/SRV1 are 
generally not included according to ASME III, and they appear here due to additional 
requirements specified in Swedish design specifications. 
3. Loads in Service limit Level B include static loads (PO+DW), time-dependent loads 
generated by opening or closing of seven safety valves (GV/SRV7).  
4. Loads in Service limits of Level C and D include static loads (PO+DW), dynamic loads 
generated by e.g. opening or closing of several safety valves, and Safe-Shutdown 
Earthquake (SSE) and so forth.   
Tab. 1 is only an example for our discussion purpose. In practice, more load cases and 
combinations need to be considered, such as Water-Hammer loads (WH), local vibration 
due to safety relief of valves, Local vibration due to chugging, Pool swell drag due to 
internal pipe break, Pool swell impact due to internal pipe break and several others. 
 
Load-combinations Design and/or 
Service limit Level  
Pressure Temp. 
PD + DW Design PD TD 
PD + DW + GV/SRV1* Design PD TD 
PO + DW + GV/SRV1* Level A PO TO 
PO + DW + GV/SRV7 (E-3) Level B PO TO 
PO + DW + SRSS(GV/SRV7(E-2), WH/VO1) Level C PO TO 
PO + DW + SRSS(GV/SRV7(E-3), GV/SSE)  Level D PO TO 
Table 1. Load-combinations and their evaluation specifications 
It should be noticed that time-dependent loads can be either given in form of response 
spectra, which are the case when GV/SSE and GV/SRV or other global vibration (GV) 
related events considered, or in form of time-dependent “nodal forces” F(t) which are in 
most cases generated in separate fluid dynamic analyses.  
Time-dependent loads F(t) can be reversing, non-reversing or non-reversing followed by 
reversing, see NB-3620, NC-3620 (ASME, 2009a). In Fig.1 we show an example of non-
reversing followed by reversing F(t) caused typically by an initial water slug followed by 
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reflected pressure pulses. As we will see later, some design rules, in particular, those non-
linear ones are given in terms of the types of dynamic loads. When dealing with dynamic 
loads, it is therefore important to distinguish reversing and non-reversing types. 
 
 
     Non-reversing load 
Mean load 
F(t) (N) 
Time (s)  
T1  
Fig. 1. Dynamic loading of a non-reversing type followed by a reversing type  
3. Class 1 piping 
The linear design rules for Class 1 piping are given in NB-3600 for general rules and in NB-
3650 – NB-3656 for specific rules. When the linear design rules unsatisfied, in other words, 
the piping design found to be disqualified, the piping can still be qualified if alternative non-
linear design requirements specified generally in NB-3200 Design by Analysis, where 
material plasticity are treated in NB-3228, can be met. In this section, we follow the rules 
specified in NB-3600 for each specific load set to clarify these non-linear design requirements.  
In ASME III, different design requirements are, in general, specified in terms of two types of 
loads: (1) Loads including non-reversing dynamic loads or non-reversing followed by 
reversing dynamic loads; (2) Loads including reversing dynamic loads. The definitions for 
reversing and non-reversing dynamic loads are given in NB-3622 and repeated below:  
Reversing dynamic loads are those loads which cycle about a mean value and include 
building filtered loads, earthquake, and reflected waves in piping due to flow transients 
resulting from sudden opening/closure of valves. A reversing load shall be treated as non-
reversing when the following condition is met: The number of reversing dynamic cycles, 
excluding earthquake, exceeds 20.  
Non-reversing dynamic loads are those which do not cycle around a mean value, and 
include initial thrust forces due to sudden opening/closure of valves and water-hammer 
resulting from entrapped water in two-phase flow. 
3.1 Design condition 
The linear design evaluation for this load set is to evaluate Eq.(9) given in NB-3652 to ensure 
the primary (primary membrane plus primary bending) stress intensity is within its limit 
1.5Sm, where Sm is the allowable design stress intensity value. According to NB-3228.1 or 
NB-3228.3, the non-linear design requirements can be formulated as follows: If Eq.(9) 
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unsatisfied, a non-linear analysis can be made to predict the collapse-load and the design 
can still be considered to be qualified if the applied loads do not exceed 2/3 of the collapse-
load. The collapse-load may be predicted either by a Limit Analysis procedure specified in 
NB-3228.1 or a Plastic Analysis procedure specified in NB-3228.3. 
There is a fundamental difference between these two procedures. While the Limit Analysis 
procedure aims at predicting the lower bound of the collapse-load, the Plastic Analysis 
procedure implies a prediction of the whole load-displacement history until the structure 
reaches, or passes through, its collapse point. The prediction of the collapse-load will be 
elaborated in Sect. 5.  
In addition to this fundamental difference, NB-3228 requires the following: 
For the Limit Analysis, the material is assumed to be perfectly elastic-plastic, and the yield 
stress is set to 1.5Sm. The yield stress can be reduced for some materials, see NB-3228.1. A 
von Mises yield criterion is used. The lower bound of the collapse-load can be computed 
incrementally or by other available procedures. Here, the historic behavior in the piping 
during the loading process, such as plastic strains, is of no interest.  
The Plastic Analysis requires that the true material stress-strain relation, including strain 
hardening behavior, should be used. A von Mises yield condition is still assumed and the 
initial yield stress must be set to the true yield stress Sy. The collapse-load can only be 
computed by an incremental procedure and it can only be determined when (almost) the 
whole historic behavior in the piping during the whole loading process is computed. 
Moreover, the collapse-load in this context is a load-level that is determined using a specific 
procedure given in NB-3213.25, not the load-level corresponding to the collapse point 
predicted numerically, see Section 5.   
The Limit Analysis is simpler but predicts, however, the lower bound of the collapse-load. It 
implies generally an application of a stronger evaluation requirement. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to use the Limit Analysis as the first choice when Eq.(9) unsatisfied.  
3.2 Level A 
In the linear design evaluation for all load sets for which Service limit Level A is designated, 
two types of requirements are to be satisfied: (a) fatigue requirements and (b) thermal 
ratchet requirements, see NB-3653.  
3.2.1 Fatigue evaluation 
The fatigue requirements are specified in NB-3653.1 – 3653.6. In principle, the following two 
conditions are verified:  
1. Primary plus secondary stress intensity range. 
The evaluation is done by using Eq.(10), NB-3653.1, to ensure the stress intensity range 
Sn≤3Sm. The evaluation must be made for all load sets in Level A. 
2. Peak stress intensity range. 
The evaluation is done by using Eq.(11), NB-3653.2, to determine a so-called alternating 
stress intensity Salt (NB-3653.3), which is in turn used to find the allowable number of 
load cycles N in design fatigue curves (NB-3653.4). Thereafter, a procedure defined in 
NB-3222.4(e)(5) is applied to estimate the cumulate damage (NB-3653.5). The design is 
qualified if we find a so-called cumulative usage factor U≤1.0. This evaluation must be 
made for all load sets in Level A. 
Remark: These fatigue requirements (1) and (2) must also be verified for all load sets which 
are designated in Service limit Level B, see Section 3.3. When computing the cumulative 
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usage factor U, all load-sets in Level A and all load sets in Level B must together be taken 
into account.  
Now we shall clarify what we can do if the fatigue requirements (1) and (2) cannot be 
fulfilled. NB-3653.6 states that if Eq.(10) unsatisfied, one may apply a so-called simplified 
elastic-plastic discontinuity analysis to evaluate Eqs. (12) and (13),  and the cumulative damage 
factor using a slightly modified procedure, NB-3653.6 (a), (b) and (c). The design is qualified 
if Eqs.(12) and (13) satisfied, and U≤1.0.  
At this point, one may ask: What can we do if Eq.(10) satisfied, but the cumulative damage 
factor in Condition (2) found to be U>1.0? ASME NB is unclear on this point. One may 
realize that, in the simplified elastic-plastic discontinuity analysis, the alternating stress 
intensity is increased by a factor Ke≥1.0 through Eq.(14), which in turn reduces the limit of 
load-cycles, and consequently increases the cumulative damage factor U. In such cases, the 
simplified elastic-plastic discontinuity analysis will not help in one’s attempt to further 
verify the piping design.  
NB-3653.1(b) states that, as an alternative to the simplified elastic-plastic discontinuity 
analysis in NB-3653.6, one may apply a Simplified elastic-plastic analysis specified in NB-
3228.5. When discussing this issue, we must remark the following: NB-3600 provides design 
rules/criteria for only piping. Whereas NB-3200 provides design rules/criteria which are 
more general and detailed and applicable for all nuclear facility components including 
piping. In other words, NB-3600 states simplified methods of NB-3200 for performing 
design-by-analysis for piping. Hence, a piping component which fails to meet conditions in 
NB-3600 can still be qualified if it meet conditions given in NB-3200. As far as piping 
concerned, the design rules and requirements given in NB-3200 and NB-3600 should be the 
same. 
We look now back to Eq.(10). Recall that Eq.(10) ensures the primary plus secondary stress 
intensity range being within its limit 3Sm. By examining NB-3220 we find, however, that 
none of rules given in NB-3228 seems to be directly applicable for doing a further evaluation 
when U>1 found in a simplified elastic-plastic analysis. Furthermore, that NB-3200 does not 
state any further design requirement if the peak stress intensity range leads to a cumulative 
usage factor U>1. 
Now, a question arises: Can we apply non-linear analyses to do a further design assessment 
when Eq.(10), or Eqs.(12) and (13), unsatisfied and/or the cumulative usage factor found to 
be U>1? In Section 3.2.3, we shall attempt to answer this question. 
3.2.2 Thermal stress ratchet evaluation  
The thermal stress ratchet evaluation is given in NB-3653.7 which ensures the range of 
temperature changes, ΔT1 range, is within its limit. NB-3653.7 does not state any further 
assessment rule if the range of temperature changes overshoots its limit. However, in NB-
3228.4 Shakedown Analysis, it is stated that a refined non-linear analysis, which will be 
reviewed and discussed in detail in the next Section, can be used to further check if the 
piping components can still be qualified. 
3.2.3 Non-linear design evaluation  
In NB-3228.4 Shakedown Analysis, both Thermal Stress Ratchet in Shell (NB-3222.5) and 
Progressive Distortion of Non-integral Connections (NB-3227.3) are discussed. In NB-
3228.4(b), it is stated that the design can be considered to be acceptable provided that the 
following two conditions satisfied: 
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1. The maximum accumulated local strain at any point, as a result of cyclic operation to 
which plastic analysis applied, does not exceed 5%.  
2. The deformations which occur are within specific limits.  
These two conditions will, for convenience in the later discussion, be termed as the 5% strain 
limit rule.  
The 5% strain limit rule is according to NB-3228.4(b) a design requirement which replaces the 
following specific requirements: (1) NB-3221.2 Local membrane stress intensity being less 
than 1.5Sm; (2) NB-3222.2 Primary plus secondary stress intensity range being less than 3Sm, 
i.e. Eq.(10) in NB-3653; (3) NB-3222.5 Thermal stress ratchet, and (4) NB-3227.3 Progressive 
distortion (deformation) control. In other words, this rule sets a limit of progressive 
deformation in a shakedown process that may eventually take place. We note that this rule 
applies for both general piping components and non-integral connections (screwed on caps, 
screwed in plugs, closures etc).  
By thermal stress ratchet it is meant in NB-3222.5 an action, more exactly speaking, a 
response, in that deformation caused during thermal cyclic loading increases by a nearly 
equal amount in each cycle. The danger does not lie in the response (deformation) caused in 
any particular load cycle, but the accumulated amount irreversible (plastic part) response, 
which may lead to uncontrollable progressive distortion. This may explain why ASME III 
limits the temperature range ΔT1 range in the linear design evaluation, but imposes the 5% 
strain limit rule when plasticity considered. In all load sets of Service limit Level A, thermal 
transients (TT) are of main concern. This implies that a shakedown process is irremissible 
and the 5% strain limit rule becomes the right choice. 
Now, we consider again the fatigue control or evaluation. Does this 5% strain limit rule cover 
also the need for fatigue control? Generally speaking, it does not! Damage due to fatigue is a 
totally different damage phenomenon than that caused by material (plastic) yielding. While 
the former is mostly dominated by brittle failure in form of micro-fracture and cracking, the 
later is entirely a ductile failure process in which the dislocation of material crystalline 
grains is dominating. These two damage mechanisms must be dealt with separately.   
To answer how a Class 1 piping under Service limit of Level A should be verified through a 
non-linear analysis when the linear design evaluation found unsatisfied, the author suggests 
the following: 
1. If the thermal stress ratchet condition unsatisfied, the 5% strain limit rule can always be 
applied. 
2. If Eq.(10) unsatisfied, the simplified elastic-plastic discontinuity analysis should be the 
first choice for further evaluation. 
3. If Eqs.(12) and (13) unsatisfied, and U>1 (evaluated by the procedure given in NB-
3653.6), the 5% strain limit rule will be applied first. If this rule unsatisfied, the design 
cannot be qualified (or must at least be further questioned)! If satisfied, we shall first 
notify the owner of the nuclear power plant. If the owner requests a further evaluation, 
a refined approach for calculating the cumulative factor U, which is based on the 
numerical results from non-linear analyses, should be suggested to the contractors (and 
the owner of the nuclear power). This should be handled on a base of individual cases. 
If such an approach agreed, the evaluation goes further. Otherwise, the design is 
declared to be disqualified.    
One may argue that the simplified elastic-plastic analysis cannot help if U>1 predicted in 
Step (2) above. The point is, when the simplified elastic-plastic analysis requested in 
PIPESTRESS for fatigue evaluation, Eqs.(12), (13) and (14) will be evaluated together and, at 
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the same time, a updated cumulative factor U will be reported. We remind that, as discussed 
earlier in Section 3.2.1, if Eq.(10) satisfied but U>1, this simplified elastic-plastic analysis 
cannot alter the result U>1. 
Furthermore, one may think that it may be possible that, one obtains the following results 
from a linear analysis using e.g. PIPESTRESS: Eqs.(12) and (13) unsatisfied, but U≤1. This 
situation should actually not happen as, according to NB-3653.6, Eqs.(12) and (13) should 
first be satisfied before computing U.   
3.3 Level B 
The linear design evaluation for all load sets for which Service limit Level B is designated, is 
the same as that for Service limit Level A, see NB-3654. The evaluation requirements are 
basically given in terms of loads including non-reversing and reversing load types. We 
notice that the formulation in NB-3654 is unclear with regard to fatigue requirements. More 
specifically, the first paragraph in NB-3654 contradicts with NB-3654.2, stating whether all 
load sets in Level A and B, or all load sets in Level A and (only) reversing loads in Level B, 
should all together be considered when computing the cumulative damage factor in fatigue 
evaluation. We agree the following:  
a. To satisfy Eq.(9) in NB-3652 for non-reversing loads, or reversing loads combined with 
non-reversing loads (NB-3654.2(a)). 
b. To satisfy the fatigue requirements specified in NB-3653.1 through NB-3653.6 for both 
reversing and non-reversing loads (NB- 3654.2(b)). 
c. To satisfy the thermal ratchet requirement given in NB-3653.7 for all load sets including 
thermal loads (NB-3654.2(b)). 
3.3.1 Non-reversing dynamic loads 
When Eq.(9) verified, the stress intensity limit is according to NB-3654.2 set to 1.8Sm, but no 
greater than 1.5Sy. Recall that it sets to 1.5Sm for Service limit Level A loads, implying a 20% 
relaxation of the stress intensity limit for Level B loads as compared to that for Level A 
loads.   
Any direct instruction for further evaluation has not explicitly been given in NB-3654 and 
NB-3223 if Eq.(9) unsatisfied. We note that the first statement in NB-3654 is “The procedures 
for analysing Service Loadings for which Level B Service Limits are designated, are the same 
as those given in NB-3653 for Level A Service Limits”. This should allow us, as we do for 
Level A loads, to apply NB-3200 to use a non-linear analysis to predict the collapse-load, or 
its lower bound, and the design can still be qualified if the applied loads are less than 2/3 of 
the collapse-load. The remaining question is how various parameters, such as the yield 
stress and so on, should be set in a non-linear analysis.  
If the collapse-load is predicted in accordance with the Plastic Analysis specified in NB-
3228.3, there will be no ambiguity as the true material yield stress and true stress-strain 
relation are used, see also Section 5.1. However, if a Limit Analysis is chosen, we may then 
ask: Should the yield stress be set to 1.5Sm  as for Level A loads? Or should it be set to a 
value corresponding to the stress intensity limit 1.8Sm (but no greater than 1.5Sy) that is used 
in connection with the linear design evaluation?    
The authors favor to set the yield stress to 1.8Sm (but no greater than 1.5Sy) based on the 
following “engineering” reasoning: (1) Setting 1.5Sm as the yield stress in a Limit Analysis for 
Level A loads is because the stress intensity limit for Level A loads sets to 1.5Sm, which 
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should be an important correlation between the linear and non-linear designs. (2)The linear 
and non-linear design principles can differ in many ways, but they are set in order to 
achieve, for an ideal design, the same safety margin. (3)The fact that the stress intensity limit 
for Level B loads is 20% relaxed as compared to that for Level A loads in a linear design 
should be “accounted or compensated” somewhere in its corresponding non-linear design, 
through e.g. raising the yield stress by 20% or, equivalently the factor 2/3 to 1.2x2/3=4/5. 
There are different views about the above choice in Sweden. Some colleagues advise that the 
yield stress must set to 1.5Sm in the Limit Analysis for all loads no matter which Service limits 
they are designated to. We will return to this issue in Section 5.2. 
Remark: All load sets in Level A and B (both reversing and non-reversing) must be together 
taken into account when computing the cumulative usage factor U.  
3.3.2 Reversing dynamic loads 
The evaluation of the fatigue and thermal ratchet requirements are the same as those given 
in Section 3.2. Additionally, it is required (NB-3654.1(b)) that any deflection limit prescribed 
by the design specification must be met. Our suggestions for a non-linear evaluation are 
described in Section 3.2.3.  
Remark: All load sets in Level A and B (both reversing and non-reversing) must be together 
taken into account when computing the cumulative usage factor U.  
3.4 Level C 
The linear design evaluation for all load sets for which Service limit Level C is designated, is 
given in NB-3655. The evaluation rules are again given in terms of reversing and non-
reversing loads.  
We note in advance that for Service limit Level C deformation limits prescribed by design 
specifications are explicitly required to be verified, see NB-3653.3. This is required for loads 
of both non-reversing and reversing types. 
3.4.1 Non-reversing dynamic loads  
For non-reversing loads, Eq.(9) in NB-3652 should be applied with a relaxed stress intensity 
limit 2.25Sm, but no greater than 1.8Sy, which is relaxed by 25% as compared to Service limit 
Level B. 
If Eq.(9) unsatisfied, similarly to cases for Level B loads, any direct instruction for further 
evaluation has not explicitly been given in NB-3655 and NB-3224.  
Referring to our discussion in Section 3.3.1 for Level B loads, it should be reasonable to use 
the same approach that handles Level B loads to do a further evaluation. That is, a non-
linear finite element analysis is used to predict the collapse-load or its lower bound. The 
design can still be qualified if the applied loads are less than 2/3 of the collapse-load.  
Again, if the collapse-load is predicted in accordance with the Plastic Analysis specified in 
NB-3228.3, there will be no ambiguity as the true material yield stress and true stress-strain 
relation are used. However, if a Limit Analysis is chosen, we may again ask: Should the yield 
stress be set to 1.5Sm as for Level A loads? Or should it be set to a value corresponding to the 
stress intensity limit 2.25Sm (but no greater than 1.8Sy) that is used in connection with the 
linear design evaluation? 
The author favor again, based on the same reasoning given in Section 3.3.1, the choice of 
setting the yield stress to 2.25Sm (but no greater than 1.8Sy) or, equivalently setting the yield 
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stress to 1.5Sm but increasing the factor 2
3
 to 2.25 2 1.0
1.5 3
× = . There are different views on 
such a choice. A few co-workers believe that the yield stress should always be set to 1.5Sm in 
a Limit Analysis for all loads no matter which Service limits they are designated to, see a 
more in-depth discussion in Section 5.3.  
3.4.2 Reversing dynamic loads 
The evaluation rule for reversing loads is given in NB-3655.2(b). The evaluation is done by 
applying conditions given in NB-3656(b), which are given for loads in Service limit Level D. 
When applying these conditions, the stress intensity limit given in NB-3656(b)(2) remains 
the same, and those given in NB-3656(b)(3,4) are reduced by 30%. The fatigue evaluation is 
not required.   
If the evaluation of NB-3656(b) disqualified, a further assessment can be done by applying 
the 5% strain limit rule described in Section 3.2.3 without any modification. This follows from 
the following reasoning: 
1. When NB-3656(b) cannot be fulfilled, one checks further the conditions in NB-3656(c). 
NB-3656(c) states that design rules in Appendix F can be used as an alternative to NB-
3656(a,b). One observes however that Appendix F is not specified for reversing loads. 
2. Although no explicit rules found in Appendix F for reversing loads, one can fortunately 
find in NB-3228.6 the following statements: “As an alternative to meeting the 
requirements of Appendix F, for piping components subjected to reversing type dynamic 
loading …, the requirements of (NB-3228.6) (a)(1) and (a)(2) below shall be satisfied”. 
3. NB-3228.6(a)(2) concerns the fatigue control which is not required for Level C loads. This 
means that only NB-3228.6(a)(1) needs to be followed. 
4. NB-3228.6(a)(1) states that “The effective ratchet strain averaged through the wall 
thickness of the piping component due to the application of all simultaneously applied 
loading including pressure, the effect of gravity, thermal expansion ranges, earthquake 
inertia ranges, anchor motion ranges, (including thermal, earthquake etc.) and reversing 
dynamic loading ranges shall not exceed 5%”. (Notice the badly formulated texts!)  
Remark: There are different views on the above reasoning as Appendix F is not given for 
reversing loads. A few people argue that the only alternative to NB-3655.2 is the application 
of NB-3224.7, which requires fulfilling the requirements of through NB-3224.1 to NB-3224.6. 
It indicates in turn by NB-3224.7 that NB-3228 Plastic Analysis, with 70% of the specified 
allowable strain values, can be applied. Namely, we require (i) the maximum accumulated 
local strain being less than 0.7x5%=3.5%, and (ii) 100.7 aan
S
E N
ε ≤ ⋅ , see Section 3.5.2.  
3.5 Level D 
The linear design evaluation for all load sets for which Service limit Level D is designated, is 
done similarly to that specified for Service limit Level C, and the general evaluation rules 
are given in NB-3656. The evaluation rules are again specified in terms of the two types of 
loads as defined for Level B and C loads, i.e. non-reversing and reversing loads. 
3.5.1 Non-reversing loads  
For non-reversing loads, the linear evaluation rule is given in NB-3656 (a), which states that 
Eq.(9) in NB-3652 should be applied with a relaxed stress intensity limit 3.0Sm, but no 
greater than 2.0Sy.  
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If Eq.(9) unsatisfied, NB-3656(c) can be applied, which in turn refers to Appendix F, 
indicating that a non-linear evaluation  can be done through the prediction of the collapse-
load or its lower bound. 
Appendix F states general rules and acceptance criteria for piping analyses when Service 
limit Level D considered. Roughly speaking, the requirements specified for Service limit 
Level D are relaxed as compared with Service limits of Level A, B and C. Below we shall 
have a close look at Appendix F. 
The general acceptance criteria when material plasticity taken into account are given in F-
1340. It is stated (F-1341) that the acceptability may be demonstrated using one of the 
following methods: (a) Elastic analysis; (b) Plastic analysis; (c) Collapse-load analysis; (d) 
Plastic instability analysis; and (e) Interaction methods. This is, in our opinion, obviously not 
a consequent and clear statement.  
First, the option (a) is no longer applicable when plasticity considered. Secondly, plasticity 
instability is a phenomenon that may for some cases, depending on both structure itself and 
applied load, not always occur and, for other cases, can definitively occur long before the 
applied load reaches its collapse point. Nevertheless, with reference to this statement and 
the evaluation rule for non-reversing loads in Service limit Level C, it should be a correct 
choice that we apply the option (c) Collapse-load analysis and, meanwhile, check if any 
plastic instability shall take place. We note these two options can be examined in one non-
linear analysis, see below. 
F-1341.3 states in connection with the collapse-load analysis that: The applied static load, or 
its equivalent, should not exceed 100% of the collapse-load, or 90% of the lower bound of 
the collapse-load obtained in a limit analysis.  
When the limit analysis used, the yield stress is according to F-1341.3 set to min(2.3Sm, 
0.7Su), where Su is the ultimate strength (A relaxation of about 2% as compared to Service 
limit Level C). Notice here that a different relaxation is used when setting the yield stress as 
compared to that used for the linear design evaluation, where the stress intensity limit is set 
to 3.0Sm, that is, a relaxation of about 33% as compared to Service limit Level C. Apparently, 
the advice of setting the yield stress to 1.5Sm is not appropriate here. 
F-1341.4 states that “the applied load should not exceed 70% of the so-called plastic 
instability load PI”. Generally speaking, PI can only be determined if an incremental 
solution, with both material plasticity (true stress-strain relationship) and large deformation 
taken into account, applied to numerically trace the response history. However, it is 
generally not an easy task from numerical point of view, and requires finite element 
software that are able to accurately handle various difficulties in so-called “path-searching”, 
such as snap-back, snap-through and so forth, see Fig. 2, where local buckling or instability 
appears, resulting a temporally and partly lost of the load-carrying capacity. Notice that if 
thin-walled piping structures are under consideration, instability phenomena can in most 
cases occur before the collapse-load reached, and PI can then be much less than the collapse-
load if there exist any material or geometric imperfection. Hence, it is equally important to 
verify PI and the collapse-load. Unfortunately, it is often the case that plastic instabilities 
cannot be accurately predicted and PI cannot be observed in numerical results.  
In Fig.2, two careless finite element (FE) solutions are shown. Both solutions fail to predict 
the plastic instability phenomena. While the solution which diverged early leads to a much 
conservative design, the other solution may result in a catastrophic design.   
Fig. 2 also indicates that both the collapse-load and plastic instability load can be predicted 
in the same non-linear analysis through tracing the responses history. This implies that a 
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collapse-load analysis should be the first choice. Whereas a limit analysis should be avoided 
when the non-reversing loading considered and Eq.(9) in NB-3652 unsatisfied. Otherwise, 
one cannot be sure if plastic instability is under control.  
 
Force (N) 
 
Pc                                                                                 Collapse- load 
Two careless FE -solutions                                                                       FE - solution diverged 
PI 
   
Initial plastic instability 
Displacement 
(mm) 
 
Fig. 2. Load-displacement relation including plastic instabilities typically observed in 
structures of thin-walled members and two careless FE-solutions 
3.5.2 Reversing dynamic loads  
For the reversing loading, the linear design evaluation is done by evaluating conditions given 
in NB-3656(b)(1)-(5). The fatigue evaluation is not required as for load sets in Service limit 
Level D.  
If the linear design evaluation disqualified, a further assessment can be done according to NB-
3228.6 (a)(1)-(2). The design is qualified if 
1. the 5% strain limit rule is satisfied, NB-3228.6(a)(1); and 
2. a thermal ratchet limit is satisfied through NB-3228.6(a)(2) 
10a
an
S
E N
ε ≤  
Above, anε is an effective cyclic single-amplitude strain, 10aS  is the allowable fatigue stress 
limit at 10 cycles according to the design fatigue curves given in ASME III Appendix I, and E 
the Young’s modulus, N≥10 the number of cycles for general reversing dynamic loads 
prescribed in design specifications, and N=10 for earthquake events.  
For computing anε  a procedure described in NB-3228.6(a)(2) should be applied. This 
procedure requires operating at material-points of interest, e.g. element’s Gaussian points, 
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where the results of strain components are available, over a typical load cycle which is 
considered to be of interest. Denote one chosen material-point by p and the procedure can be 
summarized (in a standard tensor notation) as follows: 
Step 1. Extract and record the strain results kijε  at all considered time-steps k=1,2, …, N  in a 
complete load cycle of interest.    
Step 2. Calculate the strain change kijεΔ between each time-step k and a reference time-step 
k0, e.g. k0=1. That is, for each 0k k≠ , we calculate 0kk kij ij ijε ε εΔ = − . 
Step 3. Calculate the (von Mises) equivalent strain change at time step 0k k≠ , i.e. 
2
3
k k k
eq ij ijε ε εΔ = Δ Δ . 
Step 4. Find the maximum equivalent strain range by   
max max( ),
k
eqε ε= Δ 1,2,..., .k N=  
Step 5. The effective cyclic single-amplitude strain is max
1
2an
ε ε= . 
Notice that it is important to find the material-point at which the maximum equivalent 
strain range takes place. Notice that software e.g. ANSYS does not directly provide such 
output. Additional efforts must be made in order to evaluate this quantity. 
4. Class 2 and 3 piping  
The linear design evaluation rules for Class 2 are given in ASME III, NC-3652 – 3655 and 
relevant rules are given in other items in NC-3600. The following discussion will first be 
made by following the rules given in NC-3600. Thereafter, we describe alternative non-linear 
design evaluation rules for Class 2 piping.  
The rules for Class 3 piping (ND-3600) are basically the same as those for Class 2 piping 
(NC-3600) and their difference is minor. They are, however, also applicable for Class 3 
piping.  
Similarly to Class 1 piping, different design requirements are, in general, specified for loads 
including non-reversing dynamic loads or those including reversing dynamic loads. 
4.1 Linear design evaluation 
The linear design evaluation rules for all load sets in Design Condition, Service Limits of 
Level A, B, C and D, are given in NC-3652 – 3655. These rules are summarized below. We 
remark in advance that, except for Service limit Level D, no further design assessment 
instruction has been provided if the linear design evaluation disqualified.   
Design condition 
For the Design Condition the effects of sustained loads should satisfy Eq.(8) in NC-3652 to 
ensure the primary stress intensity within its limit 1.5Sh, where Sh is the basic material 
allowable stress at design temperature. In addition, the moment term MA in Eq.(8) should be 
given based on conditions according to NCA-2142.1(c) Design Mechanical Loads.   
We note that for Class 1 piping the stress intensity limits are always defined in term of Sm. 
Notice the difference that for Class 2 the “hot” allowable stress Sh is in use. This happens for 
all load conditions, see below.   
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Level A and B 
The design requirements for Levels A and B are given in a badly formulated text. In 
particular, requirements given in NC-3653.2 are confusing and can be interpreted in several 
ways. We agree the following interpretation: 
For the Service limit Level B, the effects of sustained loads, occasional loads including non-
reversing dynamic loads should satisfy Eq.(9) in NC-3653.1 to ensure the primary stress 
intensity within its limit 1.8Sh.  
For the Service limit of Levels A and B, the effects of thermal expansion should satisfy 
Eq.(10), and the effects of any single non-repeated anchor movement Eq.(10a), see NC-
3653.2. As an alternative to the fulfilment of, Eq.(10), Eq.(11) shall be satisfied. 
For the Service limit of Levels A and B, the effect of reversing loads must always meet the 
condition given in Eq.(11a) in NC-3653.2(d). 
Level C 
For the Service limit Level C, the evaluation rules are also specified in terms the two types of 
loads as defined for Class 1 piping, i.e. non-reversing and reversing loads. 
The effects of the non-reversing loads should satisfy Eq.(9) with a relaxed stress intensity 
limit 2.25Sh (but no greater than 1.8Sy).  
For the reversing loads, conditions given in NC-3655(b) should be satisfied, using the 
allowable stress in NC-3655(b)(2), and 70% of the allowable stresses in NC-3655(b)(3-4). 
Furthermore, deformation limits given by design specifications should be verified.   
Level D 
For the Service limit Level D, the evaluation rules are again specified in terms of the two 
types of loads as defined for Class 1 piping, i.e. non-reversing and reversing loads. 
NC-3655(a) requires that the effects of the non-reversing loads should satisfy Eq.(9) with a 
relaxed stress intensity limit 3.0Sh (but no greater than 2.0Sy). For the reversing loads, 
conditions given in NC-3655(b) should be satisfied. NC-3655(c) states that “the rules given 
in Appendix F, where non-linear design requirements are given, can be used as an 
alternative to verify both non-reversing and reversing loads”. 
4.2 Non-linear design evaluation 
The review that we made in Section 4.1 indicates that, except for Level D, no further 
evaluation instruction has been provided if the linear design evaluation disqualified. The 
question becomes: For other load sets, can we apply non-linear analyses to further assess the 
piping design as we do for Class 1 piping? 
It has been discussed and argued that piping and vessels are similar, and one may apply 
NC-3200 Alternative Design Rules for Vessels to do such job. Hence, evaluation rules given 
in Appendix XIII, and in particular those given in Appendix XIII-1150 Plastic Analysis, 
Limit Analysis and Shakedown Analysis, can directly be used as advised in NC-3221.1.  
We note that there is one major difference between design rules for Class 2 vessels (NC-
3300) and piping (NC-3600), see e.g. Slagis (1987). Vessels are required to meet stress limits 
on “primary” stresses only. Whereas for piping, thermal expansion stresses including 
concentration effects are explicitly evaluated against relevant limits through Eqs.(10-11), see 
NC-3653.2, which is a control on fatigue. From this point of view, it is not appropriate to 
apply NC-3200 Alternative Design Rules for Vessels for Class 2/3 piping. 
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4.2.1 A Class-upgrade alternative 
When Level D considered, the application of Appendix F to verify a Class 2 piping in cases 
when the linear design evaluation disqualified is, in fact, equivalent to consider the Class 2 
piping as Class 1. This can be straightforward realized by carefully examining how a Class 1 
piping is verified for Level D, see Section 3.5. This observation is, to the authors’ point of 
view, important as it implies two design principles for Level D when material plasticity 
taken into account:   
1. The Class 2 piping is considered as a Class 1 piping. 
2. The design requirements specified for Class 1 in accordance with the considered load 
set, without any modification/relaxation, are applied. 
One may naturally ask why these principles are only applied to Level D, but not to all load 
sets. There are different guesses/explanations and attempts to justify them. To find the 
answer is not the scope of this report. We note only that the load sets in Level D includes 
loads resulted from the most extreme accidents e.g. the lost of coolant, leading generally to 
(large amount) plastic deformations, which implies consequently that the linear design 
evaluation that is purely based on stress limits becomes for some cases too easy to be 
violated, and can no longer play an appropriate role as a criterion to justify the acceptability 
of the piping design. 
Our experiences have indicated that design evaluation for Class 2 piping with material 
plasticity taken into account for all other load sets has been of a great concern and become a 
natural request. Under the circumstances that no clear rules have been given for load sets of 
Design Condition and Levels A, B and C, we think it should be a reasonable alternative to 
apply the above two principles. One may argue that such an alternative is conservative and 
possible involves partly unnecessary work. To compromise these, we think it should be 
reasonable to partly introduce a “relaxation” in the second principle above. 
4.2.2 More on the Class-upgrade alternative 
The difference between the Class-upgraded alternative, discussed in the previous section, 
and the argued alternative discussed in Section 4.2.1, needs possibly to be further clarified. 
These two treatments are fundamentally different. To apply NC-3200 Alternative Design 
Rules for Vessels for Class 2/3 piping does not have a principal support. They are made for 
vessels and there are, as discussed earlier, differences between vessels and piping. 
However, to raise a Class 2/3 piping to Class 1 does not fundamentally change the type of a 
structure, but only strengthens the design requirements or design safety considerations. The 
strengthened design safety will be loosen or, speaking in more appropriate words, balanced 
through relaxing those individual Class 1 design requirements. There may be many ways to 
relax those requirements and will, in some cases, have to find an “engineering” compromise 
between requirements for Class 1 and 2/3. The relaxation needs to be done on a base of 
concrete “individual case” and engineering judgments, which should be documented in 
detail. We believe that it coincides with the general design principles that ASME III has 
built. 
5. Collapse-load analysis 
As we discussed in Ch. 3 and 4, an alternative to the fulfilment of Eq.(9) in NB-3652 for Class 
1 piping (Design, Level B, C and D), and of Eq.(9) in NC-3653 for Class 2/3 piping (Level D), 
is to apply a non-linear finite element analysis to predict the collapse-load, and to ensure 
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that the applied load does not exceed a certain percentage of the collapse load. We shall here 
discuss such a non-linear evaluation in a more detailed setting. 
One must first realize that a collapse-load analysis deals only with cases when applied loads 
are static, such as PD+DW and PO+DW+D/B shown in Tab. 1. We remember, however, that 
ASME III suggests that it may also be applied for cases where non-reversing dynamic loads 
are involved. We notice that a direct application of a collapse-load analysis when dynamic 
loads involved is not possible. In the following, we shall first focus us on cases with static 
loads. 
 
Load P   
 
 
Pc     Collapse - Load
                                                                                                            C    
Pca                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                    D  
    
Φe        B 
 
( )ec Φ=Φ − tan2tan 1  
A              
 
Response/Displacement (d)
“Collapse-point” according to ASME III (II-1430) 
 
 
Fig. 3. Load-response history and the collapse-load 
5.1 General 
When plasticity and/or geometric non-linearities taken into account, a structure will loose 
its load-carrying capacity when the applied load P reaches a critical level, or collapse-load, 
Pc. To determine the collapse-load, it is required to numerically predict the load-response 
history, see e.g. Fig. 3 for the simplest cases, from an early stage A until the collapse point C 
and, in many cases, until a stage D far after the collapse point. The numerical prediction of a 
load-response history in connection with finite element analysis is not a simple task as 
pointed out in Section 3.5.1 and relevant publications (Jansson, 1995). For a comprehensive 
discussion of corresponding computational procedures and numerical difficulties, we refer 
texts e.g. Bathe (1996) and Crisfield (1996). We remark the following: 
1. At the collapse point the so-called tangent stiffness matrix is singular, implying usually 
a divergence of solution or computation. However, a diverged solution or computation 
does not necessarily imply that the collapse point has been reached or passed through. 
The divergence can be resulted by instability as mentioned in Section 3.5.1 or many 
other reasons. 
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2. A load set includes generally several loads. When plasticity taken into account, the 
structural responses (deformation and stress state) depend on how and in what order 
these loads are applied. 
3. The “collapse-load” defined in ASME III is generally less than the true collapse-load, 
ASME PVB Code, Section II-1430 (ASME, 2009b). This implies that one cannot 
determine the collapse-load by simply taking the load-level at which a computational 
divergence occurred, see also Fig. 2. 
4. In practice, when a piping system found to be “overstressed” somewhere in the piping 
system, one attempts to avoid to analyze the whole piping system in a non-linear finite 
element analysis. (We do analyze the whole piping system in many cases.) Instead, a 
critical part, for example, a bend or a T-branch, where the maximum overstress taken 
place, is first identified, and “cut” out from the piping system. Thereafter, a refined 
finite element model using e.g. 3-dimensional or shell elements is built for this critical 
part. Finally, relevant displacement solutions on the “cut” faces from the linear analysis 
are used as boundary conditions for the refined finite element model. This means that, 
the collapse-load analysis is made on a component level.  
5.2 Plastic analysis according to ASME III 
The prediction of the collapse-load according to ASME III should be done in accordance 
with the Plastic Analysis specified in NB-3213.25, 3228.3 and Appendix II-1430.  Below we 
first discuss the modeling issues and, thereafter, describe briefly how the “collapse” load 
according to NB-3213.25 can be determined.  
NB-3228.3 states that the true material stress-strain relationship should be used. Explicitly, it 
means that the true yield stress and strain hardening rule should be used. It has been 
observed in earlier performed work that the material is modeled by specifying the following 
when using non-linear finite element software e.g. ANSYS: (1) the true yield stress in a von-
Mises material and, (2) a small plastic modulus (e.g. 10 MPa) in bilinear kinematical 
hardening. Strictly speaking, this is far away from what NB-3228.3 requests. In such a 
modeling, no hardening has been taken into account.  
Notice that for some metals strain hardening is significant and, in addition, exhibits a strong 
Bauschinger’s effect. In such cases, a correct prediction of the response history can most 
likely not be made without considering hardening effects. This will particularly be true if 
cyclic loading and shakedown process should be modeled, see Section 6. Intuitively, one 
may think that the prediction of the collapse-load is in nature static analysis, where external 
loads are increased incrementally and, hence, repeated unloading-loading processes are not 
involved. This leads, in turn, to a conclusion that hardening effects are not important. Such 
reasoning is fundamentally wrong. The following facts must be reminded: While increasing 
external loads, the development of plastic deformation somewhere in a structure, changes 
the way that the structure carries the external loads. Consequently, stresses in the structure 
must be redistributed. That is to say, stresses at some material-points will increase and at 
some other material-points decrease. In other words, some material-points undergo a 
loading process and some others an unloading process. The loading and unloading 
processes will, depending on the structure and applied loads themselves, repeatedly take 
place during the entire course of the development of plastic deformation.  
NB-3228.3 suggests also taking large deformation into account in predicting the collapse-
load. This is explicitly required especially when Service limit Level D considered. For this 
case plastic instability should be examined, see Section 3.5.1.  
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Again, we remind that the load-level, at which the computation diverges, cannot be 
considered as the collapse-load. Instead, a load-displacement curve should be plotted, see 
e.g. Figs. 2 and 3. Thereafter, the “collapse point” should be determined using a procedure 
described in NB-3213.25. In Fig. 3 this procedure is illustrated, where Pca and Pc stands for 
the “collapse” load according to ASME III and the true collapse-load, respectively. As 
illustrated, Pca can be far less than the true collapse-load Pc, which will definitively be the 
case if thin-walled structures dealt with. 
5.3 Limit analysis according to ASME  
The Limit Analysis described in ASME III differs from the Plastic Analysis discussed 
previously in two aspects: (1) In the Limit Analysis, an elastic-ideally-plastic material is 
assumed, and (2) the yield stress σ  needs not necessarily be set to the true material yield 
stress Sy, instead, to some allowable stress value which, for example, is 1.5Sm for Class 1 
piping when Design Condition considered, and min(2.3Sm, 0.7Su) for Class 1 piping when 
Level D loads considered.  
In this sense, the limit analysis specified in ASME III provides only a useful estimation of the 
lower-bound of the collapse-load. Other related results, e.g. plastic strains at particular 
material points, are much less reliable and, thus, should not be used for decisive judgement 
purposes. 
We have mentioned earlier that the setting of the yield stress in a Limit Analysis has only 
been explicitly stated in ASME III for two cases: Class 1 piping when loads of Design 
Condition considered, and Class 1 piping when Level D considered. We have suggested 
that, for other cases, the yield stress can be set to the stress limit value that is used in 
connection with the linear design evaluation. Namely, we suggest to set σ  for Class 1 piping 
to 1.5Sm, min (1.8Sm, 1.5Sy), min (2.25Sm, 1.8Sy), min(2.3Sm, 0.7Su) for Design, Level B, C and 
D loads, respectively. In such a way, the yield stress σ  depends on the piping Class, the 
load set under consideration, and the design requirement (equation number) which is not 
satisfied in the linear design evaluation. And so will be the predicted collapse-load. 
Suppose that a piping system is subjected to a non-reversing load P, which should be 
considered as a load in four different conditions: Design, Level B, C, and D conditions, 
respectively. The above suggestion can be more clearly illustrated in Fig. 4, where PA, PB, PC 
och PD denotes collapse-loads are predicted in the Limit Analyses. 
In Fig. 4 we also illustrate the consequence if the yield stress is always set to 1.5Sm in the Limit 
Analysis. That is, it always requires 2
3 A
P P≤  no matter which Service limits a load P is 
designated to.  
Alternatively, as discussed in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.5.1, we may set the yield stress σ  to 1.5Sm 
in the Limit Analysis and, instead of using the factor 2
3
 when determine the “collapse-load”, 
we use a “relaxed” factor, 4
5
 (for Level B loads) and 1.0 (for Level C loads).  
In a common engineering language, the design philosophy may be interpreted as below: 
Under a normal operating condition (Level A), stresses in piping components shall be kept 
low within elastic range. In connection with emergency events (Level C), various 
components can be subjected to so high stresses that those components, which undergo a 
sufficiently high deformation, may continue to be used if certain specific tests can be passed. 
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In connection with faulted events (Level D), components which undergo a sufficiently high 
deformation should be replaced by new components. We consider that our suggestions 
coincide with the design philosophy upon which AMSE III has been built.  
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Fig. 4. Principal sketch of using a Limit Analysis to predict the collapse-loads for Design, Level 
B, C, and D, when yield stresses set to different σ  
6. Non-linear transient analysis 
For reversing loads, a non-linear evaluation requires generally to use a non-linear finite 
element analysis to trace transient structural responses. This is directly applicable for all 
load cases which do not include any dynamic load defined by floor response spectra. 
For such cases, the first essential goal of the evaluation is for most cases to examine if the 5% 
strain limit rule can be satisfied. When material plasticity involved, the non-linear transient 
analysis should be conducted with direct integration algorithms such as Newmark’s 
integration, see e.g. Bathe (1996) and Crisfield (1996), as the tangent stiffness (matrix) has to 
be updated at each time-increment. Notice that it is the Plastic Analysis specified in NB-
3213.25 that we conduct in a non-linear transient analysis, which implies that the true 
material stress-strain relationship, i.e. the true yield stress and the true strain hardening 
behavior, should be used.  
Unlike a collapse-load analysis which can be conducted on a component level, a non-linear 
transient analysis must always be conducted on the whole system level. Furthermore, when 
the non-linear analysis is made on the whole piping system, it is normally not possible to 
model all components with sufficient accuracy, as too simple element models may be used 
for certain components, for example, T-branches and bends. In such cases, in addition to the 
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non-linear transient analysis, one needs possibly cut these components out from the whole 
piping system and try to find their equivalent “static problem” and to predict their 
“equivalent” collapse-loads. 
In non-linear transient analysis, one focuses on historic transient responses, such as transient 
stresses and strains. Hence, the use of realistic non-linear material models is of vital 
importance. Among several important issues, the strain hardening behavior of piping 
materials have been intensively discussed in recent years.    
The ultimate strength of the many materials that are listed in ASME is about twice as much 
as their initial yield strength and, for some exceptional cases, more significant hardening 
effects can be observed. For example, the yield stress is 35 ksi, whereas the ultimate strength 
reaches 90 ksi for materials SB-581 through SB-626, see Tab.1B, Division II, Part D (ASME, 
2009b). To predict a correct transient response, the strain hardening effect is an important 
part in a non-linear transient analysis as cyclic loading and possibly a shakedown process 
are of main concern. 
The strain hardening behaviour is better illustrated in Fig. 5, where two typical hardening 
rules, i.e. isotropic and kinematic rules, associated with von Mises yield criteria are shown 
on a deviatoric plane. In isotropic hardening, the von Mises yield surface expands in the 
radial direction only during the development of the plastic deformation. (The “initial” 
cylinder expands and forms the “current” one.) In kinematic hardening, however, the size 
and shape of the yield surface remain unchanged, but the centre of the yield surface (the 
central axis of the cylinder) moves during the development of the plastic deformation. (The 
“initial” one moves and forms the “current” one.) In this way, the kinematic hardening rule 
allows to include the Bauschinger’s effect. There is a third available rule which is a 
combination of the isotropic and kinematic rules, and requires a more elaborated material 
test-data when it should be used. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Isotropic and kinematic hardening behavior on a deviatoric plane 
Linear or multi-linear kinematic hardening models in commercial finite element software, 
e.g. ANSYS or others, are frequently found to be used for non-linear piping analysis. It has 
been, however, shown in recent reports by Rahman et al. (2008), Hassan et al. (2008) and 
Krishna et al. (2009) that such non-linear finite element analyses can only provide a 
reasonable modeling of plastic shakedown phenomena after a few initial load cycles. For 
continuous ratcheting responses, such analyses cannot provide reasonable results, neither 
for the accumulated local strain nor for the global dimension change. They showed through 
experiments on straight and elbow pipe components that several nonlinear constitutive 
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models available in most general finite element software, such as Chaboche (1986), Ohno 
and Wang (1993), and other more recently developed models (Abdel Karim and Ohno, 2000; 
Bari and Hassan, 2002; Chen and Jiao, 2003) can provide a much improved prediction.  
7. Concluding remarks 
We have in this chapter categorized the design evaluation given in ASME III for nuclear 
piping of Class 1, 2 and 3 into the linear design and non-linear design evaluations. The 
corresponding design requirements, in particular, those non-linear design requirements, have 
in the report been reviewed, analyzed and clarified in association with every defined load 
set, through Design Condition to Service Limit Level D. Efforts have been made to formulate 
the non-linear design evaluation requirements in a format so that they are easy to be 
followed, understood and applied in connection with piping analysis.  
The non-linear design evaluation requires in principle two types of non-linear finite element 
analyses: collapse-load analysis and non-linear transient analysis. We have in the chapter 
attempted to describe in detail their computational aspects in a close accordance with the 
requirements given in ASME III.    
The design requirements given in ASME III for nuclear piping have been developed in more 
than several decades. However, it has been a known issue that its formulation and 
specification of design requirement items are far from fully clear, which are caused by 
endlessly nested references in multiple levels to a large amount of contents. This is, 
unfortunately, particularly true when design-by-analysis rules are considered. We hope this 
chapter should be able to serve as a constructive source for a better understanding of and a 
potential improvement for the design requirements for nuclear power piping. 
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1. Introduction 
As the failure of waste management had endangered the public safety, public concerns and 
awareness regarding waste disposal facilities which may bring dioxin pollution risk, PCB 
risk and other toxic threat have grown so much. A long-life radioactive waste disposal 
facility also becomes one of the public concerns. As the high level radioactive waste is not so 
familiar with the public, it brings the sense of fear of unidentified materials among local.  
Therefore, the site selection of high level radioactive waste (HLW) final disposal facility 
faces much difficulty in the world except in Finland and Sweden.  
If concerns of environmental topics of the daily life could be properly connected with 
nuclear power issues, people would certainly be easy to participate in the discussion about 
the necessity of such facilities.  
Therefore, the author investigated the relationship between the nuclear power issues and 
environmental topics such as household waste management or the precautionary principle 
analyzed by text-mining method. In this method, the author conducted the investigation 
cooperated with university students as subjects. The elements of this experiment consist of 
lectures on environmental topics, keywords of each lecture submitted by the students, and 
questionnaire survey result on nuclear power generation answered by the students.  
Many researches on the risk communication regarding nuclear power issues have been 
implemented. For example, Kugo analyzed the public comments and discussion by using a 
text mining method (Kugo, 2005, 2008). Yoshikawa also introduced the researches on the 
human interface of the computer-aided discussion board (Yoshikawa, 2007). These 
researches aimed to grasp the representativeness of the public opinion by analyzing 
majority of the subjects. 
However, the problem that the research data were not necessary reliable in term of the 
representativeness of the public because of the fluctuations of subjects’ opinion existed. For 
example, a person has the tendency to make a decision in a heuristic way in case of 
requiring a prompt answer. Therefore, the new point of the method of this analysis was that 
the author did not include the information of the majority of the subjects but the minority 
based on the assumption that the reliance of the information of minority subjects was higher 
than those of the majority since the minority submitted the keywords without heuristic 
decision making. 
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2. Method and result of analysis 
First, the author gave lectures on the risk perception and desirable autonomous ideas in the 
area of various environmental sciences including nuclear power generation issues at a 
university class. Students submitted a keyword that they considered as the best 
representative for each lecture. The keywords submitted were classified into two groups by 
cluster analysis and correspondence analysis on the keywords-subjects cross table. These 
analyses result to calculate the eigenvalue of the cross tabulation.  
On this calculation process, every small part of the keywords-subjects cross table called a 
cluster.  A relative relation of a cluster could be grasped, plotting two compounds of the 
eigenvalue of clusters on the x-y axis position. Chi-square distance could easily be calculated 
by using these x-y data. By chi-square distance from the centre, it could be majored of the 
representativeness of the students.  
This result of the analyses indicated that the keywords of frequent occurrence locate near 
the centre of the chart and the keywords of less frequent occurrence locate at a 
circumference part. Based on the keyword cluster deployment on the chart and its 
characterization, the arrangement of the keyword cluster can be interpreted along with the 
assumed mental model.  
Students whose consciousness level was low would choose keywords that were easy to find 
through the lectures (lecture titles, word appeared on the delivered documents, etc.). In that 
case, the frequency of chosen keywords would be high because those keywords were 
limited to in the documents. On the other hand, students whose consciousness level was a 
little higher would choose keywords that were emotional or used in the discussion during 
the lectures. If these keywords depended on the students internal idea, not limited to in the 
documents, the frequency of these keywords occurrence would be less than that of 
keywords chosen by low-consciousness level students. Thus, the author paid more attention 
to the less frequency keywords and students who submitted these keywords.  
Second, the author conducted the questionnaire research pertaining nuclear power 
generation and high level radioactive waste (HLW) disposal management at the end of all 
lectures. The concepts of the questionnaire consisted of necessity, approval for facility 
installation, and acceptance of adjoining facility. The students selected number of answer 
from “yes” to “no” by seven grades. Consequently, two groups of the students above 
described were characterized by ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) respectively. One was 
passive, and the other was active toward the attitude of acceptance of a nuclear facility. 
Third, by using keyword cross table, the author analyzed the correlation between the 
keyword groups of the lecture at each theme. Thus, the communication points could be 
extracted by paying attention to the correspondence of the pair of keywords chosen at two 
themes of lectures. In this paper, the author shows the results of two cases such as keywords 
group of the theme of nuclear power generation and household waste management, and the 
theme of nuclear power generation and the precautionary principle as examples. The 
concept of this correlation analysis shows in Figure 1. 
2.1 Lectures on environmental science and keywords and assumed mental model 
The students received the series of fifteen lectures (ninety minutes per a lecture) on 
environmental science. In these lectures, they discussed various themes such as global 
warming, waste problem, ozone hole, dioxin poison, radioactivity, precautionary principle, 
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and some other themes. The basic concept of these discussions was that we should have 
objective viewpoint not to avert the risk but to face it. After every lecture, students 
submitted the most impressive keyword in the theme with a message of the reason. The 
number of keywords was one hundred and sixty seven in total. The effective number of 
students who attended the whole lecture was fifty.  
 
Cluster I Cluster II Cluster III Cluster IVCluster V Cluster VI
keyword Akeyword Bkeyword Ckeyword Dkeyword E keyword F
Σｘ1i ΣX2i ΣX3i ΣX4i ΣX5i ΣX6i
10 1 5 1 2 1
keyword a ∑xi1 8 7 1
keyword b ∑xi2 5 1 3 1
keyword c ∑xi3 2 1 1
keyword d ∑xi4 2 1 1
- ∑xi5 1 1
- ∑xi6 1 1
Lecture II total
Lecture I
ignor pay attention
ignor
pay attention
 
Fig. 1. Concept of the keyword cross table analysis by the keywords of two lectures 
Table 1 gives the themes of fifteen lectures and the number of the submitted keywords at 
every lecture. In this research of the relationship between the theme of “nuclear power 
generation” and “household waste management” and the relationship between the theme of 
“nuclear power generation” and “the precautionary principle”, the author tried to find the 
students’ common value in their internal mind. Table 2 shows the submitted keywords at 
above designated three lectures. 
 
Theme of Lecture Number of submitted keyword
＃１ System of global environment 21 / 54 students
＃２ Global warming 18 / 55
＃３ Precautionary principle 13 / 57
＃４ Dioxin 17 / 55
＃５ Household Waste management 13 / 55
＃６ Ecological footprint 10 / 56
＃７ Ozone hole 9 / 53
＃８ Energy 17 / 53
＃９ Radioactivity 10 / 53
＃１０ Nuclear power generation 9 / 50
＃１１ Earthquake 9 / 49
＃１２ Environmental Sociology 11 / 46
＃１３ Safety and Relief 10 / 49
＃１４ Others - -
＃１５ Questionnaires survey - -
167 total  
Table 1. Theme of lectures and the number of submitted keywords at every lecture 
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lecture on lecture on lecture on
Nuclear Power generation Househould Waste management the Precautionary principle
Friburg （ the name of city) 3R(Reduce,Reuse,Recycle) Zero risk
MOX Fuel utilization in LWRs Quantity of disposal waste Dioxin
Nuclear fuel cycle Incentive Dioxin news report
Nuclear Power generation Globalization Risk
Nuclear energy revolution Discharge of the waste Problem of risk
Insecurity or understanding among citizen Plastics Risk communication
Renewable energy Recycle Risk management
Public opinion poll Circulative society Risk information
Radioactive waste Disposal cost Risk cognition
Thermal supply system Risk analysis
Waste Environmental hormone
Responsibility for disposal Dioxin concentration
Illegal disposal Precautionary principle
 
Table 2. The keywords at the designated lecture 
The assumed basic mental model that consists of “instinct (inner part of mind)”, “emotion 
(middle part of mind)”, and “reason (outer part of mind) shows in Figure 2.  
 
Instinctive words
Emotional words
Rational words
Level of consciousness
Student  selects a keyword that was easily found in the 
book and the delivered documents at the class.
Student  expresses their emotion in a 
keyword.
Student rationally considers the subject of 
discussion and selects a suitable keyword.
high
low
many less Number of people  
Fig. 2. The mental model of keywords chosen at the lecture (assumption) 
If a student whose consciousness level was low submitted a keyword by request, he would 
try to choose a keyword that was easy to find through the lectures (lecture titles, words 
appeared in the book or the delivered documents, etc.). This action should be the 
appearance of representative heuristic decision making, in other words. Consequently, the 
frequency of occurrence of the keywords would be high.  
On the other hand, students whose consciousness level was higher than the former would 
choose keywords that were emotional or used in the discussion time. The frequency of 
occurrence of these keywords would be less than that of keywords of low-consciousness 
level students. These words were not limited to in the documents but depended on the 
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students’ internal idea. If a student’s consciousness level were much higher than the other 
levels, the frequency of their keywords would be less than those of keywords of students 
whose consciousness levels were low or middle, since their keywords choice based on their 
own opinion. 
After the lecture on nuclear power generation, the author implemented correspondence 
analysis and cluster analysis on the basis of “keywords - subjects cross table” in order to 
apply the assumption of the above described mental model.  
If the mental model were well, the words chosen by many students would be the title of the 
lecture (i.e. nuclear power generation). The number of students who chose the keyword of 
“nuclear power generation” was twenty-seven, which was the most. The number of 
students who chose the keyword of “MOX Fuel utilization in LWRs” was eleven, which was 
the second. The numerical information about the number of keywords submitted in the 
lecture titled “nuclear power generation” shows in table 3. 
In accordance with the assumed mental model, the keyword of “Insecurity or 
understanding among citizen”, “Renewable energy”, Public opinion poll”, and “Nuclear 
energy revolution” might carry the subjective image or the meaning of something 
emotional. Conversely, “Nuclear power generation” and MOX fuel cycle”, “radioactive 
waste” and “Friburg” might carry the objective image or neutral meaning. However, this 
understanding remains vague for the student classification. Therefore, in order to 
classify these keywords along with above described mental model, the author 
implemented text-mining analysis described next section.  
 
Keywords of the lecture titled by "nuclear power generation" Number of subjects
Nuclear power generation 27
MOX Fuel utilization in LWRs 11
Nuclear fuel cycle 3
Radioactive waste 3
Friburg (name of the city) 2
Insecurity or understanding among citizen 1
Natural renewable energy 1
Public opinion poll 1
Nuclear energy revolution 1
50  
Table 3. Numerical information of keywords of the lecture on nuclear power generation 
2.2 Text mining for keywords 
The method of textual data mining was useful for analyzing public opinion. Ohsumi and 
Levert reported the results of textual data mining method (Ohsumi and Levert, 2000).  The 
summary of the text mining method that consists of cluster analysis and correspondence 
analysis shows below. 
Every lecture gave the information of keyword list and their occurrences. This frequency of 
occurrence data calls a contingency table. This “m×n” contingency table indicates 
frequencies of the appearances of “n” different keywords of “m” different students in the 
class.  
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In other words, the co-occurrence data represent a matrix X which has m rows and n 
columns, or “m×n-dimensional vector F”. 
( ) ( )   0,  ,  ij ijm n f f i I j J× = ≥ ∈ ∈F  
 
{ } { }1,2,..., ,   1,2,...,I m J n= =  
By using Chi-square statistics, the dimension of deviations from the expected values can be 
identified. 
Profiles: 
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The data matrix (Matrix X (m, n)) shows below based on above matrix or two-way table. 
( ) ( )  ,                      ij ijij ij j jm n i j j
p q
x i I j J x p p
p p p+ +× + + +
= ∈ ∈ = − = −X  
Matrix X (m, n) is the same for the equation below. 
( ) ( ) ( )  ,                          0,  0;  0,  0ij ijij ij i j i j
m n i j i j
p f
y i I j J y p p f f
p p f f + + + +× + + + +
= ∈ ∈ = = ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠Q  
Then, Matrix Q (m, n) replaced like below. 
1/2 1/2
I IJ J
m n×
=Q P P P  
Consequently, Matrix V (m, n) attributes to extracting an eigenvalue.  
1/2 1 1/2
J JI I IJ Jm n
− −
×
′=V Q Q = P P P P P  Q transposed matrix Q
P transposed matrix P
t
JI IJ
⎛ ⎞=⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟=⎝ ⎠
 
Row and column coordinates can be plotted on the single screen by using component scores 
such as (Zik, Zik’) and (Z*ik, Z*ik’). 
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The graphic presentation based on above calculation clearly shows the relationships 
between the keywords and students, with distance on the map being a representation of 
correspondence. 
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Such plotting does not indicate the relationship between row points and column points but 
only the distances between row and column points. 
The result of analysis shows Table 4 that indicates the numerical information of the clusters 
and Table 5 that indicates the numerical information of the keywords. It also illustrates on 
the graphs shown in Figure3 and Figure 4. As shown in Table 4 and Table 5, fifty students 
were divided into five groups; the nine keywords were divided into five clusters in other 
words. Namely, The largest cluster of “I” (Cluster I) contains two keywords such as “the 
nuclear power generation” (theme of the lecture) and “MOX Fuel utilization in LWRs (Plu-
thermal)” chosen by thirty-eight students. It should be safe to say that Cluster I represented 
the group of students who had chosen instinctive keywords.  Therefore, Cluster I located in 
the vicinity of the centre by Chi-Square Distance (0.20).  
The second cluster of “II” (Cluster II) contained only a keyword such as “insecurity or 
understanding among the citizen” that was chosen by a student. This cluster located far 
from the centre by Chi-Square Distance (3.68).  
The third cluster of “III” (Cluster III) contained two keywords such as “nuclear energy 
revolution” and “Freiburg” that were chosen by three students.  This cluster located more 
distant from the centre by Chi-Square Distance (5.57).  
The fourth cluster of “IV” (Cluster IV) that contained three keywords such as “renewable 
energy”, “radioactive waste” and “public opinion poll” that were chosen by five students. 
This cluster located far from the centre by Chi-Square Distance (7.92).  
The fifth cluster of “V” (Cluster V) that contained only a keyword such as “nuclear fuel 
cycle” that was chosen by three students. This cluster located in the longest distance from 
the centre by Chi-Square Distance (10.07). 
The relation between the Chi-Square Distance of each cluster and the number of student that 
belonged to the cluster shows in Figure 5. 
Then, author interpreted the meaning of cluster deployment on the screen as follows. 
The keyword of the title of the lecture (“nuclear power generation”) was chosen 
heuristically by most of the students. Therefore, the students who belong to the Cluster I did 
not have considered the theme so seriously. The author concluded Cluster I as an instinctive 
group.  The keywords of “insecurity/understanding among citizen” (Cluster II) and 
“nuclear energy revolution” (Cluster III) could be holding the connotation of unstable 
condition. Students who belonged to these clusters must have expressed their emotion 
towards the subject of discussion.  Thus, Cluster II and Cluster III that contained the 
emotional keywords were categorized into non rational groups. On the other hand, Cluster 
IV that contained the keywords of “renewable energy”, “radioactive waste”, “public opinion 
poll”, and Cluster V that contained “nuclear fuel cycle” hold no subjective message. 
Students who belonged to these clusters must have grasped the topic of discussion and have 
expressed their result of consideration. Thus, the author concluded these Cluster IV and 
Cluster V as rational groups.  
The curve of Number of Subjects – Chi square Distance relationship shown in Figure 5 had 
the consistency with the assumption of the mental model shown in Figure 2.     
As the author considered the assumed mental model fit well, the author could classify the 
students into two groups along with the cluster deployment to investigate the attractive 
discussion points. The students who belonged to “Cluster I”, “Cluster II”, and “Cluster III” 
named the Passive group. The students who belonged to “Cluster IV” and “Cluster V” named 
the Active group. The concept of this classification shows in Figure 6.  
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The author investigated the difference in an attitude between Active group and Passive group 
by using questionnaire survey, which referred nuclear power generation and radioactive 
waste management, as described in the next section. 
 
Number of
subjects
Chi-squqre
distance
x-axis y-axis
Variation
within a
cluster
Portion of
cluster
size
Cluster I 38 0.20 -0.11 0.44 0.011 0.22
Cluster II 1 3.68 1.47 -1.24 0.000 0.11
Cluster III 3 5.57 -2.31 -0.46 0.015 0.22
Cluster IV 5 7.92 0.02 -2.81 0.017 0.33
Cluster V 3 10.07 3.17 0.04 0.000 0.11
total 50 - - - 0.032 1.00  
Table 4. Numerical information of the clusters of the keywords at the lecture on "nuclear 
power generation", based on the cluster analysis 
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Fig. 3. Cluster deployment based on the cluster analysis of the keywords submitted at the 
lecture on “nuclear power generation”. The area of the circle shows the number of students 
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Keyword
Portion of
keyword
size
Number
of
subjects
Chi-
square
distance
x-axis y-axis
Nuclear Power generation 0.54 27 0.9 -0.08 0.51
MOX Fuel utilization in
LWRs (Plu-thermal)
0.22 11 3.6 -0.18 0.27
Insecurity or understanding
i i
0.02 1 49.0 1.47 -1.24
Nuclear energy revolution 0.02 1 49.0 -1.74 -0.04
Friburg (name of city) 0.04 2 24.0 -2.60 -0.67
Renewable energy 0.02 1 49.0 -0.13 -2.39
Public opinion poll 0.02 1 49.0 0.68 -3.12
Radioactive waste 0.06 3 15.7 -0.15 -2.85
Nuclear fuel cycle 0.06 3 15.7 3.17 0.04
total: 9 1.00 50 - - -
  Cluster IV
  Cluster V
  Cluster
  Cluster I
  Cluster II
  Cluster III
 
Table 5. Numerical information based on the cluster analysis of the keywords submitted at 
the lecture on "nuclear power generation” 
 
Nuclear power 
generation
MOX Fuel 
utilization
Insequrity or 
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Fig. 4. Keywords deployment based on the cluster analysis of the keywords submitted at the 
lecture of “nuclear power generation” 
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Fig. 5. Cluster deployment on the screen of number of Subjects vs. Chi Square Distance 
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Fig. 6. The concept of the student classification 
2.3 Questionnaire survey on nuclear power generation and HLW 
At the last lecture, the students answered the questionnaire survey pertaining to the nuclear 
power generation and HLW (high level radioactive waste) disposal site selection in order to 
characterize the passive and the active group.  
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The questionnaire composed of these questions from A to G as below. The students selected 
the number from 7 (yes, I guess so very much) to 1 (no, I do not guess so at all) at every 
question. 
 
Questionnaire A:  necessity of nuclear power generation;  
  “Do you think nuclear power generation is necessary?” 
Questionnaire B:  approval for facility installation of nuclear power generation;  
  “Do you think it is no problem for the installation of nuclear power generation 
  plant?  
Questionnaire C:  accepttance of adjoining nuclear power generation facility;  
  “Would you say “yes” if the local authority proposed you the construction of a 
  nuclear power generation plant adjacent tot your place of residence?” 
Questionnaire D:  cognition of high level radioactive waste;  
  “Do you recognize HLW generated in the nuclear power plant?” 
Questionnaire E:  necessity of HLW disposal facility;  
  “Do you think the HLW disposal facility is necessary?” 
Questionnaire F:  approval for facility installation of HLW;  
  “Do you think it is no problem for the HLW disposal facility?” 
Questionnaire G:  acceptance of adjoining HLW disposal facility;  
  “Would you say “yes” if the local authority proposed you the construction of a 
  geological disposal site adjacent to your place of residence?” 
 
The author implemented ANOVA to find the significant difference between above two 
groups by using numerical answer of the questionnaires. 
The result showed in Table 6, which revealed that there were no significant difference 
between the two groups in the consciousness toward nuclear power generation and 
necessity of HLW disposal facility and approval for the facility installation. However, there 
was a significant difference in the reluctant consciousness against adjoining facility 
installation. 
This result suggested that the Active group in the theme of nuclear power generation had the 
positive stance toward the waste management of nuclear power generation. They felt the 
responsibility for the back-end procedure, in other words.  
The students who belonged to the Active group believed that they had to face both side of 
science and technology, such as a benefit and disadvantage of nuclear power generation. 
They thought that nuclear power generation had the merit for energy security and 
environmental preservation. Conversely, they thought that it had the demerit of the 
requirement for long-life management of the high level radioactive waste. 
On the other hand, the students who belonged to the Passive group did not have such a 
subjective attitude.  
It would be the first to make an effort to share the feelings between a speaker and a listener 
(students of the passive group) by beginning the topics about their interest. If a speaker 
succeeded in getting the listeners’ trust, a speaker would be easy to discuss the point of that 
theme. However, as the students of Passive group chose the keywords heuristically, it was 
difficult to get their interests. Therefore, the author paid attention to the keywords of other 
themes chosen by the Active group toward the HLW site selection. 
 
Nuclear Power - System Simulations and Operation 
 
186 
Necessity
of
Nuclear power
generation
Approval
for
facility
installation
Accept
of
adjoining facility
5.5 (1.20) 3.9 (1.25) 2.8 (1.67)
5.8 (0.87) 4.3 (0.99) 3.3 (1.31)
n.s. n.s. n.s.
* ： significant, p＜0.05
The numerical value in each group indicate the average of ordinal scale of approval, such as " I
guess so very much (7 point)", "neutral (4 point)", "I don't guess so at all (1point)" respectivly. The
numerical value in a parenthesis shows standard deviation.
Nuclear power generation
Active group
significance
Items of
questionaire
survey/group
Passive group
 
Items of
questionaire
survey/group
Cognition
of
HLW
Necessity
of
disposal facility
Approval
for
facility
installation
Accept
of
adjoining
facility
Passive group 3.9 (0.64) 4.3 (0.71) 3.4 (0.92) 1.9 (1.13)
Active group 3.5 (0.88) 4.4 (0.65) 3.9 (0.68) 3.1 (1.25)
significance n.s. n.s. n.s. ＊
* ： significant, p＜0.05
The numerical value in each group indicate the average of ordinal scale of approval, such as " I guess
so very much (7 point)", "neutral (4 point)", "I don't guess so at all (1point)" respectivly. The numerical
value in a parenthesis shows standard deviation.
HLW
 
Table 6. Result of ANOVA on the questionnaire survey pertaining to the nuclear power 
generation and HLW 
The fifth theme of the lecture, household waste management, was a suitable issue to find the 
common element between the nuclear power generation and household waste management. 
The third theme of the lecture, precautionary principle, was also taken to find the common 
element. Because the characteristics to avert the risk at first would bring the chaos into the 
discussion of the site selection of HLW disposal, it would be difficult to achieve the social 
consensus. 
3. Discussion  
3.1 The attitude for the environmental scientific-related theme  
In order to grasp the communication viewpoints, the author investigated the interest of the 
Active group in the field of environmental science such as the household waste management 
and the precautionary principle by using keyword cross table and correlation analysis.  
3.1.1 Correlation with the keywords at the lecture on the household waste 
management and those on nuclear power generation 
As shown in the Table 7 of the cross table which shows the keyword group obtained in the 
lecture of nuclear power generation and the lecture of household waste management, 
 
The Text-Mining Approach Towards Risk Communication in Environmental Science   
 
187 
twenty six of the students (the largest number of the students) submitted the keyword of 
“nuclear power generation“. The eleven students (the second largest number of the 
students) submitted the keyword of “MOX fuel (plutonium-uranium mixed fuel utilization) 
“at the lecture of nuclear power generation.   
At the fifth lecture of household waste management, seventeen of above mentioned 
students who had selected “nuclear power generation“ and “MOX fuel (plutonium-uranium 
mixed fuel utilization) “ submitted the keyword of “recycle“and four of above mentioned 
submitted the keyword of “waste“. These two keywords of “recycle“ and “waste“ were also 
top two of the submitted keywords at the lecture of general waste management.  
This indicated that the students who had chosen the most and the second most keywords of 
both lectures did not consider these topics rationally. Therefore, it can be safe to say that the 
students who selected these top two of the keywords tended to make a decision in a 
heuristic way. They can be subordinate to the theme of the lecture in other words.    
On the other hand, eight students identified as the member of Active group by the analysis of 
questionnaire survey chose the keywords such as "fuel cycle", "radioactive waste", "public 
poll", and "renewable energy" at the lecture of nuclear power generation. They chose seven 
keywords such as "3R (Reduce, Reuse, Reduction)”, "globalization"," costs of waste 
management", "disposal" and other keywords. Two students, who belonged to the Active 
group, did not express the positive attitude toward the problem solution in the field of the 
household waste management, since they chose the keyword of “recycle” in the heuristic 
way.  
Therefore, the author investigated the keywords of the students who belonged to the Active 
group of Cluster IV and Cluster V by considering the connotation of the six keywords of the 
lecture on the household waste management. 
The students who had an interest in “nuclear fuel cycle” had paid attention to “3R (Reduce, 
Recycle, Reuse),” and “expense of waste management” in the area of household waste 
management. The students who had an interest in “radioactive waste” had paid attention to 
“globalization” and “waste disposal”. 
“Nuclear fuel cycle” and “3R” implied the common image of the recycling process, and 
“Disposal cost (expense of waste management)” implied the economic viewpoint.  
Therefore, this suggested that the students had a deep interest in the economic issue when 
they considered the flow of household waste, or radioactive waste.    
The concept of the global relationships between the waste discharging country and the 
waste reprocessing country could be extracted from three keywords (“radioactive waste”, 
“globalization” and “discharge of the waste”). This suggested that the students had a deep 
interest in the international relationships when they considered the process of the waste 
management.        
The other students who had an interest in “renewable energy” paid attention to “Calculative 
society (the society which put emphasis on recycling)”, and those who had an interest in 
"public opinion poll" paid attention to "rubbish discharge quantity."  
From the keyword of “renewable energy” and “calculative society (the society which put 
emphasis on recycling)”, the concept of the sustainable society could be extracted. The 
concept that the public had an interest in the process of decision making could be extracted 
from the keyword of "public opinion poll" and "quantity of disposal waste", considering the 
current social trend that public require the residential opinion poll for unpleasant facilities 
site selection.  
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This suggested that special emphasis would be placed on the economical viewpoint, global 
relationships, sustainability, and the way of expression of individual opinion, when the 
students consider the problem solving toward HLW site selection. The correspondence of 
keywords between the area of “household waste management” and “nuclear power 
management” shows Figure 7.  
 
Nuclear
Power
generation
MOX Fuel
utilization
in LWRs
Insecurity or
understanding
among citizen
Nuclear
energy
revolution
Friburg Renewableenergy
Public
opinion
poll
Radioactive
waste
Nuclear
fuel cycle
Cluster I I II III III IV IV IV V
total 49*1 26*1 11 1 1 2 1 1 3 3
Recycle 21 12 5 1 1 1*2 1*2
Waste 4 3 1
Plastics 4 2 2
Circulative society 4 3 1
Disposal cost 3 1 1 1
3R(Reduce,Reuse,Recycle) 2 1 1
Globalization 2 1 1
Discharge of the waste 2 1 1
Responsibility for disposal 2 1 1
Illegal disposal 2 1 1
Quantity of disposal waste 1 1
Incentive 1 1
Thermal supply system 1 1  
*1 A student, who was present at the lecture on nuclear power generation, was absent at the lecture of 
household waste management. 
*2 omitted from the objects of analysis 
Table 7. Cross table of the keywords at the lecture on “nuclear power generation” and 
“household waste management” 
 
Household waste management Nuclear power generation
Renewable energy
Nuclear fuel cycle
Radioactive waste
Quantity of disposal waste Public opinion poll
3R(Reduce,Reuse,Recycle)
Globalization
Discharge of the waste
Disposal cost
Circulative society
 
Fig. 7. Correspondence of the keyword (household waste management vs. nuclear power 
generation) 
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3.1.2 Correlation with the keywords at the lecture on the precautionary principle and 
those on nuclear power generation  
As shown in the Table 8 of the cross table which shows the keyword group obtained at the 
lecture of nuclear power generation and the lecture of the precautionary principle, eight 
students out of twenty seven students who had chosen “nuclear power generation” chose 
the keyword of “risk” at the lecture of the precautionary principle. Two students out of 
eleven students who had chosen “MOX fuel (plutonium-uranium mixed fuel utilization)” 
also chose the keyword of “risk”. Six students out of twenty seven students who had chosen 
the “nuclear power generation” chose the keyword of “risk information” at the lecture of the 
precautionary principle. One of eleven students who had chosen “MOX fuel (plutonium-
uranium mixed fuel utilization)” also chose the keyword of “risk information”.  
According to the above mentioned mental model, the students who chose these keywords of 
“risk” and “risk information”, which were the top two of the selected keywords at the 
lecture of the precautionary principle, had the characteristics of decision making in the 
heuristic way. “The precautionary principle”, which ranked the fourth place of the number 
of chosen keywords, was the title of the lecture”. Consequently, the author decided to 
exclude the students who chose this keyword from the objects of analysis.       
Therefore, the students, who chose the most and the second most keywords of lectures, and 
the student, who chose “the precautionary principle”, tended to make a decision in a 
heuristic way. They could be subordinate to the theme of the lecture in other words. 
On the other hand, eight students identified as members of Active group, who belonged to 
the Cluster IV and V by the analysis of questionnaire survey, had chosen the keywords of 
"fuel cycle", "radioactive waste", "public poll", and "renewable energy" at the lecture of 
nuclear power generation. 
The Active group chose six keywords of "zero risk”, "dioxin", "risk", "risk information" 
“dioxin concentration (in foods)” and “the precautionary principle” without their biasing on 
a particular keyword. Five out of eight students, who had been categorized as the Active 
member toward the HLW site selection, did not express the positive attitude pertaining to 
the problem solution in the field of the precautionary principle. They had just chosen the 
keyword of “risk”, “risk information” and “the precautionary principle”, which were 
chosen in a heuristic way by the large number of students. 
On the other hand, three students who had chosen “public poll” and “radioactive waste” 
chose the keywords of “zero risk”, “dioxin”, and “dioxin concentration (in foods)” which 
were minor selections at all. They did not make a decision in a heuristic way but made 
rational consideration on the theme of nuclear power generation and the precautionary 
principle respectively.  
When extracting the common underlying meaning from these non heuristic keywords such 
as “radioactive waste”, “public poll”, anti-centred policy style could be seen in the concept 
of demerit of the burden of nuclear power generation and the concept of individual opinion 
expression. When extracting the common underlying meaning from these non heuristic 
keywords such as “zero risk”, “dioxin” and “dioxin concentration in foods”, analytical or 
scientific attitude could be seen in the concept of quantitative thinking based on the 
numerical keyword such as the word of “zero” and “concentration”. 
This suggested that the students would have the antipathy toward logical thinking with an 
upper class viewpoint, the scientific and analytical viewpoint, when they considered the 
problem solving toward the HLW disposal site selection. The correspondence of keywords 
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between the area of “the precautionary principle” and “nuclear power management” shows 
Figure 8. 
 
Nuclear
Power
generation
MOX Fuel
utilization
in LWRs
Insecurity or
understandin
g
among citizen
Nuclear
energy
revolution
Friburg Renewableenergy
Public
opinion poll
Radioactiv
e
waste
Nuclear fuel
cycle
Cluster I I II III III IV IV IV V
total 50 27 11 1 1 2 1 1 3 3
Risk 14 8 2 1 1 1*1 1*1
Risk information 9 6 1 2*1
Dioxin news report 6 3 3
Precautionary principle 5 1 3 1*1
Risk management 4 3 1 1
Risk cognition 3 2 1
Risk communication 2 1
Environmental hormon 2 1 1
Dioxin concentration 2 1 1
Problem of Risk 1 1
Zero Risk 1 1
Dioxin 1 1
Risk analysis 0  
*1 omitted from the objects of analysis 
Table 8. Cross table of the keywords at the lecture on the precautionary principle and 
household waste management 
 
the Precautionary principle Nuclear power generation
Public opinion poll
Radioactive waste
Dioxin concentration
Zero risk
Dioxin
 
Fig. 8. Correspondence of the keyword (the Precautionary principle vs. nuclear power 
generation) 
4. Conclusion  
To find the communication point to promote the positive attitude toward the HLW disposal 
site, the author proposed the new approach of analyzing the consciousness of the students 
who stud rationally on the active position for constructive problem solution.  
The previous analysis on the public risk communication had targeted on the majority of the 
subjects based on the assumption that the majority would represent the public so far. 
However, this new approach targeted on the minority of the subjects based on the 
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assumption that a rational answer would not be made by the majority that was easy to make 
a heuristic decision but by the minority.  
In this research, the author gave the lectures on the risk and desirable autonomous attitude 
in the some areas of environmental science. The students submitted the most impressive 
keyword after each lecture. The keywords were categorized by correspondence analysis and 
cluster analysis into two groups based on the assumed mental model. The two groups were 
characterized by the analysis of ANOVA on the result of questionnaire survey on nuclear 
power generation and high level radioactive waste disposal. One group consisted of the 
students who made a decision positively considering they were responsible for high level 
radioactive site selection. The other group consisted of the students who made a decision 
negatively considering they would not like to be involved in this issue.  
The author paid attention to the former group and succeeded in deriving the common 
consciousness from the keywords of lectures on nuclear power generation, household waste 
management, and the precautionary principle. 
It was observed from the keywords of nuclear power generation and household waste 
management, that economic efficiency, global relationship, sustainability and respect of 
individual opinion were common value among the active group, whose consciousness were 
positive towards HLW disposal site selection. 
It was observed from the keywords of nuclear power generation and the precautionary 
principle, that antipathy for the seeing from up to down were common. Scientific or 
analytical viewpoints were also common among the active group.  
In order to alleviate the reluctance for uncertainty of those who show resistance of being in 
the contiguity of HLW disposal facility, it should be significant for utilizing those common 
values interpreted along with this research for risk communication between citizen and 
governmental authorities.  However, since this research has been mainly focusing on the 
area of risk communication between nuclear power generation and household waste 
management, and between nuclear power generation and the precautionary principle, there 
should be further researches conducted in the remaining areas such as global warming and 
other themes. 
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